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Abstract 
 
Background: There has been a rise in dementia awareness, with policy 
changes leading to increased diagnosis rates. However, the stigma of dementia 
is likely to cause challenges in diagnostic communication. This is complicated 
by the effect of dementia on cognitive functioning. The aims of this study were 
to (1) identify how diagnoses of dementia are communicated, (2) identify how 
people with dementia respond to the diagnosis, and (3) explore doctors’ 
perspectives on dementia diagnosis delivery. 
 
Methodology: A systematic literature review was conducted. Twenty doctors 
from 9 memory clinics across 4 NHS trusts participated. Eighty-one dementia 
diagnosis feedback meetings were video-recorded. Conversation analysis was 
used to identify patterns in diagnosis delivery. Four focus groups with the 
participating doctors were analysed using thematic analysis (inter-rater reliability 
0.89). 
 
Findings: The literature review highlighted the dilemma of communicating both 
sensitively and honestly with people with dementia, as well as challenges 
stemming from cognitive impairment. This was also evident in diagnostic 
communication. Prior to diagnosis doctors elicited patient orientation to the 
meeting purpose (“do you know why you’re here?) and perspective into 
symptoms (“how is your memory?”). The majority of patients displayed some 
confusion as to the meeting purpose and offered non-medicalised explanations 
for their symptoms. Doctors attempted to address this through repeated 
explication of test results and statements of the clinic purpose. Dementia was 
always explicitly named. Diagnoses were often delivered indirectly (“that is 
dementia”), a practice to manage patient resistance and negative responses. 
However, over 40% were delivered directly (“you have dementia”), especially 
when patients were more cognitively impaired. Doctors pursued non-minimal 
responses to diagnosis, apparently to obtain perspective before progressing to 
treatment. However, resistance was not always addressed and prognosis was 
often avoided. Doctors highlighted pressure to make diagnoses and an aim to 
emphasise “living well” rather than discussing prognosis. 
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Conclusion: The findings of this study highlighted the delicate balance between 
minimising likely resistance and distress and maximising understanding in the 
context of cognitive impairment. Instilling hope is evidently a priority for doctors. 
The diagnosis meeting is just one part of the journey of the person with 
dementia, and sufficient pre- and post-diagnosis support is integral. 
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A note on Terminology 
People with dementia will be referred to as ‘patients’ throughout the thesis. It is 
important for people with dementia not to be classified by their condition. 
However, the data presented is in the form of doctor-patient interaction, and the 
person with dementia inhabits the role of the patient within this context. The 
term ‘companion’ will be used for the family member, friend, or other person 
accompanying the patient to the memory clinic.
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Introduction
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Background 
 
Dementia encapsulates a set of symptoms indicating a decline in cognitive 
functioning, which can be caused by numerous progressive conditions. 
Common symptoms include impairments in memory, attention, concentration, 
language, and spatial and temporal perception, but the symptom profile can 
vary widely between different types of dementia and different individuals. There 
are an estimated 35.6 million people living with dementia worldwide, with 7.7 
million people developing the condition every year. One in 6 adults over the age 
of 80 in the UK have dementia (Alzheimer's Society, 2013). 
 
Dementia awareness has increased dramatically over the past two decades. In 
the 20th and early 21st Century the common view was that disclosing a dementia 
diagnosis was futile given that the condition causes people to forget information 
and that there is no effective treatment or cure (Pinner, 2000). However, a 
diagnosis of dementia is being recognised as increasingly important in order to 
develop interventions and treatment. Across the world there have been 
changes in healthcare policy regarding dementia, with a focus on identifying 
dementia in the earlier stages (World Health Organisation, 2012, Alzheimer 
Europe, 2016, Department of Health, 2009).  The UK government, in line with 
the Alzheimer’s Society Right to Know campaign, are pushing for higher rates 
of diagnosis at earlier stages of the illness (Department of Health, 2009, 
Alzheimer's Society, 2013). There is an emphasis on ‘timely’ diagnoses – a 
person-centred approach where people receive a diagnosis at the time that is 
best for them (Dhedhi et al., 2014). The result of this increase in awareness is 
that UK dementia assessment attendance has increased by 40% in 4 years, 
and diagnosis rates have risen by 17% between 2010 and 2015 (Parkin and 
Baker, 2015).  
 
However, there are currently no disease-modifying treatments and limited 
psychosocial support for people with dementia. This rapid rise in dementia 
diagnosis and awareness has thus led to some concern that a focus on 
diagnosis without similar improvements in treatment and support will lead to 
increased pressure on services and may lead to distress to people with 
dementia and their families (Robinson et al., 2015). There is a suggestion that 
 17 
while diagnosis is useful for signposting to services, receiving an official 
diagnosis may not be as important for people with dementia, and may lead to 
lower mood (Clare et al., 2016). 
 
Although there has been an increase in dementia diagnosis, it is currently an 
under-researched area. Patterns in how patients seek help for the early 
symptoms of dementia have been explored. People first notice a variety of 
different symptoms, which is described in a study by Leung et al as behaviours 
that are “inconsistent with how they ‘used to be’” (Leung et al., 2011, p376). 
People may attribute their cognitive difficulties to old age and families can be 
the instigator in approaching medical professionals (Perry Young et al., 2016). 
Similarly, people’s experiences of diagnosis and treatment have been reported, 
with patients and their families often feeling a lack of support after they have 
received a diagnosis (Samsi et al., 2014). However, there are very few studies 
of how clinicians tell people they have dementia, or of how patients and their 
families respond within the diagnosis feedback meeting (Peel, 2015, Dooley et 
al., 2015).  
 
Delivering diagnoses of life-changing conditions such as dementia has been 
identified as one of the primary causes of stress and anxiety in medical 
professionals (Fallowfield and Jenkins, 2004). Although there has been an 
increase in training interventions for the delivery of physical health diagnoses, 
particularly in oncology (e.g. Kaplan, 2010), there are far fewer studies aimed at 
improving communication of mental health diagnoses, and healthcare 
professionals receive very little guidance as to how this should be done (Milton 
and Mullan, 2014). Diagnoses of dementia will cause additional difficulties, as 
many communication techniques that are recommended in breaking bad news 
training, such as preparing the patient and delivering the news in small amounts 
of information, will be more difficult with patients with impaired short term 
memory, attention, and concentration (Tuffrey-Wijne, 2013). 
 
The topic of this thesis is how a diagnosis of dementia is communicated in 
specialist settings in the UK. This will include how clinicians approach the 
diagnosis, name and explain dementia as a condition, and how people with 
dementia respond to the diagnosis. This chapter will set the context of the 
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research, beginning with a short description of dementia and the memory clinic 
set-up, where the majority of people are assessed for possible dementia in the 
UK. The second section will be an overview of observational studies exploring 
diagnosis deliveries in other medical settings, which will illustrate how 
diagnostic interactions typically unfold. 
 
Dementia and Memory Clinics 
What is Dementia? 
Dementia is an umbrella term for a number of irreversible degenerative 
conditions. The type of dementia is determined by the cause, and this will affect 
the trajectory and to some extent the symptoms experienced by a person with 
dementia. Dementia can cause a decline in memory, the ability to learn new 
information, reasoning and visuospatial skills, concentration, orientation, and 
communication (World Health Organisation, 1992). The reduction in cognitive 
processing that comes with dementia causes difficulties in conducting everyday 
tasks and interacting with others, leading to a reduction in a person’s ability to 
live independently and changes in personality (Barbas and Wilde, 2001, 
Jacomb and Jorm, 1996). 
 
The type of dementia is determined by the cause, and this will affect the 
trajectory and to some extent the symptoms experienced by a person with 
dementia (Knapp and Prince, 2007). Alzheimer’s disease is the most common 
cause of dementia, and is caused by the build up of proteins in the brain 
forming plaques that lead to the loss of brain tissue. Vascular dementia is the 
second most common form and is caused by a lack of blood supply in the brain, 
most commonly a product of small strokes. Alzheimer’s disease is characterised 
by a smooth, gradual decline in cognitive abilities, while with vascular dementia 
the symptoms are more likely to stay constant for a time and then suddenly 
deteriorate in a step-wise fashion. Alzheimer’s disease generally starts with 
memory difficulties, accompanied by problems with language and orientation. 
Vascular dementia may not start with the memory difficulties and its symptoms 
involve problems with processing speed and concentration, as well as changes 
in behaviour and other symptoms of stroke. People often have pathologies of 
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both Alzheimer’s disease and Vascular dementia, and diagnoses of mixed 
dementia are common (Zekry et al., 2002). 
 
There are numerous other, more rare, types of dementia. Frontotemporal 
dementia is a dementia subtype characterised by symptoms of frontal lobe 
damage. It is usually sub-divided into behavioural variant frontotemporal 
dementia, involving changes in personality and behaviour, and semantic 
dementia, which involves the gradual loss of conceptual knowledge. Other 
dementia types include dementia with Lewy bodies, where memory problems 
and disorientation are commonly accompanied by hallucinations, and 
Korsakoff’s syndrome, which is usually associated with heavy alcohol use. 
Progressive neurological conditions such as Parkinson’s disease and 
Huntington’s disease are also strongly associated with dementia. For example, 
studies show that up to 36% of people newly diagnosed with Parkinson’s 
disease will have cognitive decline and 75% of people who have Parkinson’s for 
over 10 years developing dementia (Meireles and Massano, 2012).  
 
The symptom profile and prognosis of dementia are affected by age of onset. 
For example, frontotemporal dementia is much more likely in people with 
dementia under the age of 65, while dementia with Lewy Bodies is more 
common in older people with dementia (Sampson, 2004). People with young-
onset dementia are more likely to be assessed and diagnosed in neurology 
settings rather than memory clinics (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 
2006). Additionally, for people over 65 with dementia diagnoses, those who 
received the diagnosis at a younger age tend to live longer (Xie et al., 2008).  
 
Other diagnoses made in memory clinics include Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(MCI), which is characterised by a decline in cognitive function beyond that of 
typical ageing, but not affecting the person’s life to the extent of fulfilling the 
criteria of dementia (Petersen, 2011). Additionally, people can be diagnosed 
with Subjective Cognitive Decline (SCD), defined by personal reports of 
memory impairments with no sign of difficulties on cognitive tests (Blackburn et 
al., 2014). Symptoms of psychological conditions such as anxiety or depression 
can also manifest themselves in cognitive difficulties and can be confused with 
dementia. Additionally, mild forgetfulness can be a normal part of ageing. 
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Therefore, when doctors are making dementia diagnoses, they will need to 
decide whether the patient’s memory problems are causing difficulties over and 
above one of these conditions. This decision is a clinical one, in that there is no 
one test for dementia, and thus it can be difficult to make in the early stages of 
the condition. Often, what will differentiate dementia from other problems of 
cognitive functioning is evidence of deterioration over time. 
 
If a person is concerned about their memory in the UK they are often referred to 
a memory clinic, in order to be assessed and potentially receive a diagnosis 
dementia.  
 
The development of Memory Clinics in the UK 
Memory clinics consist of multidisciplinary teams who assess and diagnose 
dementia, and provide medication and psychosocial support (Hodge and Haley, 
2013). Memory clinics were first established in the UK in the 1980s and much of 
their early focus was on research, largely around medication (Moniz-Cook and 
Woods, 1997). It was not until 1997, with the introduction of cholinesterase 
inhibitors as a specific treatment for dementia, that services began to be 
developed nationwide (Lindesay et al., 2002). Dementia care remained 
sporadic and varied greatly according to region, and it was only in 2001 that the 
Department of Health specified that older adult mental health services “should 
include memory clinics” as a centre for dementia assessment and support 
(Department of Health, 2001). The development of memory clinics has 
increased rapidly since then, with standardisation of high quality care bring a 
primary focus, for example with the development of the Memory Services 
National Accreditation Programme in 2009 (Hodge et al., 2014). 
 
The increased number of memory clinics coincided with an increased 
awareness of the prevalence and cost of dementia in society, leading to the 
‘National Dementia Strategy’ in 2009 (Department of Health, 2009), the 
‘Dementia Challenge’ in 2012 (Department of Health, 2012), and more recently 
the ‘Challenge on Dementia 2020’ (Department of Health, 2015) – all 
government led initiatives to improve the quality of services for and research 
into dementia. Early diagnosis was identified as a key target for these 
strategies, with the aim being that earlier treatment and increased 
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understanding will lead to more patient centred care, with higher patient 
involvement in future planning in the earlier stages in the illness meaning less 
responsibility on family members as the illness progresses (Holt, 2011). 
Memory clinics are regarded as having an important role in fulfilling this aim, 
both as the point of referral for other services and in providing education and 
counselling for patients and their companions (Passmore and Craig, 2004).  
 
The Memory Clinic Process 
Memory clinic attendance has increased four-fold since 2010. A 2014 audit of 
82% of the memory clinics in England found that a memory clinic assesses an 
average of 18 patients a week, ranging widely from 2 to 102 (Hodge and Hailey, 
2015). The average time from when people with dementia and their families 
notice something is amiss to a formal diagnosis is just under three years (Chrisp 
et al., 2011). Once people have been referred to a memory clinic the process 
from assessment to diagnosis takes on average 8.5 weeks, but can be up to 40 
weeks (Hodge and Hailey, 2015). Memory clinics are usually placed in 
secondary care. People with suspected memory problems are referred from 
their GP after physical testing, which include blood tests and also urine tests 
and heart examinations if needed. Within memory clinics, patients will undergo 
a CT scan of the brain, a detailed discussion of their symptom history, and 
cognitive assessment. The cognitive assessments that are used vary, with the 
most common being the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Evaluation (ACE-III) (Mioshi 
et al., 2006) and the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 
1983). These tests generally take between 30 minutes and an hour. Further 
physical and neuropsychological testing will happen as required, primarily in 
mild or questionable cases (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2006). 
There is no one test for dementia: neither the brain scan nor the cognitive test 
results can give a definitive dementia diagnosis, but clinicians in memory clinics 
use a combination of all the information gathered to come to a clinical 
judgement. 
 
Memory clinics vary in how they operate, but are most frequently run by 
psychiatrists, neurologists or geriatricians, alongside psychologists, nurses, and 
occupational therapists (Passmore and Craig, 2004). Once diagnosis has been 
established, treatments that memory clinics can offer are threefold: (1) 
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medication, with cholinesterase inhibitors, antipsychotics, and antidepressants 
being most commonly prescribed; (2) psychological treatments, such as 
cognitive stimulation, validation therapy, and life story work; and (3) education 
for people with dementia and their families, such as carer support groups. The 
cholinesterase inhibitors (along with memantine, which works to control excess 
glutamate levels and is more commonly described in later dementia) are the 
only available medication for dementia-specific symptoms. However, these are 
only available for some types of dementia, primarily Alzheimer’s disease. 
Additionally, while these medications can provide some symptom improvement, 
they do not work for all people and do not stop the eventual progression of 
dementia (Trinh et al., 2003). Memory clinics will also refer patients and their 
families to social services or other charitable networks for additional support if 
necessary. Additionally, there is a wide variation in the extent to which 
psychosocial and education-based treatments are provided throughout the UK.  
 
Communication of dementia diagnoses in Memory Clinics  
Few studies have directly observed communication in memory clinics, and 
those that have will be discussed in detail in the systematic literature review in 
Chapter 2. However, research exploring how clinicians and people with 
dementia and their families experience delivering and receiving dementia 
diagnoses show complexities and challenges beyond that of other conditions. 
 
While in most medical conditions the patient can be taken as an expert on their 
symptoms, with dementia one’s ability to both remember and recognise a 
change in one’s own behaviour may be affected. Patients may not remember 
instances where they have forgotten things, or may have forgotten why and/or 
how they are at the clinic at all. This is exacerbated by the fact that many 
people attend memory clinics because of concerns raised by their families or 
friends rather than symptoms they have noticed themselves (Quinn et al., 2016, 
Karnieli-Miller, 2012). Therefore, the patient’s lack of involvement in the help-
seeking process means they can be disorientated about the purpose of the 
diagnostic meeting. 
 
In addition to memory difficulties, many people with dementia may demonstrate 
different levels of awareness of their symptoms when talking to families, friends, 
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and healthcare professionals. Clare and colleagues (2008, p2367) define 
awareness as “‘a reasonable or realistic perception or appraisal of a given 
aspect of one’s situation, functioning or performance, or of the resulting 
implications”. Awareness is a complex construct, with the literature containing 
heterogeneous terminology, measures, and contexts (Marková et al., 2005). In 
memory clinic diagnostic interactions, awareness should generally be 
considered in the context of patients’ “evaluative judgements” of behavioural 
changes (Clare et al., 2011), rather than manifestations of neurological 
symptoms. Patients in memory clinic assessments and diagnosis are asked to 
compare current abilities to past abilities (e.g. with remembering names, or 
driving), or assess internal mental states (e.g. mood or personality changes). 
These judgements may be affected by people’s ability to monitor their 
performance on day-to-day tasks, which may be caused by neurological 
changes (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989). However, the delicate and dispreferred 
nature of making negative public judgement of one’s own abilities means this is 
more likely to be affected by social and psychological factors, such as 
embarrassment, frustration, distress, or a self-maintaining coping style (Clare et 
al., 2013, Clare et al., 2012, Howorth and Saper, 2003, Mograbi et al., 2012). 
Dementia is a stigmatised mental illness, and patients may therefore not want 
to discuss symptoms publically, resisting doctor questions and assessments 
(Milne, 2010). Furthermore, awareness will manifest differently according to 
what aspect of the person’s behaviour is being discussed – for example people 
may discuss their memory problems but not problems with other aspects of 
functioning such as the ability to live independently (Marková et al., 2014). As 
Clare et al (2011, p941) state “difficulties with evaluative judgements at this 
level become evident when the beliefs or concepts expressed are clearly 
discrepant with the objectively observed situation”. If people’s reports of their 
symptoms differ to those of their companions, or what has been demonstrated 
on the cognitive testing, this can cause challenges for diagnostic 
communication. 
 
Additionally, as with all people who are referred to secondary care services for 
assessment for potentially serious conditions, people attending memory clinics 
will be experiencing anxiety and concern for their future (Aminzadeh et al., 
2007). Dementia is one of the biggest fears of older adults (Bond and Corner, 
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2001), and is associated with disability and loss of independence (Milne, 2010). 
Many people will know or have known loved ones with dementia, and thus 
attendance at the memory clinic may cause anxiety about their own future 
(Kinzer and Suhr, 2016). Therefore, it is not surprising that fear of causing 
trauma to the patient is one of the main concerns for clinicians in memory clinics 
(Johnson et al., 2000), which has been reported to cause qualified and unclear 
communication of diagnostic information (Karnieli-Miller, 2007).  
 
Another complication is that, although in current practice disclosure is 
encouraged and does occur (McKinlay et al., 2014), the difficulty in 
disentangling early signs of dementia with normal ageing or other causes can 
lead to incorrect diagnoses being delivered. Clinicians have identified the 
uncertainty in coming to a diagnosis decision – with the need to look at the 
culmination of evidence from the history, scan, and cognitive test, rather than 
there being one clear test – as a reason for reluctance about telling people they 
have dementia (Carpenter and Dave, 2004). Uncertainty is likely to be higher 
given the rapid increase in memory clinic attendance in the last 4 years, with 
increasing numbers of people in the early stages of the illness receiving a 
diagnosis (Brunet, 2014). Additionally, the memory clinic model of assessment 
and feedback occurring in secondary care (as described in detail in Chapter 3), 
does not easily allow for repeated assessment over time, which can be helpful 
in reaching a firm diagnosis in the early stages of dementia. 
 
Despite these challenges, the current guidance for clinicians in delivering a 
dementia diagnosis is scarce. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) guidelines for dementia services in the NHS have not been updated 
since 2006 (a new version is due for release in June 2018). They provide little 
detail on the communication of the diagnosis other than “healthcare 
professionals should make time available to discuss the diagnosis and its 
implications with the person with dementia and also with family members” 
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2006, :23). The Memory Services 
National Accreditation Programme (MSNAP) have published standards for 
memory clinics to work towards, but again have little detail on the 
communication of the diagnosis other than “the outcome of the assessment is 
communicated to all relevant parties in a timely manner” 
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:31). The British Psychological Society (Murphy and Gair, 2016) have noted the 
gap in guidance for clinicians, and have published their own advice in a 4 step 
model: preparation and understanding of information, provision of information, 
service provision of treatment and support, and provision of time to 
accommodate to the nature of the diagnostic process. Their guidance is more 
specific, including “adapt to the patient’s use of vocabulary, comprehension, 
and processing speed”, “subject to person’s preference, social and cultural 
issues, name the diagnosis explicitly, do not avoid the words”, “check for 
understanding, encourage and answer questions”, and to “acknowledge 
emotions during the session” (page 14). They also emphasise the importance of 
focussing on “identifying remaining abilities” and “strategies to live well”. 
However, the authors do not offer further guidance in terms of specific 
communication practices to achieve these goals, given the potential challenges 
outlined above. While a timely diagnosis will depend on the individual and thus 
cannot be dictated by an overarching guidance, there is no advice given on how 
to assess timeliness of diagnosis on a patient-by-patient basis. 
 
This thesis involves microanalysis of video recorded communication of a 
diagnosis of dementia in memory clinics. The primary method to examine the 
diagnosis delivery will be conversation analysis (CA).  
 
Conversation Analysis and Diagnosis Delivery 
 
The use of conversation analysis (CA) to examine medical interactions grew 
from pioneering studies in the seventies and eighties examining the 
asymmetrical doctor-patient relationship (Beckman and Frankel, 1984, Byrne 
and Long, 1976). The central ethos in medical sociology was that of medical 
authority – the doctor is the expert in doctor-patient interactions, and therefore 
dominates discussions in both content and outcome. The structure of diagnostic 
medical consultations – problem presentation, examination, diagnosis, and 
treatment – is taught to doctors in medical school. Doctors are thus focused on 
steering discussions through these stages, often within the time pressures of 
busy clinics. The main concern of studies in this period was that doctor 
orientation to this medical agenda, alongside doctor interactional dominance as 
medical experts, curtails patient involvement in treatment discussions.  
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However, CA studies have shown that patients are not as passive in medical 
interactions as first supposed (Drew et al., 2001, Heath, 1992). While doctors 
are medical experts, patients are experts in their own experience, and will have 
a specific agenda when visiting the doctor – be it obtaining certain medication, 
or getting a leave of absence for work (Drew and Heritage, 1992). Therefore, 
although the structure of medical interactions being led by doctors means that 
there are constraints on patient input, when patients are invited to speak by the 
doctor they will design their responses carefully to achieve their goal for the visit 
(Heritage and Maynard, 2005, Stivers, 2002). In other words, patients are 
carefully curating their input in medical consultations, and not just passively 
adhering to the doctor’s authority.  
 
An example of how patient agency manifests in interaction is that, if patients are 
unsure whether doctors can help them with their problem, they will use narrative 
formats to present their symptoms. The use of narratives works both to elicit 
some control of the interaction and demonstrate that patients have tried other 
methods to solve their problems (Heritage and Robinson, 2006). Doctors have 
been shown to be oriented to the patient’s need to demonstrate information in 
the problem presentation stage of the meeting, and will negotiate rather than 
direct the movement to the examination phase – monitoring patient cues that 
their presentation may be complete (Beach, 1995). Negotiation of doctor role as 
medical expert and patient role as experiential expert has also been reported in 
other parts of the medical consultation, for example reporting of the test results 
(Pomerantz and Rintel, 2004) and discussing treatment options (Stivers, 2005).  
 
In the study of diagnosis delivery, there are several key aspects in 
communicating the diagnosis that have interested conversation analysts.  
 
Diagnosis Delivery and Epistemic Authority 
Early studies of diagnosis argued that the doctor has ultimate epistemic 
authority – i.e. claim to knowledge (Heritage, 2012) – with respect to diagnosis. 
Doctors are extensively trained experts in diagnosing symptoms, and therefore 
this epistemic authority is seen as absolute by both patients and doctors. Byrne 
and Long (Byrne and Long, 1976) examined two thousand GP interactions and 
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found that this manifests in diagnostic interactions: in the vast majority of cases 
doctors announce diagnoses and instruct patients on treatment without 
requesting patient input. Heath (1992) and Peräkylä (1998) examined diagnosis 
deliveries in primary care in Britain and Finland respectively, and demonstrated 
that patients rarely respond extensively to diagnosis – approximately two thirds 
of patients do not respond extensively to diagnosis delivery in both settings. 
Additionally, both studies showed that doctors leave a gap for patients to 
respond, indicating that this asymmetry was not simply doctor-led. That patients 
withhold responses to diagnosis has been argued to be an illustration of their 
deference to medical expertise, and an orientation to what really matters to 
patients, which is not the diagnosis itself but the treatment of their condition 
(Robinson, 2003a).  
 
However, both Heath and Peräkylä further examined diagnosis deliveries where 
patients did respond extensively to the diagnosis, and found that the picture 
was more complicated. Heath demonstrated that the seriousness of the 
diagnosis and length of the diagnostic utterance were not factors in whether 
patients responded – but if diagnoses were presented as either uncertain or 
were in some way incongruent with the patient’s viewpoint, this increased the 
likelihood of patient responses. Peräkylä (2002) built on this, showing that 
patients are more likely to respond to diagnosis when the evidence is referred 
to in diagnostic delivery, and doctors appear to use this method to encourage 
patient extended response. However, doctor epistemic authority is still 
prevalent: when patients disagree they design their turns so as to not directly 
challenge the doctor’s expertise, for example by suggesting a symptom that is 
misaligned with the diagnosis rather than rejecting evidence from testing. Even 
straight agreements are designed as personal perspective rather than fact, and 
thus portrayed as different and inferior to the doctor’s expert opinion (Peräkylä, 
2002).  
 
Diagnosis Delivery and Accountability 
Maynard (2004, p57) considers diagnoses as “clinical assessments”. In 
asserting a diagnosis doctors are assessing the patient’s experience, and thus 
presuming a knowledge or expertise over what should be the patient’s 
epistemic domain. Doctors therefore have to show accountability for this 
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presumption – particularly in cases where the diagnosis is misaligned with the 
patient’s own assessment of their symptoms. Peräkylä demonstrated that while 
Byrne and Long are correct that doctors often appear to assert their diagnoses 
without discussing the evidence (e.g. “you have X”), these assertions take place 
immediately after physical examinations (Peräkylä, 2005). This placement 
makes the diagnosis the upshot of the doctor’s conclusions of the physical 
examination, and thus demonstrates a level of accountability. In other words, 
doctors are accounting for their assertions by making the evidence for the 
assertion clear to the patient. In cases where there may be temporal distance 
between the examination and the diagnosis, or where there may be some 
uncertainty in the examination, doctors will reassert the evidence within the 
diagnosis itself (e.g. “this shows X, so you must have X”). Therefore, doctors 
are aware of the patient’s ownership of their symptoms, and take care to 
explicate their evidence within the diagnosis delivery. In citing the evidence 
doctors are showing the intersubjective nature of diagnosis deliveries: 
diagnoses are not solely in the domain of the doctor as originally supposed but 
co-constructed through patient knowledge of the symptoms and doctor medical 
knowledge. 
 
Diagnosis Delivery and Breaking Bad News 
Many CA examinations of diagnosis deliveries have been in primary care. As 
patients in primary care are able to choose when they see the doctor, they 
place importance in demonstrating that they have a legitimate reason to seek 
help from doctors. Therefore disagreement is most common where doctors tell 
patients they do not have a diagnosable condition (Stivers, 2005). In other 
words, while it could be considered that a diagnosis of any illness is bad news, 
a primary care diagnosis leads to validation of a patient’s concern and most 
commonly to treatment, and thus is potentially a positive outcome for the 
patient. Secondary care is different. Secondary care services are specialist 
services and deal with more complex and usually more serious conditions. The 
patient in most cases will have been referred by the primary care clinician, and 
thus do not need to be validated by a diagnosis. A diagnosis from a secondary 
care service is therefore most commonly ‘bad news’, in that it “adversely and 
seriously affects an individual’s view of his or her future” (Buckman et al., 1998).  
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Bad news diagnosis deliveries are approached with caution. As Maynard 
(2003a) describes, participants in interactions display reluctance to impart bad 
news; in CA terms telling someone bad news is a ‘dispreferred’ activity. In other 
words, while good news is forthrightly delivered, bad news deliveries are 
delayed, shrouded in other information deliveries or presented only as 
responses to questions, and glossed over with minimisation or positive spins on 
the news. In clinic settings bad diagnostic news has been shown to be prefaced 
with modifiers (“this probably is..”) and litotes (“it’s not good”), with euphemisms 
commonly used (e.g. “condition” “tumour”) (Stivers, 1998, Del Vento et al., 
2009). Additionally, “good news exits” (Maynard, 2003a, :158) from bad news 
are commonly implemented, with optimistic projections regarding the diagnosis 
trajectory (e.g. “it’s potentially serious but the majority are cured”) (Leydon, 
2008). Maynard argues that it is in doctors’ interests to not focus on the 
‘badness’ of the diagnosis so they can minimise responses that will delay the 
progression to the treatment stage of the meeting.  Diagnoses are thus often 
communicated using factual and abstract wording to encourage a stoic 
response. 
 
Diagnosis Delivery and Patient Response  
There are 3 main types of patient response to diagnosis discussion: negative 
responses to diagnosis, resistance to diagnosis, and misunderstanding 
diagnostic information. 
 
Negative Responses to Diagnosis: 
Maynard argues that the avoidance of the negative aspects of diagnoses in the 
delivery is why patients generally do not respond to diagnostic news, even in 
life changing conditions like cancer or HIV. Additionally, bad news tends to be 
delivered with a low tone of voice, often with falling pitch and slow delivery, 
which encourages minimal response in a similar tone (Maynard and Freese, 
2012). There are few reports of emotional responses to diagnosis. In oncology, 
doctors rarely ask how the patient feels or leave room for patients to volunteer 
emotional information. Patients refer inexplicitly to concerns (“I hope I’ve caught 
it early enough”), but doctors tend to not to pursue them (Beach et al., 2005). 
Through being the speaker of the diagnostic news, doctors will always have the 
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first opportunity to provide a “meaning assessment” (Maynard, 2006, :1903) – 
i.e. an indication of the consequences of the news for the patient. Doctors will 
nearly always use this space to deliver a positive assessment of the news, 
regardless of its severity, which they then encourage the patient to align with 
(e.g. “it does not mean the child won’t learn” after a diagnosis of autism) 
(Maynard, 2006). Doctors in oncology have been reported to focus on optimistic 
effects of treatment, which also makes it difficult for patients to discuss how they 
feel about the diagnosis (Leydon, 2008). This translates to descriptions of other 
settings, with Maynard reporting only one exception where an HIV counsellor 
explicitly pursues the patient’s response in order to “crack the emotional nut” 
and encourage acceptance of the diagnosis (Maynard, 2003a, :191). 
 
Doctors have been shown to use strategies to avoid blunt and thus emotionally 
traumatic diagnosis deliveries. Diagnoses in secondary care are often, as well 
as being more serious, more complex than those in primary care. Medical 
examinations usually occur at a separate appointment from the diagnosis 
feedback, and thus straight assertions of the diagnosis without explicit 
reference to the evidence are unusual. Maynard (2004) demonstrated that 
doctors nearly always present medical examinations as evidence or 
confirmation of a condition, and then deliver the diagnosis. As discussed above, 
explicating the evidence for a diagnosis endorses the doctor’s diagnostic 
assessment, particularly when patients may hold a differing viewpoint. 
However, doctors also use the evidence itself as an indirect method of 
delivering the diagnosis. This is particularly common in HIV diagnosis deliveries, 
where the diagnosis announcement is made when discussing test results – 
“your results came back positive” (Maynard, 2003a). However, it also occurs in 
oncology – “malignant means cancer” (Yoon et al., 2015) – and developmental 
disabilities – “that’s what we call mental retardation” (Gill and Maynard, 1995). 
In these cases the diagnosis is delivered indirectly through syllogism: this is 
your test result, it is X, and therefore you have X. The patient then has to work 
their diagnosis out through inference, and will usually then offer some 
confirmation – “and that’s what this is” (Gill and Maynard, 1995). Thus, in 
distancing the diagnosis from the patient in this way, the doctor has avoided the 
direct diagnostic format of “you have X”, which, while encouraging “realisation” 
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(Maynard, 2003a, p36) of the news, may lead to adverse responses in its blunt 
delivery.  
 
Resistance to Diagnosis: 
The avoidance of direct attribution of the diagnostic label to the patient also has 
another function. Patient resistance to diagnosis in secondary care is 
particularly prevalent when diagnoses are of mental rather than of physical 
origin, due to the stigma of mental health conditions. Monzoni and colleagues 
(2011b) studied diagnosis deliveries in neurology where seizures have no 
physically identifiable cause, and hence are likely caused by psychological 
factors such as previous traumatic experiences. These patients are seen in 
neurology clinics, and have been experiencing physical symptoms, and will thus 
be expecting a physical explanation (most commonly epilepsy). The authors 
found that doctors will assert the evidence using the brain scan results – “your 
seizure was not epileptic”. However, the diagnosis itself will be introduced in 
non-specific, generic terms “there is a cause..70% of people have things in the 
past..traumatic things”. These generalised descriptions indirectly class patients 
as a ‘person who has experience trauma’, leaving the floor open for patients to 
comment on this unexpected explanation, but not directly attributing 
psychological causes to the patient’s seizures. Doctors in this setting often 
avoid diagnostic labels altogether, especially in cases where patients do not 
engage in the psychosocial attribution. These diagnosis delivery techniques 
evade direct conflict with patients in a setting where resistance is common.  
 
Monzoni and Reuber (2014, p6) also noted that some doctors manage 
resistance by taking a “unilateral” approach to delivering diagnostic information 
–monological explanations that discourage patient input. They demonstrated 
that when more bilateral approaches were taken, and patient input was 
encouraged, so doctors were able to construct their argument for the diagnosis 
using information that the patient themselves supplied. Gill and Maynard (1995) 
also described this practice in developmental disabilities clinics, where doctors 
are delivering diagnoses of children’s learning difficulties to their parents. 
Parents would often be resistant to labelling their children, and thus doctors 
would start the meeting with a perspective-display invitation, eliciting the 
parent’s viewpoint – “what do you see as X’s difficulty?” (Maynard, 1989). If 
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parents at this stage did not present a symptom their child may have, then the 
doctor will work to elicit one before continuing. As stated above, diagnoses in 
these settings are often presented through inference. Gill and Maynard argue 
that avoiding the direct attribution of the illness leaves the doctor space, should 
the parent not engage with the diagnosis once it is delivered, to perform a 
“remedial bid” for agreement (Gill and Maynard, 1995, p20). This often involves 
retrospective perspective questions – questions occurring after delivery on 
aspects of the diagnosis that the parents had already agreed with, e.g. “okay, 
so we know X is behind” – which the doctor will follow by demonstrating how 
this matches with the diagnosis given.  
 
Another method Gill and Maynard identified that doctors use to obtain 
agreement is downgrading of the certainty of diagnosis after it is delivered. 
Similar to dementia, there is no one clinical test to see if children have a 
developmental disability, and it is thus the work of the doctor to gather all the 
information and make a tentative diagnosis, based on clinical judgement. 
Additionally, there is no certainty as to how the child might progress. Gill and 
Maynard argue that the uncertainty surrounding the testing, along with the 
inferential formatting of the diagnosis delivery – which only implies rather than 
asserts diagnosis – allows the doctor to back down when faced with persistent 
resistance from parents (“this is not a cut and dry case”). The doctor then is 
able to continue discussion that there is ‘something wrong’ that it may be helpful 
to treat, without directly facing conflict that an official diagnosis may bring. This 
flexibility around directly applying the diagnostic label to the patient depending 
on their response allows for progression of the discussion of treatment and 
support without parents directly agreeing with the diagnosis.  
 
Misunderstanding the Diagnosis: 
There are reports that inferential, non-direct deliveries and not combatting 
resistance directly can lead to some patients not processing the diagnostic 
information given. For example, where ‘developmental delay’ description is 
used instead of a specific diagnostic label, parents will often presume that there 
is a probability of “catch up” for their child (Abrams and Goodman, 1998). 
However, there is also evidence in oncology that too much information may 
cause misunderstandings, particularly when understanding is not explicitly 
 33 
checked (Yoon et al., 2015). Maynard (2003a) argues that clear, blunt deliveries 
may not be the best option to ensure diagnostic understanding, as direct 
disclosures will disrupt processing due to the emotional impact it will have on 
the patient. Thus, the balance between managing negative or resistant 
responses and ensuring understanding is complex. 
 
 
Implications for examining dementia diagnosis delivery 
 
“Diagnostic impressions are forged by the interaction and not given by 
professionals.”  (Abrams and Goodman, 1998) 
 
The CA literature has illustrated that diagnosis deliveries do not consist of a 
simple attribution of medical label to the patient, but patient involvement affects 
how the medical label is constructed. Key factors of diagnosis are doctor 
epistemic authority and accountability. Doctors explicate the evidence for their 
diagnoses to account for their clinical assessments, and patients navigate 
resistance in the confines of doctor medical expertise. In secondary care, 
doctors are aware of the negative impact of bad news diagnoses. Therefore 
diagnoses are often qualified, downplayed, and are communicated indirectly 
through syllogisms and inference to avoid blunt deliveries. These strategies 
appear to result in very few emotional responses, which arguably makes it 
easier to progress to discussion of treatment. Also, resistance can be more 
common in secondary care, so inferential deliveries offer space for doctors to 
engage patients in co-construction of the diagnosis, or to downgrade the 
severity to encourage agreement. There is evidence therefore that doctors 
encourage patient input into the diagnosis discussions in order to encourage a 
sufficient level of acceptance of the diagnosis to make treatment discussions 
possible.  Direct explorations of patient understanding are rare, and as a result 
patients can leave the diagnostic feedback with incorrect information.  
 
Monzoni and Reuber (2014) noted that there are common practices 
implemented by doctors across different medical settings. While there will be 
many aspects of diagnosis delivery in memory clinics that will be the same as 
that identified in other settings, there may also be context specific actions in 
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dementia diagnoses that are defined by the condition (Sacks et al., 1974). That 
patients receiving diagnoses of dementia are likely to have some level of 
cognitive impairment may cause doctors and patients to use different strategies 
within the interaction. Peel (2015) used CA on a small sample of dementia 
diagnosis deliveries from one clinician, and found it difficult to see whether 
certain behaviours, such as qualification of information and lack of patient 
response, were due to dementia-specific factors or features of bad news 
deliveries in general. She states that further analysis on a larger selection of 
data is needed to explore “how dementia is different – especially in regard to 
capacity, understanding and patient insight into the condition” (page 7).” 
 
The aims of this thesis are therefore threefold: 
 
1. To identify how diagnoses of dementia are communicated in diagnosis 
feedback meetings in memory clinics. 
2. To identify how people with dementia respond to the communication of 
the dementia diagnosis. 
3. To explore the perspectives of doctors working in memory clinics 
regarding the communication of dementia diagnoses in memory clinics. 
 
Before addressing these aims, a systematic review of the literature will be 
presented, in order to provide context for the study within the existing literature. 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two: 
Communication in healthcare 
interactions in dementia:  
A systematic review of 
observational studies
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This chapter is primarily a replication of a systematic review published in 
International Psychogeriatrics in February 2015 (Dooley et al., 2015). A 
repeated of the full systematic search has not been undertaken. However, a 
search was repeated using the same search terms, and monitoring of the 
published literature relevant to this thesis has been occurring continuously. At 
the end of the chapter there will be a short section containing an overview of 
studies using conversation analysis to observe communication between 
clinicians and people with dementia in outpatient settings, which were all 
published in the time between publication of the systematic review and 
submission of this thesis. These were not included in the presentation of the 
review in order to maintain the systematic nature of the review as it stands. 
 
Background: 
 
High quality healthcare communication has been shown to have a positive 
effect on patient outcomes such as treatment adherence (Thompson and 
McCabe, 2012), wellbeing (Kinmonth et al., 1998), illness recovery (Kelley et 
al., 2014) and physiological responses to diagnoses (Sep et al., 2014). Street et 
al have argued that effective communication enhances understanding, decision 
making, and the doctor-patient therapeutic relationship, leading to patient 
empowerment (Street, 2013).  
 
However, there are challenges in doctor-patient communication in dementia 
care that may impede effective communication. Dementia can cause problems 
in comprehension, word finding and short term memory loss (Blair et al., 2007). 
Additionally, unfounded presumptions of impaired patient abilities (Srinivas Rao 
and Blake, 2002) or ethical issues surrounding dementia diagnosis delivery 
(Karnieli-Miller, 2007) can impact interactions. Furthermore, although 
companions have an increasingly important role in supporting a person with 
dementia, their presence can result in additional difficulties for professionals in 
terms of balancing patient needs with that of the third party (Robinson et al., 
2009). 
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Studies of doctor-patient communication in outpatient dementia care are scarce 
(Zaleta and Carpenter, 2010). Research into dementia diagnostic disclosure 
has shown that patients and carers experience anxiety and confusion due to a 
lack of support in the early stages of dementia care (Robinson et al., 2010), and 
that treatment suggestions are often not utilised (Wolfs et al., 2011). 
Additionally, theories of person and relationship-centred dementia care (Adams 
and Gardiner, 2005) and communication training interventions have been 
developed (Eggenberger et al., 2012). However, to improve communication it is 
important to first identify how patients and healthcare professionals are currently 
communicating (Street, 2013).  
 
To date, studies that observe communication in outpatient dementia care have 
not been reviewed. The aim of this study was to systematically review research 
on naturally occurring communication between healthcare professionals, people 
with dementia and their companions in outpatient settings, in order to identify 
evidence on how communication problems are manifested in professional-
patient communication and whether particular strategies have been identified as 
effective in communicating with these patients. 
 
Methods  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Included studies were original English language articles due to insufficient 
resources for translation and reviewing non-English articles. The included 
studies used objective methods (audio or video recording) to observe 
communication, and analysed communication between patients with dementia, 
professionals that work in outpatient dementia healthcare settings, and patient 
companions when present. 
 
Studies observing residential care were excluded as they typically captured a 
different type of communication involving personal care. Studies only observing 
communication between people with dementia and/or their companions were 
excluded. Studies of communication using other ethnographic methods (not 
audio or video recordings) were excluded, as were studies focusing on group 
therapy and interventions that focused solely on memory retrieval. 
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Search strategy: 
A rigorous search of all electronically registered references up to 13th August 
2014 was undertaken. A hand search of relevant journals was also performed 
for the past 5 years, as well as a grey (unpublished) literature search (see Table 
1 for details). 
 
Table 1: Search Resources 
 
Search terms were grouped into illness, clinic and communication categories, 
and then combined (see Table 2). They were further developed and databases 
chosen after consulting experts in the field of dementia and communication, and 
were kept intentionally broad to ensure maximum scope.  
 
Screening: 
Two authors reviewed the search results independently. Full texts of selected 
abstracts were obtained for inspection, again performed independently by two 
Databases Hand Search Grey Literature 
Books@Ovid 
CINAHL 
Embase 
Medline 
London Health 
Libraries 
PsychInfo 
PubMed 
Aging and Mental Health 
Alzheimer’s Disease and 
Associated Disorders 
American Journal of Alzheimer’s 
Disease and other dementias  
BMC Geriatrics 
British Journal of Psychiatry 
Clinical Gerontologist 
Dementia: 
International Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry 
International Psychogeriatrics 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 
Journal of Aging Studies 
Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society 
Journal of Clinical Nursing 
Patient Education and Counselling 
Research on Aging 
Canada Theses 
DART European Theses 
EThOS UK Theses 
Informa Healthcare 
website 
ProQuest: (wire feeds, 
trade journals, 
dissertations, theses, 
news/magazines, 
conference papers, books, 
reports) 
WorldCat global library 
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authors. Any diverging views were discussed with the third author until reaching 
a consensus.  
 
On the removal of duplicates, 15538 titles were retrieved after the database 
search. Broad search terms yielded many irrelevant results and thus initial 
screening was based on title. 597 abstracts were reviewed, 519 of which were 
excluded. 78 full texts were examined and 15 included for data extraction. 
 
Table 2: Search terms (with truncation) 
 
Hand searching retrieved 16 articles, with 2 included in the review. The grey 
literature search produced 25 abstracts: all were excluded. Reference lists of 32 
relevant reviews identified in the database search were examined, 11 full texts 
were reviewed and 2 included for data extraction. Authors of included studies 
were emailed to establish if there were any additional relevant studies, and 1 
book chapter was identified and included. Forward and back citation searching 
was performed of included studies, 23 were screened, and 7 were included for 
data extraction. See Figure 1 for a PRISMA flow diagram. 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Service Users 
- combined by OR 
Clinics 
- combined by OR within column 
- combined by AND between columns 
Communication 
- combined by OR 
Alzheimer* 
dement* 
cognitive impair* 
next of kin 
caregiver 
companion 
family care* 
informal care* 
companion* 
memory 
alzheimer* 
dement* 
neurocogni* 
neuro-cogni* 
cogni* disor* 
cerebr* 
cogni* func* 
clinic 
centre 
center 
unit 
service 
intera* 
communica* 
talk* 
discour* 
dialog* 
conversa* 
interview* 
disclos* 
Group terms combined by AND 
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Data Extraction and Quality Assessment 
Twenty-seven studies were included in the data extraction stage. Two authors 
independently extracted data using a tool designed to elicit relevant information 
including setting, participant information, number and method of recordings, and 
the analysis of and findings from the recorded data.  
 
For 5 studies it was not initially possible to extract data due to difficulty in 
establishing whether the data represented directly observed findings rather than 
participant recollections or other forms of triangulated interpretation (Keady et 
al., 2004, Hutchinson et al., 1997, Robinson et al., 2009), or findings related to 
people with dementia rather than older adults without cognitive impairment 
(Hasselkus, 1992b, Hasselkus, 1992a). Authors clarified methodological 
aspects for 4 studies, 3 were excluded (Hasselkus, 1992a, Hasselkus, 1992b, 
Keady et al., 2004) and 1 included (Robinson et al., 2009). One study was 
excluded as the authors could not be contacted (Hutchinson et al., 1997). Four 
papers in total were excluded at this stage, leaving 23 studies for quality 
appraisal and the final synthesis.  
 
 
Figure 1: PRISMA flow diagram 
Records identified through 
database searching 
(n=19695) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources  
(n=97) 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n=15635) 
Abstracts screened  
(n=713) 
Full texts assessed for eligibility 
(n=103) 
Studies included in the qualitative 
synthesis  
(n=23) 
Abstracts excluded  
(n=610) 
Full texts excluded n=80 
 No recordings n=31 
 Not communication focused n=14 
 Not dementia n=11 
 Not with healthcare professionals n=18 
 Residential care n=8 
 Group therapy n=5 
 At data extraction (unclear methods) n=4 
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The CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme, 2017) was used for quality 
assessment (see Appendix A). It is widely used (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007) and 
fitted the needs of the review in allowing examination of each study in terms of a 
basic methodological standard and adequate interpretation of results (Hannes, 
2011). Each question and prompt was scored, with 34 items in total. Items were 
scored from 0-2: 0 for ‘no’, 1 for ‘partially’ (for example if the criteria was only 
met for one method), and 2 for ‘yes’. A percentage score was calculated and a 
consensus was reached through discussion to give each study a single quality 
score.  
 
Data synthesis 
Narrative synthesis was conducted using the protocol developed by Popay et al 
(Popay et al., 2006). Textual descriptions of the studies were grouped and 
tabulated. Two researchers independently coded the findings and put together 
descriptive themes of each study. Techniques recommended by Popay et al 
were used: primarily ‘reciprocal translation’ of the themes to explore 
relationships, and ‘ideas webbing’ to create a visual representation of the 
emerging themes.  
 
Results: 
Description of studies 
The characteristics of the 23 included studies can be found in Table 3. Thirteen 
of the studies were conducted in the USA, 3 in Finland, 2 in Israel, 2 in Sweden, 
2 in the UK and 1 in Canada. Eight studies observed communication in 
dementia assessment and/or diagnosis meetings, 6 in day centres, and 3 in 
support groups. One study observed communication in routine meetings with 
old age psychiatrists, 1 follow up consultations in a neurology clinic, and 3 in 
primary care. One study observed research consent procedures in an 
Alzheimer’s disease research centre.  
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Study quality 
The quality scores from the CASP ranged from 45-89% (mean 64%). Overall, 
the studies were robust in reporting clear aims, analysis methods and results. 
There were some limitations across studies in addressing researcher bias and 
the selection of data to illustrate findings.    
Participants: 
The majority of the studies included only patients with dementia. Five studies 
also included older patients who were not cognitively impaired. In two of these, 
the proportion of participants with dementia was not reported. Of the remaining 
three, the proportion of people with dementia ranged from 52-94%. Twelve of 
the studies included patients with any type of cognitive impairment, 6 included 
only patients with Alzheimer’s disease and in 5 of the studies the patient 
diagnosis was not explicitly stated beyond cognitive impairment. Thirteen of the 
studies reported cognitive test scores: 7 reported MMSE (range 5-30), and one 
used specifically the serial 7s (range 11-26) and the WORLD (12-27) test items 
from the MMSE. Two reported the Clinical Dementia Rating (from “no dementia” 
to “mild dementia) and 2 studies used the Cognitive Performance Scale (range 
2-3, moderate dementia). Patient age was reported for 18 studies, the majority 
were over 65. The patients’ gender ranged from 15-73% female (unreported in 
3 studies). Companions were present in 14 studies, although only 8 reported 
their characteristics. All these reported gender, and for all of them the majority 
of companions were female. Companions were typically spouses or adult 
children, occasionally another family member, and a single study included one 
paid companion. Companion age was reported in 6 studies, ranging from 36 to 
86.  
 
Five studies included nurses in a day centre; 2 observed a nurse running a 
support group and one used volunteer day centre workers. Two studies 
observed neurologists, one observed psychiatrists, and one primary care 
physicians. Nine studies included multidisciplinary staff. In 2 studies healthcare 
professional type was not stated. Fourteen studies reported characteristics: 14 
reported gender (range 12.5-100% female), 4 reported age (range 28-73), and 
4 reported number of years practicing as a healthcare professional (range 1-
42). 
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Study methods 
Thirteen studies used audio recordings, 9 used video and one used both. Nine 
studies developed their own coding system to look at a particular 
communication feature. Three studies used conversation analysis, and 2 used 
discourse analysis. Two studies used the Roter Interaction Analysis System 
(Roter and Larson, 2002) to code patient centred communication, and one 
study used Behavioural Interaction Codes (Roberts et al., 1991) to record types 
of turns of talk in groups. One study employed thematic analysis, one content 
analysis, one grounded theory and one Goffman’s frame theory. One study 
used abductive content analysis, a mixed inductive and deductive approach to 
interpret the communication specifically in relation to the authors’ topic of study 
(agency and communion). In one study the recordings were used to compare 
the diagnosis delivered versus diagnosis reported by participants. In 7 studies 
quantitative measures of participant involvement were documented.
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Table 3: Summary of papers included in the review 
Reference 
and 
country 
Patients Companions Professionals Recordings Focus and analysis Relevant Key Findings QA 
Setting: Assessment and diagnosis 
Amizandeh 
et al  
2007  
Canada 
n=30  
Alzheimer’s 
Disease (AD) 
37%, Vascular 
Dementia (VaD) 
23%, Mixed 40% 
 
MMSE: >26 13%, 
21-26 70%, 15-20 
17%  
 
Age: 65-75 10%, 
75-84 57%, >85 
33% 
 
67% Female 
n=30  
Spouse 23%, 
Child 67%, 
Other family 
10% 
n=? 
Interdisciplinary 
n=30 
Audio 
 
Emotional reactions to diagnosis  
Transcribed and coded using 
coding scheme developed by 
authors to categorise emotional 
responses of dementia 
diagnosis: associated feelings 
and behaviours and illustrative 
statements 
Shock and distress following diagnosis 
Emotional responses stronger with diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s Disease rather than Vascular 
Dementia 
Small minority expressed relief and 
validation 
Emotional response sometimes interfered 
with comprehension 
66% 
Karnieli 
Miller et al 
2007  
Israel 
n=14 
All diagnosed with 
dementia/AD 
 
Age: 78.5 (SD 
8.4)  
 
64% female 
  
n=14  
Adult children 
n=3  
Neurologists 
 
Years in practice: 
13-34 
n=14 
Audio 
 
Ethical dilemmas for 
professionals when disclosing 
dementia diagnosis 
Thematic analysis as a unit with 
pre/post interviews with 
professionals, and post 
interviews with patients and 
companions 
Brief encounters: 4.40 to 13.5 minutes, 40 
seconds to 5.4 mins actually discussion 
diagnosis 
Avoid elaborating on diagnosis and checking 
understanding; evidence of changing 
subject, preemptive reassurance, ending 
conversation. 
Rapid transition from diagnosis to 
management, more time spent on 
management.  
Standardisation and ‘preliminary stage’ 
language. Fractured sentences and 
confused language when delivering 
diagnosis 
67% 
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Karnieli 
Miller et al 
2012  
Israel 
n=25 
MMSE: 12-27 
 
Age: mostly >65 
 
68% female  
n=?  
Most often 
family 
member 
n=6  
Neurologists, 
geriatricians, 
psychiatrists. 
n=25 
Audio and 
video 
 
 
Explore triadic communication  
Mapped transcriptions to assess 
interaction and involvement of 
each participant 
Systemic grounded theory 
analysis. 
Graphic representations  
Semi-structured interviews with 
participants 
Phases of visit: introduction, formal cognitive 
evaluation (usually without a companion), 
summation (results, treatment)  
Alternating dyadic interchanges. If third 
person attempts to enter either:  
1. They are ignored 
2. Information is “borrowed” into the dyad 
3. They are silenced 
4. They manage to redirect to themselves 
Physician controls the conversation. Turn 
taking shown in small but significant verbal 
and nonverbal gestures 
Some evidence of confusion of roles 
Significant change between introductory and 
summative: outset with patient, summation 
with companion, but all three present. 
Side/private conversation with companion 
about diagnosis 
69% 
Sakai and 
Carpenter  
2011 
USA 
n=86 
Not all dementia 
 
Age: 72.93  
(SD 8.1) 
 
60.5% female 
 
n=86 
58% spouse, 
24% child, 
9% other, 8% 
friend. 
70% female 
Age: 62.46 
(SD 13.72) 
 
n=7 
Physicians 
n=86 
Video 
Power dynamics in dementia 
diagnosis 
Verbal dominance (t-tests) and 
pronoun use (ANOVAs) recorded 
and linked with outcomes 
Questionnaire of anxiety, 
depression and Dementia Care 
Satisfaction for patients and 
carers 
Physicians spent 83% of the time talking, 
patients 10.3%, companions 6.3%. This did 
not differ on dementia status.  Companions 
spoke more if patients had dementia (7.7% 
vs. 3.7%) 
Physicians used fewer singular pronouns 
than patients and companions. Companions 
used fewer singular pronouns than patients 
Physicians used more plural pronouns than 
patients and companions 
No links with outcomes 
82% 
Saunders 
(1998) 
USA 
n=17  
41% AD, 12% 
VaD, 6% alcohol 
related, 6% non 
impaired, 6% 
mixed, 23% other, 
6% undetermined 
70% female. 
Age: 54-86 years  
n=5 (not 
analysed) 
Family 
members 
n=4 
2 
psychometricians, 
2 trainees 
75% female 
Age: 28-50 
n=17 
Audio 
 
Use of humour in 
neuropsychological assessments 
Discourse analysis 
Coded for humour – then further 
coded for initiator, function, 
focus, topic 
ANOVA for initiator and presence 
of third party 
Humour: 3.6% of talk: clinicians 1.4%, 
patients 3.7%. Third party did not influence 
Clinician humour more about testing issues 
No difference between patient humour in 
personal exchanges and testing exchanges 
Patients used significantly more dominant, 
self-denigrating and self-focused humour 
Relational humour the same for both patients 
and clinicians 
Humour can serve more than one function 
simultaneously. Patient self-denigrating 
humour indicates they are cognizant enough 
to reflect on their own situation 
62% 
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Saunders 
(1998b) 
USA 
(same as above) (same as 
above) 
(same as above) n=17 
Audio 
 
Determine type and purpose of 
accounts (self description of 
expected and unexpected 
behaviour) during 
neuropsychological assessments 
Interaction discourse analysis 
5 types of accounts: 
1. Cognitive (metaphor or memory process) 
2. Experiential (assign blame or account 
correct) 
3. Ability and attention (position of self as 
poor listener, or bad artist) 
4. Emotional (blame other or anxiety) 
5. Comparative (to others) 
Suggests that despite cognitive difficulties 
patients attempt to construct and maintain 
identity and an awareness of expected 
performance 
55% 
Zaleta and 
Carpenter, 
2010 USA 
n=54 
AD 85%, 
Frontotemporal 
Dementia (FTB) 
4%, Diffuse Lewy 
Body Disease 
(DLD) 2%, 
medication 
induced cognitive 
dysfunction 2%, 
Unclear 7% 
Clinical Dementia 
Rating (CDR): 
67% very mild 
dementia, 33% 
mild dementia 
Age: 74.13 
(SD 8.34) 
61% female 
 
 
n=54 
63% spouse 
or partner, 
22.2% child, 
12.9% other 
family, 1.9% 
friend. 
 
Age: 65.57 
(SD 12.5) 
 
70.4% female 
 
n=10  
Neurologist 50%, 
geriatrics 40%, 
geriatric 
psychiatry 10%. 
 
Years experience: 
8.2 years 
(SD=7.3) 
 
40% female 
 
n=54 
Video (audio 
coded) 
 
Patient Centred Communication 
(PCC) in diagnostic disclosure 
RIAS (Roter International 
Analysis System) for PCC 
Associations between RIAS and 
sociodemographics – binary and 
logistic regressions 
Physicians engage in more positive rapport 
building and facilitation than activation, 
compared to emotional rapport building 
Positive Rapport Building: “physician 
agreement with the patient/companion” most 
frequent. Physicians also frequently showed 
approval. They laughed or told jokes with 
moderate frequency 
Facilitation and Patient Activation: Back 
channelling, eg: ‘Mhmm’, ‘ok’, most frequent. 
Moderate frequency: confirming own 
understanding, and checking understanding 
of patient/companion. Less frequent: asking 
for patient/companion’s opinion. Rarely 
asked for patient permission 
Emotional rapport building: Relatively 
infrequent behaviours overall 
Greater variability between physicians than 
within physicians 
No relationship found with dependent 
variables of dementia severity, gender or 
age 
80% 
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Zaleta et al 
(2012) 
USA 
n=90 (29 non-CI)  
AD 56%, FTD 
2%, DLD 2%, 
posterior cortical 
dysfunction 1%, 
medication 
induced cognitive 
dysfunction 1% 
CDR: no 
impairment 32%, 
very mild 45%, 
mild dementia 
23% 
Age: 71 (SD 8) 
60% female  
 
n=90 
61% spouse, 
20% child, 
10% other 
family, 7% 
friend 
Age: 62.9 
(13.5) 
Gender: 71% 
female 
 
(same as above) 
Nurse also 
present at 
consultation 
n=90 
Video  
 
Agreement after diagnostic 
consultations 
Diagnostic impressions collected 
from patient and companion 
recollection, written summary 
from nurse, raters from video, 
physician CDR value. Cohen’s 
kappa to calculate percentage 
agreement  
Sociodemographic, physician 
rated patient understanding and 
patient satisfaction questionnaire 
Pearson’s chi square for 
sociodemographics and 
agreement 
Consensus 76.6% - moderate 
Patients demonstrated only fair agreement: 
65.9% with companion, 61% with physician 
Companions better than patients with all 
sources, good with physician (81.9%) 
Physician and nurse (86.7%) and physician 
and video (84.7%) good but not perfect 
Diagnosis affected agreement: overall 
consensus lower for people with very mild 
dementia (66.7%) compared to mild 
dementia (71.5%) and no dementia (94.1%) 
89% 
Outpatient and Primary Care 
Hasselkus 
(1994) 
USA 
n=27 
(not specified n 
with cognitive 
impairment (CI)) 
 
Age: 64-91 
(mean=77.3) 
17/27 lived with 
carer. 
n=2 
(not specified 
n with CI)  
35% spouse, 
31%  
children, 7% 
other.  
Age: 36-86 
76% female 
n=11 
(not specified n  
with patients with 
CI) 
5 staff physicians, 
4 residents, 2 
geriatric fellows 
n=40 
Audio 
 
Self care behaviours as a marker 
of adult status in the older patient 
Identification of clues of 
incapacity or capacity on basis of 
caregiver interactions, and 
mechanisms of marginalization of 
patient by all 3 members of triad 
Categorized into marked 
(dementia diagnosis mentioned 
or evident from discourse), 
moderate (mild cognitive 
impairment or sensory 
impairment) or no apparent 
impairment 
Patients with cognitive or sensory 
impairment demonstrated least self care 
behaviours and allowed caregivers to explain 
their impairments 
Marked impairment: patient involvement 
limited to the examination stages, especially 
with cognitive rather than sensory 
impairment, where more effort is made to 
include the patient 
Moderate impairment: poses “on the spot” 
challenge for professional to establish 
“ambiguous capabilities” of patient and 
caregiver – shift between the two. Caregiver 
tended to play more prominent role as 
consultation progressed 
 
Hunsaker 
et al 2010 
USA 
n=25 
MMSE Serial 7s: 
18.08 (11-26); 
MMSE WORLD: 
20.85 (12-27) 
 
Age: range 69-92, 
(mean=79.3) 
 
60% female  
n=25 
64% spouse, 
36% child 
 
Age: 46-83 
(m=67.6) 
 
76%  female 
n=23  
Primary care 
physicians (PCP), 
geriatrician, nurse 
practitioner. 
 
30% female 
 
Age: 49.8 (33-73) 
 
Years in practice 
18.8 (3-42) 
n=25  
Audio 
 
Discussion of dementia related 
behaviours (DRBs) and 
comparison with RMBPC 
(Revised Memory and Behaviour 
Problems Checklist):  
• Direction and quality of verbal 
interaction 
• Content and initiator of topics 
• Dementia related companion 
issues 
• Quality of support offered 
Dementia discussion: 88.5% of visits: 
Initiated by PCP 47.8%, companion 34.8%, 
patient 17.4% 
Quality of support moderate 
DRBs: 76.9% of visits:  
• Memory behaviours: 100% of companions 
reported 1 or more, discussed in 70% 
• Disruptive behaviours reported by 80% of 
companions, yet discussed 23% 
DRB discussion not related to PCP or 
caregiver demographics, relationship to 
patient, caregiver or PCP initiation of 
discussion. Burden higher for caregivers who 
initiated discussion 
81% 
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Robinson  
et al (2010) 
England 
n=? n=? n=7?  
Consultant old 
age psychiatrists 
n=53? 
Video 
 
Thematic analysis of recordings 
combined with interviews and 
literature review to develop 
intervention to improve patient 
centred communication in 
outpatient reviews of patients 
with dementia taking 
cholinesterase inhibitors 
Semi-structured interviews with 
patients and carers using 
prompts from videos 
Semi-structured interviews with 
clinicians on background, clinics, 
views, barriers and facilitators to 
patient centred care 
Difficulties included: 
• Developing a therapeutic alliance, 
especially with patient-companion conflict 
• Facilitating shared responsibility whilst 
promoting patient autonomy 
• Presenting information in manageable 
amounts so that patients with dementia 
can make informed decisions 
• Exploring person with dementia’s 
experience and promoting quality of life. 
• People with dementia very rarely identified 
issues in response to direct questions  
Consultations tended to focus on negative 
aspects of a patient’s life 
Way in which doctors structured their 
consultations could be as important as the 
communication skills they used 
59% 
Saunders 
(2011) 
USA 
n=29 non-CI 
n=31 CI 
Possible, 
probable AD, or 
mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI).  
MMSE: 18.4 (SD 
6.6) only for 25. 
Age: 78.7, 63-92 
58% female  
n=30 CI 
n=10 non-CI  
Typically a 
family 
member, 1 
case paid 
companion 
n=8  
Neurologists. 
Age: 38-65 
12.5% female 
 
n=60 
Audio 
Communicative coping 
behaviours (CCB): accounts and 
humour in outpatient neurology 
appointments 
Frequencies: chi square to find 
differences between CI and non-
CI 
Doctors did most of the talking, followed by 
patients and companions  
In CI patient companions did more talking 
than non-CI patient companions. CI patients 
talked approximately the same as non-CI 
patients, however doctors took more turns 
with CI patients 
• 141/154 memory accounts by CI patients 
• 11/96 health accounts CI, 23 non CI, 72 
doctors 
• 145/217 humour CI, 72 non-CI 
79% 
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Schmidt et 
al (2009) 
USA 
n=23 
Probable or 
possible AD 
MMSE: 21.4 (SD 
4.2) 
Age: 79.3 (SD 
6.3) 
57% female  
n=23 
65% spouse, 
35% adult 
child 
78% female 
 
Age: 68 (SD 
10.6)  
n=20  
Primary care 
physicians (PCP) 
 
30% female 
 
Age: 48.4 (SD 
9.8) 
n=23 
Audio 
 
Participant involvement in 
consultation 
Coded participant speech for full 
second began/ended. Compared 
verbal participation using ANOVA 
Associations with patient verbal 
fluency, cognitive status, triad 
members’ verbal participation 
and satisfaction 
Satisfaction and 
sociodemographics from 
structured interviews following 
PCP visit 
Consultations 11.7 to 55.7 (m=24) minutes. 
• PCP highest speech 53%, caregiver 31%, 
patient 16%. 
• Caregiver participation correlated with 
both PCP and patient participation 
• Patient with lower verbal fluency and 
MMSE participated less. 
• PCP participation not related to any 
patient verbal characteristics. 
• Caregiver participation linked to 
satisfaction. 
• Patient participation not linked to 
satisfaction 
• Patient with male caregiver had higher 
participation 
• Higher caregiver education levels linked 
with lower PCP participation. 
87% 
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Sugarman 
et al (2007) 
USA 
n=26 
MMSE 21.8 (SD 
5.2) range 9-30. 
Presumed AD 
50% female 
n=26 
22 spouses, 
4 adult 
children 
65% female 
n=1  
Physician 
n=29 
Audio 
 
Examination of informed consent 
agreements in outpatient 
department of research centre. 
RIAS (Roter Interaction Analysis 
System) coding of dynamics of 
three-way interaction, range of 
affective dimensions. Coded for 
key elements of informed 
consent process. 
Length: 3.2 - 10.2 mins (m=7.1 (SD 1.7)) 
Average 95 statements: Physician 62%, 
companion 25%, patient 13% 
Physician averaged 10 statements for each 
patient statement, 3 for each companion.  
• Half patient statement agreement and 
approval, 16% psychosocial, 7% 
questions, 7% emotions 
• 37% of companion agreement/approval, 
19% providing biomedical information, 
17% psychosocial, 8% questions, 6% 
emotion.  
• 19% physician agree/approval, 2% 
psychosocial, 30% emotion, 7% 
biomedical.  
• Partnering behaviours: 12% of physician, 
3% patient and companions. 
• Positive association between discussion 
length and MMSE. 
88% 
Day Care Centres 
Bohling et 
al. 1991  
USA 
n=10/11 
All AD 
55% Female  
 n=8 
Daycare centre 
workers 
75% female  
n=15 
Video 
 
Responses of professionals to 
patient’s shifts in reality. 
Goffman’s labeled frame 
analysis: coding responses when 
person with AD breaks ‘frame’ of 
conversation 
4 basic types of caregiver responses (n of 
examples): 
1. Joins patient’s frame (n=1) 
2. Briefly joins patient frame and then returns 
to own (n=3)  
3. Maintains own frame with occasional 
acknowledgement of the patient’s (n=6)  
4. Maintains own frame regardless of the 
patient’s frame (n=3) 
53% 
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Bourgeois 
et al. 
(1996) 
USA 
n=4 
Possible AD, AD 
or SDAT 
MMSE: 7-21 
Age: 74-80 
50% female 
 
 n=3  
Volunteer 
workers. 
Age: 51-67 
Years working: 1-
2 
100% female 
n=1-2 per 
patient per 
week over 8 
weeks 
Audio 
 
 
Memory wallet intervention  
Coded for n of patient novel and 
wallet statements of fact, 
ambiguous, error and other 
statements, and volunteer topic 
prompts, questions and 
statements in 5 minute 
conversational samples. Multiple 
baseline design with replications 
across subjects. 
Clients:  
• Factual statements increased 
• Reduced ambiguous statements 
• n=2 reduced frequency of unintelligible 
utterances 
• n=1 increase in error utterances 
• n=1 slight decrease of perseverative 
statements 
Volunteers: 
• None asked fewer than 3 prompts 
required 
• 2 used less prompts 
• Reduced the number of statements with 2 
clients but increased with 2 
• Number of questions decreased for all 
66% 
Kemper 
(1994) 
USA 
n=5 with CI 
Probable AD 
MMSE: 10-18 
Age: 69 
 n=3  
Nursing aides, 
nurse or personal 
attendant 
Age: 35-50 
66% female 
n=40 total 3 
with AD 
Audio 
 
Elderspeak in care services for 
older adults 
Coded for linguistic features of 
Elderspeak  
Multivariate ANOVA to analyse 
effects of audience (young vs. 
old) and speaker (service 
providers (part time volunteers) 
vs. caregivers (day to day 
professionals)) 
Compared non-CI to CI 
All spoke differently to younger vs. older 
adults 
Professionals speak with lower lexical units 
with dementia, fewer cohesive ties, longer 
pauses, more diminutives 
Speech style to dementing older adults 
appears to be an exaggeration of that to 
non-dementing older adults 
68% 
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Lindholm 
(2008) 
Finland  
n=3 
33.% VaD, 66.6% 
AD 
Age: 79-84 
33% female  
- n=4  
Nurse in charge, 
assistant nurse, 
health care 
student, 
researcher 
100% female 
n=2 
(analysed) 
Video 
 
Use of laughter in proverb game 
Conversational analysis (CA) 
Laughter segments were 
categorized on their sequential 
environments:  
1. When a new sequence was 
initiated 
2. When the patient encountered 
problems in an ongoing 
sequence 
3. After the correct response was 
uttered by another speaker at 
the end of a sequence 
Examples of laughter: 
1. As a response to sequence-initial first pair 
part 
2. With sequence-internal problems 
3. As a response to second pair part (i.e. 
game answer) 
If laughter after first-pair part nurses often 
gave elaborate response. If laughter after 
second-pair part varying responses from 
nurses. Responding to laughter related to 
activity environment, if problem generally 
don’t join in. If laughter directly after first pair 
part then elaborate response, if later more 
minimal 
52% 
Lindholm 
and Wray 
(2011) 
Finland 
(same as above)  n=3 
Nurse in charge, 
assistant nurse, 
health care 
student 
100% female 
n=? 
(analysed) 
30 hours total  
Video 
 
Conversation Analysis (CA) of 
extracts which revealed 
problematic sequences in 
proverb game. 
Game needs pragmatic understanding and 
an assumption of engagement with the 
content.  
Laughter: common response but may not 
mean amusement: could be to cover up. 
Creative/humorous responses indicate game 
useful for interactions, but purpose of game 
is undermined if players have never known 
the proverbs. 
47% 
Lindholm 
(2013) 
Finland 
n=6 (2-6 per 
recording) 
66% AD, 22% 
VaD, 22% no 
diagnosis 
50% female (1 
non-CI) 
 n=4 
(same as above, 
with researcher) 
n=30 hours 
 
Challenges of naturally occurring 
group conversations 
CA methodology 
Challenges: nurses speaking in overlap, 
difficult words, using complex linguistic 
structures, absence of non-verbal hints 
Continue conversation after patient 
acknowledges, but do not check 
understanding, heterogeneous abilities of 
patient group 
Patients can use repair initiators to re-enter 
conversations: verbally and non verbally 
Games expose varying competence: 
paradox given supposed therapeutic nature 
 
 
45% 
Support Groups 
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Hedman et 
al (2014a) 
Sweden 
n=5 
All AD 
CPS (cognitive 
performance 
score): 2-3 
Age: 59-78 (mean 
65)  
60% female  
 n=1 
Nurse, trained in 
the validation 
method.  
Female 
n=10 
Audio 
 
Social Positioning 
Qualitative content analysis – 
segments where participants 
positioned themselves analysed 
and category system developed. 
Second order positioning also 
identified and described 
Field notes and participant 
interviews before attending group 
5 first-order positions identified 
1. Project manager 
2. Story teller 
3. Moral agent 
4. Person burdened with AD 
5. Coping person 
Positions overall affirmed, except when less 
favoured. Humour, teasing, scorning and 
silencing used to reposition others 
Evidence of more discussion of difficulties 
than in interviews, but not by all participants 
89% 
Hedman et 
al (2014b) 
Sweden 
(same as above)  (same as above) (same as 
above) 
Sense of self (expressions of 
possessing certain attributes) 
Abductive approach – interpreted 
in regard to the concepts of 
agency and communion. Implicit 
and explicit expressions sorted 
into predefined categories 
Discussions of Agency: 
• Self-mastery: manage everyday life.  
• Status/victory: describing prestige/status. 
• Achievement: expressing pride. 
• Impact: empowerment. 
• Failure/weakness: losing abilities, use of 
humour to discuss 
• Losing face: struggling to conceal. 
• Ignorance: confusion. 
• Conflict: not a major topic 
Discussions of Communion:  
• Love/friendship: Often ambiguous. 
• Dialogue: supported in group only. 
• Caring: ability to help others decreased. 
• Unity/togetherness: families and friends. 
• Separation: disconnected from life.  
• Rejection: let down by caregivers. 
• Disillusionment: shown implicitly. 
• Another’s misfortune: grieving. 
77% 
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Mason et al 
(2005) 
UK 
n=11 
‘probable or 
possible dementia 
of any type’ 
MMSE: 19-29 
(mean 24) 
Age: 72-85 (79) 
73% female 
 n=4 
Admiral Nurse, 
Assistant 
psychologists, 
Consultant 
Psychologist. 
n=3 sessions 
from each 
group 
analysed 
Video 
 
Support group processes and 
interactions 
Behavioural Interaction Codes 
(BIC) coding verbal responses: 
each turn coded for BIC 
categories: self disclosure, 
information giving, personal 
question, impersonal question, 
request for feedback, support, 
interpretation, direct guidance, 
agree, negative, reflection, group 
process, talk, inaudible 
Also coded who speaker was 
and who it was directed 
Semi-structured interviews with 
participants on experience of 
group 
Patients: 
• Disclosures = 77% group A and 66% 
group B’s total responses. 
• Self-disclosures – just over a third of total 
responses in each group. 
• No responses reflective of group 
processes. 
• Self-report of feeling supportive 
Facilitators: 
• Questions = 50% (1/3 personal questions) 
• Group A = information giving 28% 
• Group B = interpretation 28% 
Directions of interactions: 
43% and 32% (A and B) of verbal responses 
made by facilitators 
Group A: 
• Almost 75% interactions between 
facilitator and individual member: 39% 
originating from member. 
• 68% of responses by a group member 
were directed towards a facilitator 
Group B 
• 47% between group members 
• Member responses equally directed 
towards a facilitator, another group 
member or the group as a whole 
72% 
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Findings 
Three overarching themes emerged: the communication of the dementia 
diagnosis, participant involvement, and participant communicative strategies 
when faced with cognitive impairment. 
 
Communication of the dementia diagnosis: 
Five studies observed professional-patient-companion triads during diagnostic 
feedback. The results fell into two subthemes: emotional impact and 
understanding. 
Emotional Impact: 
Amizandeh et al (2007) examined patient and companion verbal and non-verbal 
emotional responses to the diagnosis. More severe distress was associated 
with a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease than with other forms of dementia, even 
when clear explanations were given as to the consequences of the other 
diagnoses. Karnieli-Miller et al (2007) noted however, that professionals 
avoided emotional exploration of the impact of the diagnosis, with minimal time 
spent on explanations of the diagnosis. They speculated that frequent “ums” 
and hesitancy might demonstrate professional anxiety in diagnosis delivery. 
Zaleta and Carpenter (2010) found that ‘emotional rapport building’, e.g. 
reassurance and empathy, were infrequent, and hypothesised that 
professionals are focusing on ensuring comprehension and treatment 
compliance rather than providing emotional support. However, Amizandeh et al 
(2007) argued that strong emotional responses might interfere with cognitive 
processing of the information given.  
Understanding the diagnosis: 
Zaleta et al (2012) showed that consensus on the diagnosis between patients, 
companions and physicians after the diagnostic meeting was only moderate 
(76.6%), despite high patient rating of thoroughness (mean 4.62/5) and clarity 
(4.33/5) of delivery. Even agreement between physician, nurse and researcher 
ratings (obtained from watching the recordings) was far from perfect (84.7%). 
Consensus was lower for those receiving a diagnosis of very mild (66.7%) or 
mild dementia (71.5%), and 16.7% of companions disagreed with the clinicians, 
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suggesting patient’s impaired cognition was not the only cause of confusion. 
Qualifying statements, such as ‘what we might be seeing is..’, were identified by 
the authors as a potential reason for ambiguity. Additionally, both Zaleta (2010) 
and Karnieli-Miller et al (2007) found that professionals rarely explicitly checked 
patient understanding when delivering diagnoses. 
 
Patient involvement: 
Quantitative profiling of triadic interactions provided some evidence of 
involvement of people with dementia in interactions, but the studies did not fully 
explore the reasons and implications of this. Schmidt et al (2009) and Hunsaker 
et al (2010) observed primary care consultations. Schmidt et al examined total 
speech, while Hunsaker et al examined initiation of discussion of dementia 
related behaviours, with both finding that professionals spoke approximately 
half (53% and 48% respectively) and companions a third of the time (31% and 
35%). Sugarman (2007) found in consent interactions that professionals spoke 
slightly more (62% of statements), which may be expected given the need to 
explain study procedures. In all three studies, patients spoke for approximately 
half the time of their companions. Hasselkus (1994) qualitatively explored 
patient involvement in internal medicine and geriatric clinics in a hospital, and 
also observed patient marginalisation, describing the doctor-companion 
interactions as one of “two practitioners in a dyadic exchange”. 
 
However, Sakai and Carpenter (2011) examined power dynamics in diagnostic 
feedback and found that while professionals spoke for 83% of the time, patients 
spoke for 10.3% of the time and companions only 6.3%. Saunders et al (2011) 
also found that patients with dementia take more turns than their companions, 
34% versus 25%. Professionals also spoke less, taking 41% of the turns at talk. 
However, Saunders’ study was in a neurology setting where patients were 
undergoing neuropsychological examinations, and therefore the higher 
proportion of speech may be due to the examination process. This could also 
be the case in Sakai and Carpenter’s diagnostic consultations, where the 
patient plays a more central role as they are the one receiving the diagnosis. 
This is explored in Karnieli-Miller et al’s (2012) qualitative description of 
participant involvement, in which they illustrated the patient-companion-
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professional triad as a series of dyads directed by the professional: focusing on 
the patient at examination stage, and the companion at diagnostic delivery, 
sometimes to the point of patient exclusion (eg: corridor conversations with the 
companion prior to formal discussion). 
 
Cognitive impairment was identified as a factor affecting patient involvement. 
Schmidt et al (2009) found that involvement is lower and Sugarman et al (2007) 
found consent discussions were shorter with patients with lower cognitive test 
scores. Hasselkus (1994) found that if there were clues to incapacity, 
professionals addressed the companion over the patient, and that professionals 
and companions make more effort to include patients with sensory impairments 
than those with cognitive impairment. Saunders et al (2011) also found that 
companions of those with cognitive impairment took more turns of talk than 
those accompanying people without cognitive impairment, however companions 
were present for only 34% of consultations with people without cognitive 
impairment. 
 
There was also evidence that professionals found interacting with people with 
dementia in a group presented particular challenges. Schmidt et al (2009) 
identified that the presence of a companion affected involvement in primary 
care consultations on a quantitative level: with their participation being 
negatively correlated with that of professional and patient. Additionally, 
Lindholm (2013) described problems when professionals were interacting with 
groups of patients with heterogeneous capabilities in day centres, indicating 
overlapping speech and the use of overly complex sentences when addressing 
patients. Mason et al (2005) found in support groups that 87.9% of interactions 
that involved the facilitator occurred between facilitator and individual 
participants. The authors suggested that this indicates that groups with people 
with dementia require more facilitator input than ordinary support groups.  
 
Mason et al (2005) also observed that individual professional styles and the 
patient characteristics will affect support group climate, which is likely to affect 
involvement. They observed two support groups run by two different pairs of 
professionals, both member-led in terms of discussion topics. Different facilitator 
styles were observed to result in different patterns of group communication. For 
 59 
example one group consisted of one-on-one conversations between individuals 
and facilitators whereas the other consisted of conversations across the group 
as a whole. The authors suggest that groups with heterogeneous abilities may 
require varying degrees of input and support and flexible facilitation is required. 
 
Patient face work, companion roles and professional challenges and strategies  
The patient, companion and professional demonstrated a variety of different 
behaviours to compensate for the perceived or actual cognitive impairment of 
the patient. 
Patient face work: compensatory strategies for memory, comprehension and 
pragmatic difficulties 
Strategies to maintain one’s self image in social interactions is defined by 
Goffman (1967) as ‘face work’. Lindholm (2008) observed that problems for 
people with dementia in interactions can occur: (1) immediately after the 
professional has spoken, suggesting comprehension difficulties, (2) in the midst 
of patients speaking, possibly due to word finding, and (3) after speaking, 
possibly due to an awareness of an inappropriate response. Hedman et al 
(2014b) also noted language difficulties, such as decreased fluency, content 
and comprehension, as evident in support group interactions. Patients deploy 
various coping techniques in response to these problems. 
 
Saunders (2011) identified patient face work when undergoing assessments. 
Patients attempted to account for their difficulties, for example using emotional 
reactions, e.g. “you rattled me so I’m off”, or blame lack of attention, e.g. “I 
wasn’t listening”, to explain poor performances. In addition, complex metaphors 
were used, for example “my brain is off key”. Hedman et al (2014b) also 
described use of metaphor in discussions about dementia in support groups, 
with participants describing an increasing prevalence of dementia as “a social 
tsunami” that will “put us back in the stone age!” These subtle uses of language 
may evidence intact creativity and contextual understanding, and Saunders 
argues that this enables patients with dementia to maintain their identity despite 
loss of memory and other abilities. 
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Furthermore, there was evidence that people with dementia used humour to 
assert themselves, for example to raise concerns (Robinson et al., 2009), 
manage difficult feelings and lighten serious discussions (Hedman et al., 
2014a), claim control in assessments and group conversations (Hedman et al., 
2014b, Saunders, 1998b), and hide miscomprehension and maintain 
interactional flow (Saunders, 1998a, Lindholm, 2008). These studies argued 
that by using humour flexibly to both dominate talk and be self-deprecating, 
patients are showing insight into their expected responses and limitations and 
demonstrating that they are “productive members of the interaction” (Lindholm 
and Wray, 2011). However, Sugarman et al cautioned interactional partners of 
people with dementia to be aware of the possible negative effect of face work: 
patients with lower cognitive scores were found to devote more turns to 
agreement in consent discussions, and the authors suggested that this may 
represent an attempt to remain engaged with the interaction, through assent, 
rather than actual agreement (Sugarman et al., 2007).  
 
There were several studies that evidenced the assistance that people with 
dementia give each other to maintain face in support groups (Hedman et al., 
2014a, Hedman et al., 2014b, Mason et al., 2005) or day centre group 
interactions (Lindholm, 2013). Lindholm found that group members would 
compensate for others’ difficulties, for example by slowing down their talk and 
repeating turns. Mason et al coded types of turns at talk in two support groups, 
and although they found a low incidence of what they classified as ‘helping 
behaviours’ (9% of talk in group A and 16% in group B) they found that in 
interviews patients reported feeling supported, and suggested that this might be 
due to the sense of containment within the group. Hedman et al also examined 
support groups and found that patients supported each other’s expressions of 
sense of self, especially in discussions of dementia as a burden and in 
developing coping strategies. The authors compared (anecdotally) the group 
discussions with individual interviews with the people with dementia prior to the 
support group, and found that people emphasized their difficulties more in a 
group with other people with dementia than in discussion with the researcher. 
Additionally, although not all people with dementia spoke up about their 
difficulties in the groups, all reported a feeling of collective identity and support.  
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Companion as patient advocate and professional informant: 
Hunsaker et al (2010) found that companions were twice as likely as patients to 
initiate discussion of dementia related behaviours with doctors, and Sugarman 
et al (2007) similarly found that companions delivered more biomedical 
information about the patients than the patients themselves. In both studies, the 
people with dementia were in mild or moderate stages of the illness, and 
Sugarman et al found no statistical relationship with illness severity and the 
information provided by companions. Hasselkus (1994) suggests that 
companion interjections can result in patient marginalization due to assumptions 
of (in)capacity, which may be attributable to ageist or paternalistic attitudes, or 
long standing family relationships. Alternatively, Hunsaker et al (2010) argued 
that companion assertiveness is important to increase support for patients. 
However, they found that while memory difficulties were more readily 
discussed, disruptive behaviours (e.g. irritability or wandering) were under-
reported. They suggested there might be discomfort for the companion in 
divulging sensitive information in the presence of their relative. Similarly, 
Hasselkus describes episodes of ‘protective caregiving’, where companions 
subtly communicate with professionals ‘without overtly highlighting the patient’s 
incapacity’. However, Hunsaker found that companion reports of behaviours 
were more likely when their burden was higher, suggesting that in an attempt to 
save embarrassment for the person with dementia, companions may only raise 
issues when the need is great. 
 
Professional challenges and communicative strategies: 
Several studies noted the particular importance of the increased conversational 
role of the professional in dementia care, given the likely cognitive impairment 
of patients (Hedman et al., 2014a, Mason et al., 2005). However, Robinson 
(2009) noted that psychiatrists found certain areas challenging, namely 
balancing patient and companion needs, presenting information for shared 
decision making and exploring patient experiences. Additionally, Bohling et al 
(1991) observed that patients may change the topic or meaning of 
conversations in a place that may not be socially expected, and professionals 
often cope with the confusion by returning to their own topic immediately or after 
only a brief attempt at understanding the patient, resulting in patient frustration. 
These difficulties also occurred in support group settings, with Hedman et al 
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(2014b) presenting evidence of some people with dementia explicitly showing 
annoyance when other patients dominate the conversation or repeat 
themselves and the facilitator does not intervene. 
 
Hence, interactional work to ensure mutual understanding was a recurrent 
theme. Bourgeois and Mason (1996) aimed to enhance patient-professional 
communication by developing a memory wallet intervention, which they showed 
decreased “ambiguous” patient statements, but had varying effects for the four 
patients trialled. Kemper (1994) found professionals subtly adapted their speech 
when addressing elderly people and specifically used longer pauses, shorter 
sentences and fewer cohesive devices when interacting with people with 
dementia, although the study did not address if this enhanced the interaction. 
Lindholm and Wray (2011) examined a game played in day centres, and argued 
that game playing assumes that the person with dementia has entered the 
“world” of the game with the professional – that it is a game rather than a test. 
They note that if the game were introduced unclearly, any work the professional 
may do to maintain the patient’s dignity within the game would be lost.  
 
Strategies to address cognitive impairment in interactions were also identified. 
Lindholm’s papers (Lindholm and Wray, 2011, Lindholm, 2013) raised the issue 
of whether factual correctness should really be the aim when conversing with 
people with dementia in a day centre, or whether compensatory work by the 
professional may result in less testing interactions. They also, perhaps 
conversely, found that elaborate responses highlighting the patient’s 
shortcomings might provide patients with more of an opportunity to repair 
understanding and continue the interaction, or to insert humour into the 
exchange, therefore maintaining common ground with the professional. 
However, different professionals and patients responded differently, making 
blanket recommendations for communication difficult. Hasselkus (1994) 
reported that some professionals carried out their tasks while masking their 
knowledge of the patient’s incapacity, although no examples of this were 
described. Hunsaker et al (2010) noted that when professionals asked directly 
about dementia related behaviours in GP consultations, ensuing discussions on 
the topic were not more likely to occur. They argued that this might be due to 
patients and carers not wanting to explicitly foreground sensitive problems in 
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front of each other. They therefore suggested that professionals utilize more 
subtle techniques to elicit discussions, for example by being aware of and 
responding to oblique allusions to difficulties. Robinson et al (2009) suggested 
that practical and structural factors, such as seating arrangements and whether 
patients and carers are seen separately, may also be important to encourage 
patient centred care in outpatient settings.  
 
Discussion: 
 
The overarching themes in the 23 studies of naturally occurring communication 
between people with dementia, their companions and healthcare professionals 
in outpatient settings were the diagnostic delivery, involvement of people with 
dementia, and participant strategies used in adapting to the impact of cognitive 
impairment on interactions. 
 
There was evidence that differing patient capabilities and companion and 
professional roles in these healthcare interactions can create difficulties for all 
participants. Cognitive impairment impacts on the patient’s involvement, and a 
preserved awareness of their incompetence at certain points in the interaction is 
manifested in considerable attempts to save face. The companion’s dual role as 
an informant and an advocate of the patient is a recurring theme, and also one 
that is evident in other literature on triadic healthcare interactions, for example 
in doctor communication with adolescents (van Staa, 2011) and patients with 
psychosis (McCabe et al., 2002). Professionals can understandably struggle in 
striking a balance between fulfilling their institutional role and providing 
emotional support to both patient and companion. This has not only been noted 
in other diagnosis settings, such as HIV and learning disabilities, but is also a 
feature of delivering bad news in general conversation, where speakers will 
convey information in an abstract, fact-based way and avoid emotional 
language (Maynard, 2003a). Further additional challenges for professionals are 
manifest by the presence of a third party with additional needs and 
expectations. These sometimes-conflicting roles and differing participant 
concerns often shaped the interactions and were identified as potential 
explanations for the communication difficulties observed. 
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The ethical dilemmas that arise with diminishing capacity also emerged in the 
studies. For example, Lindholm (2011) illustrated how professionals will vary 
between highlighting incorrect patient responses and glossing over 
misunderstandings. In day centre activities it may not be deemed ethically 
problematic to save the patient embarrassment by moving on in the interaction. 
However, whether this still acceptable when delivering diagnoses or making 
treatment decisions or whether ensuring factual understanding should be the 
primary goal at this stage is uncertain. There is now a general acceptance that 
dementia diagnosis disclosure should be the norm (van den Dungen et al., 
2014). However, there was evidence of both subtle and overt marginalisation 
with studies showing companions speaking twice as much as patients in 
primary care, and corridor conversations taking place prior to diagnosis delivery. 
This may lead to patient disempowerment, future withdrawal from social 
situations, and feelings of frustration and diminished self-worth (Sabat, 2001). 
However, given the emotional impact of the diagnosis for all involved, and the 
frustration and anxiety patients are shown to experience when they have been 
misunderstood or do not understand, the ideal level of patient involvement 
remains an ongoing discussion (Abley et al., 2013). Additionally, while patients 
and companions might want to know all the facts about their illness, it still needs 
to be communicated in a sensitive manner. While there is some research on 
‘truth telling’ in dementia care (Pinner, 2000), it is clear that more research is 
required on how this is best done, in terms of both how it is communicated and 
the physical setting, and the effects this has on patient and companion 
involvement and understanding. For example, in those studies that explored 
diagnostic delivery it was found that mitigating language left room for patients 
and companions to misinterpret important diagnostic information. However, 
while clearer and more straightforward delivery may improve understanding, it 
may cause a more negative emotional impact. Similarly, ‘protective caregiving’ 
could minimise distress and save face, but may result in barriers to shared 
decision making and patient centred communication.  
 
Strengths and limitations: 
The strengths of this review lie in the systematic and transparent methods of 
data searching, extraction and synthesis, and the focus on direct recordings of 
communication. The inclusion of a variety of professional types and settings 
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increases generalisability. However, given the heterogeneity of qualitative 
research, the variation in reporting and the need to exclude studies based on 
lack of methodological clarity, the resulting quality of included studies was only 
moderate. There was wide variation in the type and stage of dementia, which 
will impact on the communication, but this information was sometimes lacking 
from the studies. Finally, only papers published in English were included. 
 
Conclusions and future research: 
Three-way patient-companion-professional communication in the management 
of dementia raises a number of ethical questions: in particular, how to strike a 
balance between the different communicative needs of patients and carers; how 
to moderate the emotional impact of a diagnosis of dementia while ensuring 
clarity; and whether to minimise or expose interactional difficulties and 
misunderstandings to enrich patient understanding and participation. 
 
Future research should specify the interactional context and degree of cognitive 
impairment along with communicative strategies that appear to be effective. 
Rather than assuming that particular communicative behaviours are positive or 
negative, specific consequences for patients and companions should be 
explored. An area of clear importance is the delivery of a diagnosis of dementia, 
and the emotional impact for all parties, including professionals, who may 
require support in attending to the emotional import for patients and 
companions. Further research is therefore important to inform guidance for 
healthcare professionals to ensure clear communication and understanding in 
outpatient care whilst still maintaining a sensitive and empathic approach. 
 
 
 
Conversation analytic studies of outpatient dementia interaction 
published from 2015 to 2016 
 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, a repeat systematic search, which 
would be necessary to be absolutely certain that there were no relevant papers 
published between August 2014 and November 2016 that have been missed, 
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has not been conducted. However, regular literature searches using the same 
search terms were undertaken, as well as forward citation searches of the 
papers included in the review, reading related papers and their references lists, 
and discussions with researchers in the field. In these searches, 6 particularly 
relevant papers published since 2014 have been identified as important to 
discuss. All these papers use conversation analysis (CA) to examine 
interactions between healthcare professionals and people with dementia.  
 
Two papers have been published from a group of researchers aiming to create 
a diagnostic conversational profile of people with dementia (Jones et al., 2016, 
Elsey et al., 2015). Video recordings of the history taking section of the initial 
assessment in memory clinics were examined to see how people who ended up 
receiving diagnoses of dementia interacted with the clinician (n=15), compared 
with people who ended up with non-progressive, functional diagnoses (n=15). 
People with dementia were less likely to be able to answer questions about 
personal information, and often appealed to their companions to answer 
questions for them. They often showed a lack of ability to hold information in 
working memory – for example forgetting things the doctor had said, or that they 
had already told the doctor. This also resulted in difficulties in answering multi-
part questions, for example “do you know why you’ve been referred to this 
clinic, and who is more concerned?” Additionally, people with dementia took 
longer to answer questions, and provided less detail than people who did not 
receive a dementia diagnosis. These studies provided insight into specific 
features of interaction that are affected even in early stage dementia.  
 
Another study of memory clinic communication (Hesson and Pichler, 2016) 
examined patients’ “I don’t know” responses to questions in the cognitive test. 
Patients can say “I don’t know” as an indication of lack of knowledge, but there 
are other functions such as qualifications of responses (“oh I don’t know, but I 
guess..”), filling up the gap while working out the answers (“I don’t know, I just 
go by..”), and indicating resistance to answering questions (“I don’t know there’s 
so many different ones to start with”). The authors found that people with more 
severe dementia would use more of the “I don’t know” utterances that indicate 
lack of knowledge, and argued that awareness of this could aid clinicians in 
recognising the level of a person’s cognitive impairment.  
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A highly relevant study to this thesis was by Peel (2015), who observed how 
one clinician delivered dementia diagnoses to 5 patients in a memory clinic. She 
found that patterns of dementia diagnosis delivery were very similar to 
diagnoses in other settings (as discussed in Chapter 1): the doctor delivered the 
diagnosis indirectly using evidence from the brain scan, and patients and their 
companions rarely responded. Her study corroborated previous findings that 
doctors avoided ‘dementia’ and ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ labels, and found that 
these labels were only observed if the patient’s companions instigated their use. 
Additionally, in the one case she examined where the diagnostic term 
Alzheimer’s disease was used by the doctor, the patient then displayed a lack of 
knowledge of what the diagnosis entails in his response (“it (my memory) is 
coming back”). This led Peel to argue that the use of diagnostic terms may not 
facilitate the patient’s explicit understanding of the diagnosis. 
 
The remaining three studies were less relevant to this thesis. Two papers 
observed the challenges involved in implementing cognitive tests when an 
interpreter is needed (Plejert et al., 2015, Majlesi and Plejart, 2016). These 
papers highlighted how difficult it was to see what aspects of the situation were 
impacting on the cognitive test when patients did not speak the language of the 
tester. Clinicians, interpreters and patients all used non-verbal communication 
such as gesturing and body positioning to maintain interactional flow.  
 
The last study was a continuation of the studies in the systematic review by 
Lindholm (2015), who observed how care workers responded when one person 
with dementia in a day care centre produced “confabulations” – i.e. told them 
something that the care worker knew was not the case. There were a 
continuum of responses care workers would use – from open or embedded 
challenges to acquiescence and encouragement. There was no evidence that 
the person with dementia preferred one response to another, but the authors 
argued that as confabulations often contain links to the person’s past, 
engagement may help care workers gain insight into their experiences.  
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Conclusion 
 
The papers summarised above thus complement the findings of the review. The 
difficult balance in maintaining the at times competing factors of the 
understanding, involvement and emotional well being of the person with 
dementia, and the healthcare professional’s honesty and need to complete 
clinical tasks, can be found throughout the studies. The impact of the patient’s 
lack of insight into their symptoms, and potential lack of orientation to the topics 
of discussion, was demonstrated across different clinical settings. These 
themes will be developed throughout this thesis.  
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Chapter Three: 
Context, Methodology, and  
Participant Information 
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Context – The Memory Clinic 
 
Data were collected for this thesis in two sites in the UK – Devon (Site A) and 
London (Site B). While the memory clinic structure is essentially the same 
nationally, following the NICE guidance for dementia diagnosis and assessment 
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2006), each clinic is set up differently 
within the recommended pathway (summarised in Figure 2). The diagnostic 
process within this pathway differed between the two sites, details of which will 
be explained below.  
Referral from the GP 
A referral to the memory clinic will come from the patient’s GP. Some people 
may have gone to the GP themselves worrying about their memory problems, 
some have been taken by a family member or friend, or the GP may have 
noticed symptoms and recommended a referral. The GP will take the history 
and usually do a short assessment with the patient. They will also refer the 
patient for blood and urine tests, as well as administer any other physical 
examinations to rule out cognitive impairment caused by other factors such as 
strokes. This information will therefore be available to the memory clinic when 
triaging the patient for assessment.  
 
Cognitive Assessment, History Taking, and Brain Scan 
The cognitive assessment and brain scans are organised by the memory 
clinics. The cognitive assessments can take place in the memory clinic or at the 
Referral 
from GP 
Physical 
Tests: Brain 
Scan, Blood 
Test 
Cognitive 
Testing: e.g. 
ACE, MMSE 
History 
Taking (also 
from family 
member) 
Professionals 
Meet to Make 
Diagnosis 
Decision  
Diagnostic 
Feedback 
Meeting  
Post-
Diagnosis 
Meeting  
(if dementia) 
Referral for 
Further 
Testing (if 
unsure) 
Discharge to 
GP (if MCI or 
no diagnosis) 
Figure 2: Memory clinic process 
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patient’s home. In Site A psychology assistants conduct the assessments, and 
in Site B the clinicians vary according to clinic and can be a psychologist, nurse, 
or in some cases the same psychiatrist or geriatrician who delivers the 
diagnosis.  
 
The cognitive assessments differ between clinics, but the majority of the 
patients in the study took the ACE-III (87%), and a proportion took the MMSE 
(9%). The cognitive assessments take on average 30 minutes to an hour. The 
ACE-III has a total score of 100, with a score lower than 82-88 (depending on 
the patient’s pre-morbid IQ) indicating difficulties beyond that which would occur 
with ageing. The MMSE has a total score of 30, with the cut-off point for 
dementia being lower than 26. The ACE-III and MMSE are brief cognitive tests 
that are used clinically to detect dementia, but their specificity can be lacking 
with people in earlier stages or with unusual symptom presentations 
(Velayudhan et al., 2014). More detailed neuropsychological tests are not 
routinely administered, but should there be a clinical uncertainty about the 
diagnosis the patient may be referred for further testing. This occurred for two of 
the patients in the study, but these test results were not collected or reported to 
the patient in detail in the video recorded meeting. 
 
The patient will be interviewed on their symptom history in the same 
appointment as the assessment. The memory clinics ask the patient to attend 
the appointment with a family member or someone who knows them well, and 
this companion plays a key role in the history taking (examples of letters in 
Appendix B). In Site A the patient’s companions have an in-depth interview on 
the patient’s history while the patient undertakes the cognitive testing, and thus 
the patient is not present. Site B has no formal separation of patient and their 
companion at this stage, although it reportedly commonly occurs. 
 
The patients also have a CT scan, which gives an indication of any structural 
changes to the brain. The scan is used primarily to rule out any tumours or 
major strokes that may account for any cognitive impairment, and is thus not a 
diagnostic tool for dementia. However, there is a link between Alzheimer’s 
disease and atrophy (loss of volume) of the brain in the region around the 
hippocampus, and thus doctors use this as an indication of likely dementia. 
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Additionally, the scan can show a change in the blood flow of the brain, which is 
caused by small vessel disease and can cause vascular dementia. In early 
dementia however the scan may show no more changes than one would expect 
with normal ageing, and a cognitively intact person may have some of these 
changes in the brain but not have dementia. The doctor thus will not be able to 
tell the patient’s diagnosis from the scan alone.  
 
In Site B these assessment and brain scan appointments take place separately, 
usually over one or two months, although this can take longer. Site A has a 
different approach, where the assessments, history taking and diagnosis 
feedback all take place on the same day, and for the clinic based in the hospital 
the brain scan is also on the same day. Therefore, while in Site B the patient 
will have one appointment for the brain scan, one for the assessment and 
another for feedback, in Site A the patient has one appointment for all the 
stages, which takes about 4 hours.  
 
The average number of days between GP referral and the diagnostic feedback 
meeting in Site A was 69 (approximately 10 weeks). The referral data was 
missing for two of the trusts within Site B, but for the remaining trust there were 
on average 134 days (18-19 weeks) between GP referral and diagnostic 
feedback. 
 
Diagnostic Decision Making 
Once all the information from the history taking, physical tests, and cognitive 
tests has been collected, the psychiatrist or geriatrician will meet with the rest of 
their team to assess the evidence. In Site A, where everything happens on the 
same day, this meeting takes place once the patient has completed the tests 
and their companion has completed the carer’s interview. The meeting consists 
of a half hour discussion between the doctor, the psychologist who 
administered the test, and the nurse who conducted the companion interview. 
The patient and their companion wait in the waiting room during this time. The 
Site B clinics differ in their approach, but tend to have weekly or fortnightly 
meetings where the cases are discussed in the larger team and diagnostic 
decisions are made ready to be fed back at the patient’s next appointment. 
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Dementia is a complex, clinical diagnosis. People can score under the threshold 
in the cognitive tests not only if they have dementia, but also if they are anxious 
or have low mood, a low level of education, sensory impairments, or do not 
speak English as a first language. Similarly, as stated above, the brain scan 
cannot provide a clear indication that the patient has dementia. For this reason, 
the doctor is reliant on the history when coming to their diagnostic conclusion: 
the collateral information from the patient and especially the patient’s 
companion is key. A patient may have perfect cognitive test scores and there 
may be little evidence for dementia on the brain scan, but if he or she has 
experienced a change in cognitive functioning, which cannot be explained by 
depression or anxiety, then this might point towards a diagnosis of dementia. Of 
particular importance is that this is a change in functioning over time, and hence 
patients may need to be tested over time to detect deterioration. Likewise, if the 
patient did not do well on the cognitive test and had some vascular risk factors 
or atrophy on the scan, but has recently gone through a dramatic life change 
such as a partner dying or retirement, this may not lead to a diagnose of 
dementia. Reaching a diagnosis of dementia therefore involves balancing up 
numerous pieces of evidence, and thus there can often be uncertainty 
surrounding diagnostic accuracy. 
 
Pre-diagnosis Counselling 
For patients in Site A, there is no contact from the memory clinic prior to the day 
of diagnostic feedback other than the appointment letter (Appendix B). This 
letter outlines what will happen on the day in terms of a scan followed a meeting 
with memory clinic staff. However, the possibility of a dementia diagnosis is not 
mentioned in the letter, with the following paragraph describing the potential 
outcome of the day:  
 
“The purpose of the Memory Clinic is to assist people in Devon who may have 
problems with memory.  Later, when we have a clear understanding of your 
circumstances we may be able to advise you on ways of helping with the 
memory difficulties.” 
 
While the psychology assistant may explain the testing and the fact that this 
may lead to a dementia diagnosis when they meet the patient and their 
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companion in the clinic, there is no formal process of informing or consent for 
the diagnosis to take place. 
 
Some clinics in Site B explicitly use the initial assessment appointments as pre-
diagnostic counselling – i.e. prepare the patient for a possible diagnosis and 
discuss their preferences for treatment and support should they have dementia. 
However, there is only one clinic (from nine) with a formal process in place, 
despite recommendations for pre-diagnostic counselling in the UK national 
memory clinic guidelines (Hodge et al., 2014). Similar to Site A, the 
appointment letter for the diagnosis feedback does not mention the possibility 
that the person will receive a diagnosis of dementia (Appendix B). 
 
Diagnostic Feedback Meeting 
The next stage of the memory clinic process is the appointment where the 
patient receives (or does not receive) a diagnosis of dementia. It is these 
meetings that are video recorded and examined in this thesis. In Site A this 
meeting occurs on the same day as the patient’s assessment, at the end of 
their 4 hours slot at the memory clinic. In Site B this meeting may occur from 
weeks to months after the initial assessment. The goal of this meeting is to 
diagnose the patient, start them on appropriate treatments, and refer and 
signpost them to relevant support services. In all the clinics in the study, the 
doctors (psychiatrists or geriatricians) lead the diagnostic feedback meetings. In 
Site A they are usually the only clinician in the room, but in Site B the clinician 
who conducted the initial assessment, or the clinician or support worker who will 
follow the patient up, are often also present. These clinicians are usually mental 
health practitioners working in the NHS, or support workers from the 
Alzheimer’s Society. 
 
People who are told that they have mild cognitive impairment, or that their 
difficulties are not sufficiently severe to receive a diagnosis, are discharged with 
instructions to go back to their GP if they notice their memory problems getting 
any worse. The patients who are told their memory problems are due to 
psychological factors may be referred to the mental health team, prescribed 
anti-depressants, or referred for therapy, and will then also be discharged. 
When the doctor is not clear what is causing the patient’s memory problems, 
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they may refer the patient for further cognitive testing or a more detailed brain 
scan. Another appointment will be booked, usually with the same clinician, to 
discuss those results.  
 
Post-Diagnostic Meetings 
Should a patient receive a diagnosis of dementia, they usually meet with 
someone connected to the memory clinic between a week and a month after 
their diagnostic feedback. Nurses, occupational therapists, or more increasingly 
Alzheimer’s Society support workers run these meetings. The purpose is to 
check how the patient has reacted to medications if they were prescribed, and 
also to discuss planning for the future, such as setting up lasting power of 
attorney (giving permission for another person to take over financial and health 
decisions in the event of loss of capacity). Information is provided for the patient 
and their family on memory services available in their area, such as memory 
cafés or dementia-friendly groups. The number and nature of post-diagnosis 
meetings varies according to the individual clinic, but memory clinics generally 
do not provide long term care for patients unless they have complex needs. If 
the patient requires further support in the home they will be referred to social 
services. The patient’s GP will be in charge of monitoring medication once the 
patient has been discharged from the clinic.  
 
Methodology – Data Collection and Conversation Analysis 
Data Collection 
Data was collected from 9 memory clinics across 4 NHS trusts (Devon 
Partnership NHS trust, East London NHS foundation trust, Camden and 
Islington Foundation NHS trust, Barts Health NHS trust). Data collection ran 
from May 2014 to October 2015.  
 
Professionals were identified through established links with the participating 
trusts, and contacted at first through email, and then by telephone. Once 
recruited, clinicians or their administrative staff identified eligible patients. All 
patients attending the memory clinic were eligible other than those who did not 
understand English sufficiently to take part in the diagnosis feedback without an 
interpreter. The use of an interpreter was deemed a disruption to the 
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communication of the diagnosis, which, while an interesting topic of research 
(Plejert et al., 2015), is beyond the scope of this study. A letter outlining the 
study was sent from the clinician to potential participants with their memory 
clinic appointment letter. When the patient and their companion arrived at the 
clinic, a researcher approached them to discuss the study and obtain written, 
informed consent. Their meetings with the clinicians were then filmed without 
the researcher present.  
 
Equipment 
The memory clinic meetings were filmed using GoPro HERO3+ black edition 
cameras. The majority of the meetings were recorded using two cameras, 
placed so as to capture as much detail as possible, ensuring all participant 
faces were captured. The meetings were also audio recorded using 
dictaphones to ensure maximum chance of high quality audio capture. Audacity 
audio processing software was used for CA transcription of the diagnostic 
feedback, as well as QuickTime for non-verbal information. The CA transcription 
was done using the Jeffersonian method (Jefferson, 2004), see Appendix C for 
transcription notation. This method of transcription uses symbols to identify all 
features of talk, including the timing (such as when different speakers overlap 
and the exact length of pauses), as well as changes in pitch, volume, and 
speed. I transcribed 46 diagnosis deliveries for CA analysis and the remaining 
were transcribed by the company CA Transcription.  
 
Conversation Analysis 
Two of the research aims of the thesis are to describe how dementia diagnoses 
are delivered in memory clinics and how people with dementia respond to the 
diagnosis. The literature review identified broad themes affecting 
communication of diagnosis (namely emotional impact and misunderstandings) 
and communication with people with dementia in other outpatient settings 
(balancing patient and companion needs and compensation for cognitive 
impairment), and recommended further exploration of the diagnostic interaction 
itself. The method chosen for this exploration within this thesis is Conversation 
Analysis. 
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CA is “a qualitative approach to the study of social organisation of human 
interaction” (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984).  It was developed as a method to 
analyse talk as it occurs naturally, “directly and with repeated inspection, (to) 
discover and elucidate orderly phenomena evident in the domains of actual talk 
and social interaction” (Sidnell and Stivers, 2013, :27). CA is an unmotivated, 
inductive method that aims to identify and describe regularities in the sequential 
organisation of our interactions that enable us to communicate meaningfully.  
 
The theory behind CA is that it is the study of talk in interaction. What makes it 
different from other sociological, linguistic, or psychological studies of talk is that 
while it is interested in language, its primary concern is how social actions are 
organised and constructed within interactions. In this sense, CA is a study not 
of what language an utterance contains, but what social action is being 
achieved within that utterance. In CA, participants within interactions co-
construct the meaning of social actions by their construction (i.e. design of our 
utterances) and placement within a sequence of talk. The role of sequence 
within interaction creates expectations for participants to respond in a certain 
way. For example, if one participant asks a question, the expected response is 
for the other participant to answer the question. These sequences become 
rules, which participants in interactions are accountable for sticking to. These 
are evidenced by the fact that, should a participant not adhere to the expected 
sequence, there is generally a public display of accounting for that rule-break. 
For example, if the participant did not understand the question and thus cannot 
answer it, they will initiate a “repair” – such as asking the speaker to repeat their 
question.   
 
CA as a study of sequence and design of talk allows an interesting approach to 
doctor-patient interaction, in that it allows a direct examination of how an 
institutional action is acted upon by participants of that institutional interaction. 
Specific to this study, it allows us to take the concept of “diagnosis delivery” and 
see how this action is undertaken by doctors and responded to by patients. This 
allows a description (within the CA framework of sequence, turn design, and 
social actions) of how these actions occur in “ordinary life” (Mondada, 2013, 
p34). Therefore, while other methods of analysing communication (e.g. coding 
certain interactional features) can seek and identify behaviours and count their 
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frequency, they do not report how these behaviours are communicated and how 
they affect the interaction as it unfolds. CA, through microanalysis of how our 
communication develops within a sequence of talk, is able to report on the 
subtle nature of interaction in a way no other method can.” 
 
CA is an established, rigorous method to identify interactional behaviours in 
different contexts in many different disciplines. As the vast majority of tasks 
accomplished by clinicians occur via communication, CA has been identified as 
a useful tool in examining healthcare interactions (Parry and Land, 2013). As 
discussed in the introduction, CA has been used to identify broad features of 
medical interactions such as the organisation and structure of consultations 
(Robinson and Heritage, 2005), and how participant roles manifest in medical 
interactions, such as how patients are able assert ownership of their 
experiences (Heath, 1992). Furthermore, the ways that doctors design their 
turns at talk have been shown to affect the participation of the patient in the 
interaction. An example of this is that doctors formulate questions to expect 
certain answers: for example “no blood or anything?” expects a negative 
response, and thus makes it harder for patients to say they are experiencing 
that symptom (Heritage, 2009). CA, in describing these behaviours within 
doctor-patient talk, provides “a sound basis for assessing the likely interactional 
and communicative of consequences of adopting one form (of talk) rather than 
another” (Drew et al., 2001, p67). 
 
CA has also been highlighted as a useful method in examining interactions 
where one participant has dementia. While other methods to explore 
communication may focus on the deficits of the person with dementia, CA sees 
interaction as a collaborative achievement, and the successful progression of 
the interaction thus depends on both parties (Perkins et al., 1998). This can 
lead to useful discoveries in how to improve interaction with people with 
dementia. For example, Hamilton (1994) showed that turn taking is present 
even in late stage dementia, but the split second timing required in multi-party 
interactions causes difficulties for someone with dementia to enter 
conversations. Identifying specific communication issues for people with 
dementia such as this can result in those who are interacting with people with 
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dementia modifying their behaviours in a productive way to enhance 
communication.  
 
Conversation Analysis is an established and useful tool for examining both 
medical interactions and interactions with people with dementia. However, the 
vast majority of the literature on dementia diagnosis delivery consists of 
interviews with participants, which are limited by memory and post hoc 
rationalisations that the interview structure can induce. The advantage of CA as 
a method is that it allows examination of the diagnosis deliveries themselves, 
not how people report experiencing them, or limited aspects of the interaction 
as dictated by a coding scheme. As stated in the previous chapter, there is only 
one paper using CA examining dementia diagnosis delivery to date (Peel, 
2015). This study illustrated data from three meetings with one clinician, and 
states “larger data-corpora of talk within the memory clinic context” (page 7) are 
needed. 
 
Data Analysis Methodology 
CA methodology was thus employed to examine the diagnosis delivery and 
patient responses (Sidnell, 2013). Initial analysis involved repeated watching of 
the videos, mapping topics and noting the time started and time spent on each 
topic within the meetings. This was recorded in tables and then repeated in 
NVivo to link the mapping to the text in the transcripts. The structure of the 
meetings was identified, which is described in Chapter 4. 
 
After identifying the meeting structure, the sections of the diagnosis feedback 
where the diagnosis is named and the patients responded to the diagnosis were 
identified. These sections were transcribed in more detail, using Jeffersonian 
notation (see Appendix C). The next stage consisted of identifying turns where 
the action of “diagnosis delivery” was undertaken by the doctor. These were 
defined as the first instance where the diagnostic label was attributed to the 
patient (more detail in Chapter 5). Detailed analysis of these sequences 
identified systematic patterns of the diagnosis delivery and responses across 
the consultations. The precise design of the turns was analysed, i.e. the words 
used and the order in which they were used. This facilitated further description 
of the commonalities and differences across the 81 cases. 
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The analysis was conducted individually, but also frequently in groups in CA 
data sessions. The data were presented at different CA data sessions nationally 
(DARG, EMCA conference and CARP), and at one international CA conference 
(ICCAP, Ghent 2014). I also presented at 3 data sessions when spending a 
semester studying CA at UCLA, which was the place where CA was founded 
and offer undergraduate and graduate programmes in the method (Sacks and 
Jefferson, 1995). Additionally, in attending national data sessions, UCLA 
seminars, and CA conferences throughout my PhD, I gained insight and 
understanding from others working in the CA field, which I was able to apply to 
my work. On return from UCLA an average of 3 data sessions a month were 
held with my supervisor and colleagues at Exeter University. 
 
Presentations to clinical audiences at conferences (one national, one 
international and four within Exeter University Medical School) and informal 
discussions with clinicians taking part in the project also informed the analysis. 
The ethnographic information that the clinicians were able to provide was 
extremely important in examining the data. Additionally, spending time in the 
clinics when recruiting participants, as well as prior experience of working in a 
memory clinic, provided important insight as to the context of the diagnostic 
interaction.  
 
NVivo (version 11) was useful throughout the data analysis process to be able 
to easily access different segments of the meeting, and also as a method of 
coding different doctor and patient behaviours throughout the dataset once 
practices had been identified using CA. This was particularly useful given the 
size of the dataset. Word and Excel tables were also created and much 
adapted throughout the process to have more focussed collation of specific 
aspects of the analysis.  
 
A note on the validity and reliability of Conversation Analysis  
When conducting the systematic review, it was evident that the CA papers 
scored the lowest marks on the CASP Quality Assessment Scale. This was 
invariably due to the reporting of the analysis itself – with the studies scoring 
little or no points in their description of minimising researcher bias in data 
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collection and analysis and in selecting data for presentation. It is thus worth 
noting that as CA does not adhere to the usual qualitative analysis techniques 
(of investigating meanings through interpretative analysis) that are used in more 
commonly used qualitative methods such as thematic or discourse analysis 
(Parry and Land, 2013), validity and reliability are dealt with in a different 
manner. 
 
CA comes from an ethnomethodological tradition and is an inductive method. 
As Roberts and Robinson explain both "the process and the product" of CA are 
"grounded in the communicators' orientations, which are themselves grounded 
in the observable features of naturally occurring interaction" (2004, p337). The 
product of CA is a therefore representation of the data itself. In this sense, 
much of the validity of CA is through making the findings transparent: the 
behaviours described should be apparent for the reader in the presentation of 
the data (Kirk and Miller, 1986).  
 
There are 3 established practices in CA to ensure validity of findings: 
 
1. The “next-turn proof procedure” (Sidnell, 2013, p79): As Sacks described, in 
CA it is the data itself that provides our interpretation of talk: “since it is the 
parties’ understandings of prior turns’ talk that is relevant to their 
construction of next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for 
analysis” (Sacks et al., 1974, p729). Hence, the analysis of an utterance is 
grounded in how participants in the interaction respond to that utterance. In 
this sense, the interpretation of an utterance is evident in the data 
presented, and this provides a transparency of analysis to the reader that 
enhances validity (Peräkylä, 2004).  
 
2. Presentation of “deviant cases”: Regular patterns in talk can be 
demonstrated by presenting deviant cases. These cases, that are different 
from others in similar contexts or settings, can openly test hypotheses about 
the data: both in examinations of what the specific differences are, and how 
participants in the interaction respond to these differences. For example, 
questions requesting information place an obligation for the recipient to 
provide that information. Should the recipient not provide that information 
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(i.e. a deviant case), this is oriented to by the participants in the interaction – 
for example by the questioner further pursuing a response, or recipient 
apologising or stating that they do not know the answer. The participants, in 
accounting for why something has not happened as it should, themselves 
provide evidence for the ‘norm’.  
 
3. Use of “data sessions”: Data sessions with CA researchers allow for 
repeated inspection and discussion of data (both with transcripts and the 
video recordings). This enables analysts an opportunity to reflect on 
observations and CA interpretations of action, sequence and turn design. 
Data sessions involve presentation of one or two examples of practices or 
actions, with analysis undertaken as a group to encourage discussion and 
debate. This allows public demonstration of individual analysis to other 
researchers, over many stages of the analytic process. At the beginning of 
the analysis, when only a minority of cases have been analysed individually, 
this can provide inspiration as how to approach the analysis of the remaining 
data. At later stages of the analysis, data sessions provided a forum for 
discussion that allow for re-characterisations of the findings from alternative 
explanations for behaviours from other analysts (Albert, 2014).  
 
Recordings are at the heart of the CA method, preserving the important objects 
of study of communication: the practices that participants implement and are 
oriented to within temporal boundaries and sequences. Sacks (1984, :26) 
argued that recordings are “a good enough record of what happened” in order 
to analyse what in conversation is treated relevant by participants. However, as 
with all methods it is important to minimise potential biases. The presence of 
cameras may influence people's communication, or there may be something 
that the camera or the audio recorder does not catch and thus is not included in 
the analysis. High-quality recordings that control for these factors (for example 
by using un-intrusive equipment and logging when participants refer to the 
cameras) are thus very important: data collected using this method can 
preserve the details that the participants treat as relevant in interactions 
(Mondada, 2013).  
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CA, like all methodologies, also needs to recognise whether or not its findings 
can be generalised. However, CA embraces this within its analytic philosophy: 
communication is recognised as a complex object of study and blanket claims 
across contexts are not made (Parry and Land, 2013). While patterns can 
emerge and be described, the results of individual studies are not intended to 
be representative of the entire population. Despite this, as collections of certain 
types of data grow different settings can be compared and certain patterns can 
be described as less context specific (Voutilainen and Ruusuvuori, 2010). 
Additionally, Peräkylä (2004, :37) also considers generalisability in CA as “the 
possibilities of language use”. While descriptions of talk by CA are not definitive 
descriptions of talk that will be used by a person in that context, they are 
descriptions of ways of speaking that can be used. In this sense, conversation 
analysts can identify possible ways that communication can be achieved in and 
across differing contexts. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
The frequency of certain features of the interaction, identified through CA, was 
counted and explored quantitatively. The presence or absence of certain 
practices or behaviours was entered into SPSS 22, and chi-square tests of 
independence (or Fischer’s or Monte Carlo tests where cell numbers were low) 
and independent samples t-tests were used to examine relationships in the 
data.  
 
Statistical explorations of the data were designed to be secondary to the 
qualitative analysis. Practices in interaction are constantly shaped by ever-
changing activities and contexts within interaction, and therefore while 
quantitative analysis can find relationships in the data, it must be recognised 
that these will be affected by any number of other interactional and contextual 
factors. Therefore, it was recognised prior to the start of the analysis that while 
statistical associations can be useful to “assess the robustness” of the 
qualitative conclusions (Peräkylä, 2005), the nature of interactions are such that 
they cannot prove or disprove qualitative findings (Schegloff, 1993). 
 
 85 
A note on the presentation of data 
The data presented is in the form of transcripts containing Jeffersonian notation 
(Jefferson, 2004), details of which can be found in Appendix C. Data extracts 
were chosen in order to evidence the practice that was being described. Due to 
the unfolding and ever-changing nature of interaction, there were some 
examples that contained insertion sequences where participants would discuss 
something off topic, or where one of the participants would halt the progression 
of the talk to initiate repair. Of particular importance was that the extracts would 
be able to demonstrate the practice with maximum clarity to the reader, and 
thus shorter and more concise extracts were chosen for inclusion within the 
thesis. Additionally, care was taken to ensure that there was not too much 
repetition of the same doctors or patients in the examples chosen in order to 
add “transparency and trustworthiness” to the data (Tong et al., 2007, p356).  
 
The doctor is represented as “DR”, the patient as “PT”, the companion as “CN”, 
and the nurse or support worker as “CC” (standing for ‘care coordinator’). The 
data is anonymous, and is labelled based on participant ID, with Pn (e.g. P01 
etc.) standing for patient ID, and Hn (H01 etc.) standing for doctor ID. ‘H’ was 
used for DR ID because there were different healthcare professionals in the 
ShareD study, and ‘H’ was used for all. Where relevant, non-verbal behaviours 
will be indicated within the transcript in italic font. Important lines from the 
transcript as discussed in the text will have either the speaker initials or the key 
words in bold font. 
 
The aims of this thesis focus on the responses of the person with dementia, the 
patient, rather than their companion. The companion is an integral part of the 
diagnosis delivery: from providing information for the doctor to make the 
diagnosis, having their own preconceptions about the patient’s behaviour and 
its causes, to being directly affected by the impact the condition has on their 
relative or friend and thus a key stakeholder in treatment decisions. However, 
the companion’s involvement in the interaction occurs in multiple, often 
extremely subtle, ways, which could be a thesis in its own right. Therefore, while 
the companion’s input is discussed when necessary for the analysis aims for 
this thesis, it will not be the focus of the findings.  
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Participant Information 
 
There were 81 video recordings of dementia diagnosis feedback meetings 
collected between May 2014 and October 2015 that were suitable for analysis. 
There are thus 81 patients in the sample, and 20 doctors.  
 
Patient and Companion Sample Information 
The patient and companion socio-demographic information can be found in 
Table 4. The patients were on average 80 years old, ranging from 52 to 92. The 
52 year old was the only patient under 65, with 48% (n=39) of the patients in 
their eighties. The majority of the patients were female (58%) and white (86%). 
Seventy per cent were born in the UK.  
 
The scores on the ACE-III varied from 27-94 (average 67), and the score for the 
12 patients who took the MMSE varied from 7-28 (average 21). The majority of 
the patients were therefore in the mild to moderate stages of dementia. 
 
The majority of diagnoses being delivered were Alzheimer’s disease (58%), with 
Vascular dementia (15%) and Mixed Alzheimer’s and Vascular type (16%) 
being the next most common. For three of the patients the type of dementia 
was never specified. Some of the sample had rarer forms of dementia: three 
had Lewy Body dementia, two had Parkinson’s dementia, and one semantic 
dementia. These patients, while having different symptom presentations than 
the more common dementias, did not have lower cognitive test scores. Those 
with the lowest cognitive test scores had either Alzheimer’s or Vascular 
dementia. 
 
That the majority of patients had the most common subtypes of dementia (i.e. 
Alzheimer’s disease, vascular, and mixed dementia) was not surprising 
considering the consecutive sampling methods. That the majority of patients 
were over 65 reflected the fact that younger patients are likely to go through 
different pathways (e.g. neurology clinics) to be investigated for possible 
dementia. However, the overall sample contained a variety of subtypes, ages, 
and cognitive test scores. Should the lack of homogeneity may cause some 
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dementia diagnosis deliveries to differ from others, this was embraced as part of 
the CA method. As described above, should a lower cognitive test score or 
different dementia subtype affect the diagnostic communication, this can be 
described as a deviant case, which adds further to the description of a 
diagnostic ‘norm’ in memory clinics. 
 
Companions were present in 93% of the meetings – there were 6 patients who 
attended the diagnostic feedback alone. Six patients brought 2 companions and 
2 patients brought 3 companions. The majority (64%) of the companions were 
female. Companions were generally either children or children in law (45%) or 
the patient’s spouse or partner (35%).  
 
Forty-three of the patients were from Site A Devon Partnership Trust. Thirty-
eight of the patients were from Site B NHS trusts: 11 from East London, 4 from 
Barts Health, and 23 from Camden and Islington.  
 
Doctor Socio-demographic Information 
Doctor socio-demographic information can be found in Table 5. Eleven of the 
doctors (55%) were from Site B and 9 (45%) were from Site A. They had 
worked an average of 12 years with people with dementia, ranging from 4 to 25. 
Fifty-five per cent were female and 80% white. The remaining 20% were Asian 
British or Indian.  
 
There were an average of 4 patients per doctor (range 1-10). The doctors were 
primarily consultant psychiatrists (75%). Three (15%) were consultant 
geriatricians and two speciality doctors (10%).  
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Patient Characteristics  
Age 80 (52-92) 
Gender: 
   Female  
   Male 
 
47 (58%) 
34 (42%) 
Ethnicity: (n=78) 
  White British 
  White Other 
  Caribbean 
  Asian Other 
  Black or Black British 
  African 
  Other 
 
61 (75%) 
8  (10%) 
3   (4%) 
1   (1%) 
1   (1%) 
1   (1%) 
3   (4%) 
Country of Birth: (n=78) 
  UK 
  Other 
 
57 (70%) 
21 (26%) 
Diagnosis: 
  Alzheimer’s disease 
  Vascular dementia 
  Mixed dementia 
  Parkinson’s dementia 
  Dementia unspecified 
  Lewy body dementia 
  Semantic dementia 
 
47 (57%) 
12 (15%) 
13 (16%) 
2   (3%) 
3   (4%) 
3   (4%) 
1   (1%) 
Cognitive Test Scores: (n=77) 
  Addenbrooke’s Cognitive  
  Examination III (ACE-III)  
  (n=64; total 100) 
  Mini Mental Status Examination 
  (MMSE)  
  (n=12; total 30) 
  San Louis University Mental     
  Status Examination (SLUMS)   
  (n=1; total 30) 
 
67 (27-94)* 
 
 
21 (7-28) 
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Companion characteristics  
Companion Present  
 Two companions  
 Three companions  
75 (92%) 
  6 (7%) 
  2 (2%) 
Gender: 
 Female 
 Male 
 
53 (64%) 
30 (36%) 
Relationship to patient: 
  Child/Child in law 
  Spouse/Partner 
  Other  
  Friend 
  Sibling 
 
37 (45%) 
29 (35%) 
10 (12%) 
3 (4%) 
3  (4%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Patient and companion characteristics 
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Doctor Characteristics  
Gender: 
  Female   
  Male 
 
11 (55%) 
9 (45%) 
Ethnicity: 
  White British 
  Other White Background 
  Asian or Asian British 
  Indian 
 
13 (65%) 
3   (15%) 
2   (10%) 
2   (10%) 
Clinician Type: 
  Consultant Psychiatrist 
  Consultant Geriatrician 
  Specialty Doctor 
 
15 (75%) 
3   (15%) 
2   (10%) 
No of Years working in Dementia 12 (4-25) 
Clinic Location: 
  North London 
  East London 
  Devon 
 
6 (30%) 
5 (25%) 
9 (45%) 
Table 5: Doctor Characteristics 
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Chapter Four: 
“Do you remember what this is all 
about today?” 
The Structure of Dementia 
Diagnosis Feedback Meetings 
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Doctor-patient interactions are one of many institutional interactions studied in 
CA, others including courtroom interactions, calls to emergency services, and 
classroom settings (Heritage and Clayman, 2010). One of the key features of 
institutional interactions is that there is an overall task to achieve within an 
organisational structure consisting of recurrent sections (Robinson, 2003a). This 
is easily identifiable in diagnostic feedback meetings. There is an overall goal – 
to inform patients of their diagnosis – and this goal is achieved through 
separate stages of the meeting, each with their own sub-goal. The stages prior 
to diagnosis delivery consist of different tasks that build up incrementally to the 
diagnosis delivery itself (Stivers, 2002). However, there are specific factors at 
play in dementia diagnostic interactions that can lead to differing trajectories in 
completing these tasks.  
 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the diagnosis delivery, this chapter will 
describe the stages of the meeting leading up to the delivery stage.  
 
Stages of Diagnostic Feedback Meetings 
 
The institutional asymmetry evident in all medical interactions is present in 
dementia diagnosis feedback meetings. The doctor drives the interaction as the 
medical expert and steers the meeting through the different stages (Robinson, 
2003a). As described in Chapter 3, much if not all of the information gathering 
and history taking on the patient’s symptoms has been done prior to the 
diagnosis feedback meeting. Therefore the primary aim for the feedback 
meeting is to deliver the diagnosis and discuss treatment and support (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2006).  
 
There are 7 stages that occur systematically in dementia diagnosis feedback 
meetings (see Figure 3 for an overview). 
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Stage 1: Introductions  
In most of the meetings, the doctors are meeting the patients for the first time 
(n=61, 75%). Therefore, feedback meetings usually begin with the doctor 
introducing themselves and other medical professionals if present, and ensuring 
that they know the patient’s companion’s name and their relationship to the 
patient.  
 
(1) [P67_H03] 
1 DR:  hello: [        ther]e: 
2 PT:         [°(well/wow)°] 
3      (.) 
4 DR:  hi::=>hehe< .hh [I- ] I’m: do:ctor (name) I’m the  
5 PT:                  [hm,] 
6 DR:  consultant in the mem[ory  ] cl[ini::c.   ]  
7 PT:                       [yeah.]   [↑oh ri:ght] 
8 DR:  .hh ah: and I belie:ve you:’ve- [have met   ] 
9 PT:                                  [yeah: I met]  
10      [you before   ] yeah. 
11 CC:  [>you met< me.] 
12 CC:  (na:[:me) >so] I’m< one of the nurses:. 
Introductions 
Eliciting Orientation 
Eliciting Perspective on Symptoms 
Feeding back the Test Results 
Delivering the Diagnosis 
Discussing Treatment and Support 
Closing 
Figure 3: Stages of dementia diagnosis 
feedback 
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13 PT:      [yeah.   ] 
14      (.) 
15 CC:  °yeah.° 
16      (0.6) 
17 DR:  [o::kay.                 ] 
18 CN:  [>°just putting that on°<] silent, 
19      (.) 
20 DR:  .hh an:d an:d th- (.) this is your dau::ghter? 
21 PT:  yeah 
22      (0.9) 
23 PT:  (na:me), 
24 CN:  [hi::  ] 
25 DR:  [hello:] there h(h)i 
 
This stage is mostly short and straightforward as in the example above, and is 
evident as a typical introduction sequence (Pillet-Shore, 2011). The patient has 
just entered the room with her daughter, and something has happened on entry 
which has made her smile and caused her quiet exclamation (line 2) – it is 
unclear exactly what this is from the video. The doctor acknowledges this with a 
slight chuckle while he introduces himself with his name and role (lines 1-6). He 
then establishes the prior meeting between the patient and the nurse who did 
the initial assessment (line 8), which the patient and nurse both confirm (lines 9-
11). The nurse states her name and role again, looking to the daughter while 
speaking (line 12). The patient’s daughter is looking at her phone and turning it 
to silent mode, which causes the slight delay in response (lines 14-19). The 
doctor then checks the patient-companion relationship (line 20), which the 
patient confirms and introduces her daughter by name (lines 21-23), and her 
daughter responding once she finishes putting her phone away (line 24).  
 
Speakers choose to display specific category membership features in 
introductions, depending on what information is relevant to the recipient in that 
context (Pillet-Shore, 2008). The patient has met the nurse (who is present in 
the meeting) previously, and may be expected to be informed as to the nature 
of the appointment. Therefore, when the doctor uses the place reference 
“memory clinic” in introducing himself, thus referencing both the medical setting 
and the symptoms being discussed, he is displaying information that the patient 
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could be expected to already know. However, the patient’s response – an 
upward intoned “oh right” (line 7), containing a ‘change of state token’ (Heritage, 
1984) – indicates the information was not known to the patient. Additionally, the 
doctor’s “I believe you’ve met” (line 8) invites confirmation from the patient that 
she has met the nurse before. If the patient had not confirmed this, it would also 
have been an indication of lack of orientation to the clinic process.  
 
These aspects of the introduction stage are sufficiently similar to introductions in 
other settings that they may not be designed specifically as probes of patient 
orientation. However, the example above shows that apparent lack of 
awareness of the purpose of the meeting may become evident at this stage.  
 
Stage 2: Eliciting Orientation 
The second stage of the meeting contains further, more explicit checks of 
patient orientation. Doctors often elicit patient understanding of the purpose of 
their meeting through direct questioning. How this unfolds is contingent on the 
patient’s response. 
 
(2) [P46_H50] 
1 DR:  ri:ght (.) so, (0.8) so >do you know what?< (0.5) >do 
2      you remember what this is all about< today¿ 
3      (0.9) 
4 PT:  er:: (0.6) no not really. 
5 DR:  ah well I'll tell ya 
6      (1.0) 
7 DR:  nh .hh (.) you came here 
8 PT:  mm[m,] 
9 DR:    [a ] while back 
10 PT:  that's ri:ght [yes.] 
11 DR:                [  ab]out your memory. 
  
In this extract the doctor asks the patient if she remembers “what this is all 
about today” (lines 1-2).  The repair from “know what”, to “remember what” 
shows doctor orientation to the fact that the patient may have forgotten rather 
than just not know the meeting purpose. This segment occurs at the beginning 
of the meeting, and thus the “this” clearly indexes the meeting itself, which is 
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reinforced by the doctor gesturing between them, non-verbally indicating the 
meeting. The yes/no interrogative format again invites an affirmative answer, 
but the patient answers with a dispreferred “no not really”, which comes with the 
delay and hesitation common in dispreferred responses (lines 3-4). The patient 
turns to her daughter and then back to the doctor while answering, which is a 
behavior that has been observed of people with dementia in medical 
interactions when they are struggling with providing relevant information (Jones 
et al., 2016). Her hedged answer – “not really” – is also likely to indicate a face 
saving strategy: it is expected as competent adults that we will not only know 
the reason for our medical appointments, but also be able to account for them 
(Heritage and Maynard, 2005). The doctor, in responding immediately and 
launching into a narrative describing what took place previously in the process, 
covers the patient’s loss of face in the interaction, while ensuring the patient 
orientation prior to progression onto the next stage of the meeting (lines 5-11).  
 
The interaction unfolds differently when patients are aware of the reason for 
their presence at the clinic. 
 
(3) [P102_H41] 
1 DR:  ↑what expectation did you have of coming here toda:y. 
2      (1.5) 
3 PT:  somebody that would he:lp with my memory:, 
4 DR:  oh:: ↑ri:ght .hh ye::s [we:ll that's] what- that's what 
5 PT:                         [kHHM        ] 
6 DR:  we do::, 
7      (.) 
8 PT:  mm::.  
9      (0.8) 
10 DR:  .hh um tch (0.4) and I've heard the story:, er:: from:: 
11      the lady that spoke to your: daughter (name):¿  
12      (0.6)  
13 DR:  I >gather you have< ↑five children: is that ri[:ght¿] 
14 PT:                                                [  ye:]s. 
 
In this extract, the doctor asks the patient what she was expecting from the 
clinic (line 1). While there is some delay in the patient responding, she is able to 
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provide an answer that illustrates both the purpose of the clinic and some 
awareness of her memory problems (line 3). The doctor’s upward intoned news 
receipt indicates the patient’s answer may have been unexpected, but she 
continues with a confirmation of the patient’s expectation (lines 4-6). The patient 
utters an emphasised downward intoned “mm”, indicating acknowledgement 
and discouraging continuation of this topic (line 8) (Heath, 1992). The doctor is 
thus able to progress to the next phase of the meeting (lines 10-14). 
 
The doctor will not always elicit orientation using a direct question, but instead 
will present the process prior to and/or the purpose of the meeting while inviting 
a response from the patient.  
 
(4) [P85_H24] 
1 DR:  so it’s been a few months s[ince] 
2 PT:                             [ YE:]S 
3      (.) 
4 DR:  we saw you l[a:st] 
5 PT:              [ ye:]s 
6 DR:  back in September: 
7 PT:  y[es] 
8 CN:   [ m] h[m,] 
9 DR:         [we] saw you in this very bui:lding¿ 
10 PT:  that’s ri:ght. 
11      (.) 
12 DR:  and I gather that (researcher name) has spoken to you:: 
13      [befor]e: you [came i]::n,  
14 PT:  [yes  ]       [yes   ] 
 
In this example the doctor is confirming with the patient their last meeting a few 
months prior. The patient comes in with an emphasised acknowledgement 
before the doctor finishes her first turn (lines 1-2), suggesting that he follows the 
projected action of her completing her description of their previous meeting, 
thus already indicating memory of that time. The doctor comes to a potential 
turn completion (line 4) and the patient again acknowledges her statement. The 
doctor however continues her turn, upgrading by adding a date reference to 
their prior meeting, and perhaps pursuing a more extended confirmation from 
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the patient that he recalls the meeting (line 6). The patient gives a slight nod in 
this turn and provides another acknowledgement token (line 7), with his wife 
also acknowledging this (line 8). The doctor continues with a final elaboration 
(line 9), upgrading again this time with a place reference and a questioning 
intonation, and the patient adds a stronger form of agreement in line 10. With 
this the doctor appears to accept that the patient remembers and is oriented to 
the diagnostic feedback meeting, and the discussion progresses to the patient’s 
participation in the research project (line 12-14).  
 
Similarly, patients can also show lack of orientation even when doctors do not 
explicitly question them. 
 
(5) [P182_H49] 
1 DR:  I’m one of the:: psychiatrists. 
2 PT:  ye:[:s=>you’re the] psychi[atrist.<] 
3 DR:     [yeah::,       ]       [.hh     ] an:d (.) I just 
4      want to talk with you abou:t what we’ve done today:,  
5 PT:  mm:, 
6 DR:  .hh what we think might be going on and how: we can help 
7      you. 
8      (.) 
9 PT:  .hh ↑oh. 
10 DR:  is that al[ri::ght.         ] 
11 PT:       [>>well is there<<] more tablets,  
12      [=I take eight a day]: now 
13 DR:  [ahh heh heh heh    ] 
14 DR:  I [know] I saw::! 
15 PT:    [ah  ] 
16 PT:  [heh! heh!] 
17 DR:  [.hh so,  ] (.) in this clinic we see people with (1) 
18      possible: possible mild memory problems .hh and we try 
19      and deci:de (.) ↑is it due to: (.) getting olde[r,] 
20 PT:                                             [oh]:. 
21      (.) 
22 DR:  or: or could it be something else li:ke a dementia. 
23      (0.3) 
24 PT:  well my wife has got dementia.=I think I told 
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25      [the other guy] 
26 DR:  [ye:s,        ] 
27 PT:  and she’s- and I: visit her: 
 
The doctor finishes her introduction, and the patient repeats her utterance, 
which is a common feature of communication with people with dementia (Davis 
and Guendouzi, 2013) (lines 1-2). The doctor continues in overlap by stating the 
purpose of the meeting, including a reference to “what we think might be going 
on and how we can help you” (lines 3-7). This forecasting of a potential 
diagnosis with a suggestion the patient needs help may be the cause of the 
patient’s surprised response: with an upward intoned, emphasised “oh”, 
indicating that this is news to the patient (Heritage, 1984) (line 9). Given that the 
patient is from Site A, and would have had the brain scan and cognitive testing 
in the immediate 3 hours before this meeting, his surprise at the potential 
upcoming diagnosis may be unexpected. This may be why the doctor checks 
for his consent to this proposed plan for the meeting (line 10). The patient’s 
reply in overlap flags potential treatment as a concern: he’s taking eight tablets 
a day already (line 11-12). The patient’s eyes had been fixed towards the 
direction of the computer screen, which is displaying his brain scan, and when 
he looks at the doctor as he starts this utterance she begins to laugh. Doctor-
initiated laughter is rare in medical interactions but has been shown to occur 
when doctors are faced with difficult interactional tasks, such as disagreement 
over causes of symptoms (McCabe et al., 2002, Haakana, 2001). It is therefore 
likely that this laughter is a result of the patient’s resistance to treatment. 
 
The patient joins the laughter as the doctor aligns with the patient’s statement 
about multiple medications (lines 14-16). The doctor avoids answering the 
patient’s concern about medication by continuing her description of the purpose 
of the meeting. She gives a generalised clinic description (“we see people” line 
16), and minimises the symptom profile of people who attend the clinic (“with 
possible mild memory problems” line 17-18), potentially as a result of the 
patient’s resistance. However, she adds specificity and thus stronger 
forecasting of the diagnosis – by stating the purpose as trying to distinguish 
between “getting older” and “something else like a dementia” (lines 19-22). It is 
unusual for doctors to explicitly mention dementia at this point in the meeting, 
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with 22 meetings (27%) containing mentions of ‘dementia’ prior to the diagnosis 
itself, and in 4 of these cases the term is raised by the patient or companion. 
 
However, the reason for the explication of the dementia term becomes apparent 
in the patient’s response, where he topicalises his wife with dementia who he 
visits in a home (line 24-27), and the doctor’s emphasised acknowledgement of 
this (line 26) suggests prior knowledge. The patient does not however 
acknowledge the purpose of the meeting and the potential consequences as 
forecasted by the doctor, but continues with a description of his wife’s condition 
once this extract ends. While this lack of acknowledgement may indicate a 
resistance on the part of the patient, it displays an orientation to the topics being 
discussed, which is demonstrated in the doctor not pursuing further 
demonstration of orientation, and instead engaging in the patient’s description 
of his wife’s behavior (not shown due to length of extract).  
 
In summary, doctors in memory clinics can elicit patient orientation at the start 
of the meeting. This can be done through direct questioning or through stating 
the purpose of the meeting inviting patient acknowledgement. If the patient 
does not know the purpose of the meeting, the doctors will halt the progress of 
the meeting to ensure the purpose is made clear prior to continuing to the next 
stage. However, dementia terms are not often used in the meeting introduction.  
 
Stage 3: Eliciting Perspective on Symptoms  
As mentioned previously, the doctor will already have a comprehensive report 
of the patient’s symptoms from the assessment meeting. Additionally, the 
doctor will (mostly) have decided on the patient’s diagnosis prior to the start of 
the diagnosis feedback meeting. However, doctors in memory clinics spend 
substantial time reviewing the information they have in their notes with the 
patient in the feedback meeting. While this may be expected in the clinics 
where there has been a gap of weeks or months between assessment and 
feedback (Site B) and thus further information may need to be gathered, this 
stage occurs as often in Site A meetings, where the information will have been 
gathered only an hour or two previously.  
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As stated above, 75% of the doctors have not done the history taking in the 
prior meeting, and therefore it may be that they are making some aspects of the 
report clear in this stage. However, it is evident that doctors are not simply 
collecting new or additional information regarding the patient’s symptom history, 
but are primarily eliciting the patient’s perspective on their illness.  
 
(6) [P79_H17]  
1 DR:  ↑what I’m: (0.4) hea:ring from the repo:rt that my 
2      colleague (name) wrote, (0.3) s:peaking with (companion 
3      name) as we::ll (0.3) >is that< ever since your: husband 
4      sadly:: (.) ↓die::d, some years ago:, .hh 
5 PT:  three:: (.) °yea[r:s.°] 
6 DR:                  [  yes] you’ve ↑had >sort of< (0.5) some 
7      difficultie::s that have come and go::¿  
8      (0.4)  
9 DR:  but when they’ve been there:: they’ve cau:sed you to  
10      have problems with memory and concentration. 
11      (0.4) 
12 PT:  oh: >well it’ll< be: (1.8) whe:n something happens >or 
13      anything< I:’m (0.8) I:=it’s:: >ah-< I sort of 
14      afterwards think oh I’ve lost my:: c(h)oo:l.=>y(h)ou  
15      know er< (.) [which wou]ldn’t be:: (0.5) I wouldn’t be::  
16 DR:               [↑ah ha.  ]      
17 PT:  nasty or any[thi::ng   ] 
18 DR:              [↑yeah: and] do you lose your cool more 
19      easily:, these day:s. 
20      (0.5) 
21 PT:  ↑no:: not really really 
 
The doctor begins by accounting for his knowledge of the patient’s history 
(“from what I’ve been hearing..” lines 1-4). The patient stakes her epistemic 
claim over her experience by specifying the amount of years that her husband 
has been dead for – from the doctor’s “some” to “three” (lines 4-5). The doctor 
agrees and continues with his assessment of the patient’s problems, pausing to 
invite agreement from the patient, which does not occur immediately (lines 6-
11). When the patient responds she marks her answer as complex and avoids a 
straightforward agreement - beginning by registering the doctor’s assessment 
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with the “oh”, and then launching into a ‘my side telling’ with “well” (lines 12-17) 
(Heritage, 2015). She does not align with the doctor’s description of her 
memory and concentration, but describes isolated incidents when “something 
happens” and she thinks “oh I’ve lost my cool”. The patient then minimises the 
severity of her difficulties, saying “I wouldn’t be nasty or anything bad”. The 
doctor’s response in overlap is an emphasised receipt of the patient’s 
description (“ah ha” line 16). He then continues his questioning using her 
wording – “do you lose your cool more easily these days?” (lines 18-19), thus 
building on the patient’s conception of her symptoms when approaching the 
diagnosis.  
 
These exchanges are very similar to perspective display sequences described 
by Maynard in developmental disabilities clinics (Maynard, 2003a). The doctor 
firstly queries or invites the patient’s perspective (lines 1-10 above), the patient 
offers a reply or assessment (lines 12-15), and the doctor confirms this (lines 
16, 18-19). However, difficulties can occur in memory clinic interactions where 
the doctor’s perspective invitation includes symptom descriptions that have 
been reported by the patient’s companions and not the patients themselves.  
 
(7) [P105_H43] 
1 DR:  so:, (.) from >what I< understa::nd your memory problems 
2      started about nine months ago? 
3      (2.8) 
4 PT:  ↑no °hha° I I've never sai:d (.) that- >↑I've never said 
5      ↑↑that< 
6 DR:  no: it's the: yeah: 
7      (0.3) 
8 PT:  I've [never sa]id fo- 
9 DR:       [probably] 
10 DR:  f- family mentioned that but in your (0.5) observation:, 
11      (.) how is your memory¿ 
12      (0.3) 
13 PT:  ↑↑good 
14      (0.3) 
15 DR:  >any problems?< 
16    (1) 
17 PT:  only just recently when I lost my: (0.8) i- oh: my 
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18      wallet, 
 
The doctor references his knowledge of the patient’s symptoms – “from what I 
understand” – without specifying the source of this knowledge (line 1-2). His 
question is in the form of a statement with a questioning intonation, projecting 
agreement from the patient. However, the patient does not answer for nearly 3 
seconds – his eyes widen and he looks from side to side, before looking briefly 
at his daughter and then back to the doctor (line 3). He then disagrees strongly, 
challenging the doctor’s formulation – repeating “I never said that” (line 4-8). He 
again looks at his daughter briefly on the second “I’ve never said” (line 4), 
potentially demonstrating a suspicion that she may have provided this 
information. The doctor immediately comes in with strong agreement, while 
smiling, again an indication of a delicate situation (McCabe et al., 2002). The 
doctor accounts for his knowledge: that he got the information from the patient’s 
family (lines 6-10). He then changes tack and opts for a direct exploration of the 
patient’s own perspective of his memory (lines 10-11). The patient, after a slight 
delay where he looks to the side and nods, states that it is “good” with a raised 
intonation, continuing the high pitch that indicates his disagreement.  
 
The doctor does not respond directly to this answer, which is typical in cases 
where patient ‘good news’ reports of symptoms contradict the medical 
perspective (Beach, 2013). Instead, the doctor reformulates his query with a 
yes/no interrogative format - “any problems?” (line 15) (Raymond, 2003). This 
format of this question is similar to that commonly seen in history taking in 
primary care (Heritage, 2009).  The use of “any”, which is a negative polarity 
item in question design (Heritage et al., 2007), requires the patient to account 
for providing a dispreferred “yes” response. This occurs after a second delay, 
where the patient does admit to losing his wallet (lines 16-18). However, he 
presents this as both a solitary occurrence and a recent one (“only just recently” 
line 17), thus remaining resistant to the doctor’s initial formulation of “problems” 
over “nine months”.  
 
In summary, doctors present their formulation of the patient’s problem in order 
to elicit their perspective on their symptoms. Doctors can build on information 
provided by the patient in formulating the diagnosis in a way that is aligned with 
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the patient’s narrative. However, as the assessment process involves taking the 
companion’s view on the patient’s symptoms separately from the patient, this 
can give rise to sensitive moments when doctors account for the information 
that has not been received directly from the patient. 
 
Stage 4: Feeding back the Test Results   
The majority of doctors feed back the results from both the brain scan and the 
cognitive testing. There is large variation in how much detail is given and how 
much time is spent on test feedback, as well as whether the cognitive test, brain 
scan, or both is fed back to the patient.  
 
As is evident in other diagnostic interactions, the test feedback is designed to 
achieve intersubjective understanding of the consequences and thus set the 
patient’s expectations for what is to come (Maynard, 2003a, Stivers, 1998).  
 
(8) [P145_H49] 
1 DR:  but what it shows us is that there’s a little bit of 
2      shrinkage, 
3      (0.3) (PT nods) 
4 DR:  which we do expect (.) as people get older: [.hh bu]t 
5 PT:                                              [ye:s  ] 
6 DR:  I think there’s perhaps a bit more in your brain 
7      (.) than I would expe[ct  ] 
8 PT:                       [pect] ye[ah] 
9 DR:                                [ju]st due to your eighty  
10      four years 
11 PT:  ye:s 
 
The doctor in this example is discussing the brain scan results. She introduces 
the results as “what it shows us”, with the “it” referring to the brain scan (lines 1-
2). This removes the doctor’s agency in the news delivery, instead placing the 
‘ownership’ of the results with the objective medical testing (Turowetz, 2015), a 
device often used in settings where resistance is common. The doctor 
describes “a little bit of shrinkage”, referring to the atrophy that often occurs in 
Alzheimer’s disease, but not providing any more detail. Delivery of test results 
without interpretation places the patient in the role of ‘independent expert’, and 
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gives them the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the results 
(Pomerantz and Rintel, 2004). The patient passes up this opportunity and 
instead offers a non-verbal acknowledgement, suggesting a lack of knowledge 
of the consequences of the shrinkage (line 3). The doctor continues reporting 
the results, using the institutional “we” (Drew and Heritage, 1992), illustrating 
her knowledge as a medical professional, to say that this can be expected. The 
emphasised “do” and the extended “older” projects a “but”. This comes with an 
added specificity to the symptom description (“your brain” “your eighty four 
years”), and a change from the institutional “we” to the doctor’s personal 
reference of “I would expect” (line 4-7). This presentation of the test results 
alongside a meaning assessment that they cannot be explained by ageing is 
common in test feedback, and forecasts the cause as being a medical condition 
and thus a diagnosis being likely.  
 
Many patients do not respond or respond very minimally to test feedback. 
However, patient responses can give doctors an indication as to their readiness 
for the diagnosis.  
 
(9) [P86_H23] 
1 DR:  u:m, (.) doctor (name) did the:: (.) cognitive testing 
2      with you:: (0.4) .hhh erm (.) there were some  
3      significant problems in a couple of areas.   
4 PT:  °mm° 
5 DR:  specifically arou:nd memory: you were performing (.) 
6      below (.) where we [would expect  ]  
7 PT:                 [°yeah I’m not°] I’m not too certain 
8      about that because er (0.4) I: (0.4) hhh (0.6) I:, (.) 
9      er (.) >you know< at my age I::, (0.4) and remembering 
10      a lot and [I:: re- rememb]er an awful lot of things. 
11 DR:       [yea::h        ]  
12 DR:  .hhh (.) yes an- and tha:t is not surprising because 
13      what we fi:nd is it’s (.) short term memory, (0.4) .hh 
14      that’s, (.) dominantly affecte:d  
 
The doctor is feeding back the cognitive test results (line 1-6). The feedback 
initially lacks specificity, using the generalised medical term for the 
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assessments (“cognitive testing”), and reporting “significant problems in a 
couple of areas”, but with no indication as to what these problems are. This is a 
more paternalistic format than the last extract, which did not explain what the 
results meant (“there’s a little bit of shrinkage” extract 8 lines 1-2), and thus 
invited patient interpretation (Pomerantz and Rintel, 2004). The patient in this 
example utters a quiet continuer (line 4), and the doctor specifies the findings – 
that the patient’s “memory” scores were “below where we would expect” (lines 
5-6). The patient enters in overlap in with a direct challenge to the test results, 
demonstrating his experiential expertise of his symptoms (line 7). This is done 
with delicacy and respect for the doctor’s epistemic authority as a medical 
professional (Peräkylä, 2002). The litote “I’m not too certain” (line 7) makes the 
disagreement less direct. The patient then delivers a contrasting report of his 
abilities (lines 8-10), similar to how patients show resistance in primary care. He 
references his age, thus putting this forward as a cause of any difficulties he 
may be experiencing. He states that he remembers “an awful lot of things”, 
minimising the severity of his memory problems. The doctor acknowledges the 
patient’s perspective but encompasses it into her illness explanation (lines 12-
14). She uses the institutional “we” in line 13, restating her medical authority 
while also removing the agency from herself. Her report of “short term memory 
that’s dominantly affected”, with the emphasised “short” illustrates that long term 
memory may well be intact. This provides an explanation as to why the patient 
may still be able to remember “an awful lot of things” and thus acknowledges, 
while also refuting, his view on his symptoms. Additionally, the use of “affected” 
insinuates that there is a disease that is causing the patient’s problems, and 
thus forecasts a potential diagnosis. However, this statement also assumes that 
the patient will understand that the purpose of the testing is primarily to uncover 
short term memory problems, as this is the most common symptom of early 
stage dementia. If the patient does not understand this, it does not address his 
opinion that he did not do badly on the test.  
 
Given this strong forecasting that can accompany test result feedback, it may 
be expected that there would also be negative responses to the test results as 
patients may come to a distressing realisation that they will be a receiving a 
diagnosis. However, this is rare in the data. The following extract is one of the 
very few examples of explicit negative patient response to test feedback. 
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(10) [P23_H21] 
1 DR:  u um (.) an:d (.) you know we- do you remember we did a 
2      scan of your hea:d 
3      (0.3) 
4 PT:  mm. 
5      (0.8) 
6 DR:  >and it< showed that- your: (.) got quite a lot of 
7      shrinkage of your brai:n. 
8      (2) (PT pulls mouth downward and turns to wife) 
9 PT:  °°hm°°  
10 DR:  mm:. 
11      (.) (wife smiles at PT, PT smiles) 
12 DR:  .hh [which] i- i- [it might-] 
13 PT:      [°hm° ]       [not funny] 
14      (0.3) 
15 DR:  er no: it’s not really very funny [it’s not it’s] NOT a 
16 CN:                                    [ha ha ha     ] 
17 DR:  good thing: to have but >we don’t get any choices about 
18      what happens an[d< what’s] happening to u:s [.HH]H u:m  
19 PT:                 [no.      ]   
20 CN:                                              [mm.] 
21      (0.3) 
22 DR:  a:nd (0.5) what we would normally think=and it showed 
23      (0.3) that >you know< there’s no tumours >and it< 
24      showed that you:’d ha:d (0.8) some ti:me a fall  
25      (0.4)            
 
This example is from Site B so the patient will have had his brain scan months 
ago, which is likely why the doctor begins the scan feedback asking if he 
remembers the scan (lines 1-2). After a minimal answer from the patient (line 4), 
the doctor feeds back the results – “quite a lot of shrinkage” (line 6-7). The 
patient responds to this news by turning to his wife and pulling a face with a 
downward turned mouth (line 8). His wife does not immediately turn to the 
patient until the patient produces a small very quiet chuckle (line 9). She smiles 
at him as the doctor utters an emphasised acknowledgement (line 10). The 
doctor starts to continue her report of the test result, possibly about to state 
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what this means (line 12), when the patient produces an assessment of the 
results, stating it’s “not funny” (line 13). This demonstrates an understanding 
that this “shrinkage” is likely to have negative consequences. The doctor 
agrees, and both the patient and his wife laugh (the patient silently, not shown 
on transcript, lines 15-16). Patient laughter has been shown to occur as a 
response to problematic situations (Haakana, 2001), and thus this joking is 
likely an illustration of understanding that this shrinkage on the scan is bad 
news. The doctor continues with a confirmation of the bad news but abandons 
further analysis (“what we would normally think” line 22) to try and reassure the 
patient, stating that there were “no tumours”. She then shifts the topic to the 
patient’s history of falls, moving on to a different aspect of the brain scan (lines 
14-24). There were only 6 (7%) patients who provided negative assessments of 
the test results, while 13 patients (16%) make jokes at the test feedback stage.  
 
The doctors are thus using the test results to illustrate that the patient has 
memory difficulties, and that there is a medical reason for these beyond old 
age. Patients can respond to test feedback with differing explanations for the 
results, attributing any difficulties to age or other reasons such as the type of 
questions or how the test was conducted. Very few patients explicitly indicate 
understanding of the negative consequences of the test feedback. If the patient 
shows resistance or offers different explanations for their difficulties, the doctor 
will re-state the illness explanation, often through emphasising their medical 
knowledge.   
 
However, one difficulty in formulating dementia diagnoses is that, as explained 
previously, the test results do not in themselves indicate dementia, but are part 
of a body of evidence the doctors use to make a clinical judgment when making 
the diagnosis. Therefore, simply presenting the test results will not always be a 
sufficient method of forecasting the diagnosis to come. Additionally, patients are 
unlikely to have an understanding of the complexities involved in interpreting 
the test results. If the test feedback is not approached with these factors in 
mind, it can lead to confusion about the meaning of the results. The following 
extract (split into two parts) is an example of how this can cause difficulties of 
the progression of the test feedback to the diagnosis. 
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(11) [P101_H43 (part 1)] 
1 DR:  now your: (.) memory te:st (.) that you did today:,  
2      (0.8) wasn’t too ba:d,  
3      (0.7)  
4 DR:  you got eighty three: out of a hundre:d 
5      (.) 
6 PT:  ↑↑there you ↑are::, 
7      (0.9) 
8 DR:  ↑now: 
9      (.) 
10 PT:  °↑hooray:°  
11      (.) 
12 PT:  ha thh  
13      (.) 
14 DR:  >you know< looking at every[thi:ng I w I would  ] 
15 PT:                             [(I’m not dementing )] 
16 DR:  probably expect you to score slightly more:, 
17      (.) 
18 DR:  so it’s not a bad score:: but [I ] think your 
19 PT:                                [no]  
20 DR:  memory is affected 
21 PT:  .Hh 
22 DR:  you clearly struggle with short term memory: ques[tions] 
23 PT:                                                   [mm   ] 
24      hm, 
25 DR:  a:lso naming questions so you’re [ri]:ght tha:t 
26 PT:                               [m ] 
27 DR:  forgetting na:mes etcetera is a problem,=it was 
28      [ev]ident, 
29 PT:  [m ] 
30      (.) 
31 DR:  on the ↑te:st. 
32      (.) 
33 DR:  .hh the other thi:ngs were (0.3) your:: (.) visual (.) 
34      visuo orientation wasn’t very good, 
35      (.) 
36 DR:  so the drawing te:st you  
37      di[dn’t, (.) you struggled a bi:t.] 
38 PT:    [hhh (smiling then shakes head) ]   
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39      °no:° °°I’m not v[ery-°° ] 
40 DR:                   [.hh uh:]:, (.) now ↑tha:t (0.3) 
41      obviously te:lls us (.) in real life as we::ll, (.) i-  
42      i- (.) it ca:n make you more confu:sed 
43 PT:  mm.   
44      (0.3) 
 
The doctor feeds back the patient’s cognitive test score, with a qualified positive 
interpretation – “wasn’t too bad” – reporting the score 83/100 (lines 1-4). The 
patient’s response indicates a belief that this is good news, exclaiming “there 
you are!” (line 6). She looks and gestures upward in a triumphant manner 
towards the doctor, then her daughter and then back to the doctor. This 
response indicates that it was not just the doctor as a medical professional that 
was challenging her competency by subjecting her to testing, but that she may 
have had previous disagreements with her daughter. The doctor begins his next 
turn with “now”, projecting continuation and qualification of this news delivery, 
but hesitates. In this pause the patient continues celebrating her result (“hooray” 
lines 8-10). The doctor starts to qualify his initial “not too bad” report, 
referencing how doctors make decisions on diagnoses - “looking at everything” 
(line 14-16). The patient appears to say “I’m not dementing” in overlap (line 15). 
This utterance clearly indicates the patient’s attention is not on the doctor’s talk. 
The doctor however continues with his assessment of the patient’s test results, 
providing more specific detail from the testing. He first re-states that “it wasn’t a 
bad score”, which the patient agrees with (lines 18-19). However, he then gives 
a clear negative assessment of the test results: that the patient “wasn’t very 
good” and she “struggled” (line 22-37). He refers back to the patient’s report of 
forgetting names in a previous stage of the meeting, stating this “was evident on 
the test”. The patient nods and offers quiet continuers throughout this part of the 
feedback, and is withdrawn compared to earlier in the interaction. 
 
When the doctor mentions the “drawing test” the patient starts laughing and 
shakes her head and starts mouthing “no I’m very..” – suggesting an alignment 
with a suggestion that her drawing was not good (lines 38-39). The doctor 
however interrupts the patient, and illustrates the upshot of these results, which 
suggest that the patient’s functioning “in real life” is also affected (line 40-41). 
The patient’s non-verbal participation has reduced dramatically by this point. 
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The doctor continues in the next extract, directly addressing the patient’s 
attribution of her problems to old age, which she stated in the history reviewing 
stage. 
 
(12) [P101_H43 (part 2)] 
45 DR:  u::m 
46      (0.3) 
47 DR:  now, (.) you a:sked me:: whether just your age? 
48      (0.3) 
49 DR:  ↑probably no:t. 
50      (.) 
51 PT:  °mm:° 
52      (.) 
53 DR:  I would thi:nk (0.4) uh:: changes in your brain 
54      circulation¿  
55      (0.3) 
56 DR:  may play a par:t in this¿ 
57 PT:  °mhm,°  
58      (.) 
59 DR:  uh: although, (.) the scan doesn’t show any shrinkage in 
60      the brai:n¿ which can happen in Al:zheimer’s disease 
61 PT:  ↑mm: 
62      (0.7) 
63 DR:  the- the scan is normal on that fron:t, 
64 PT:  ↑↑mm: 
65 DR:  but ↑someti:mes there can be a sma:ll (.) shrinkage 
66      which may not >be visible on the< sca:n <which is often 
67      in> Alzheimer’s disease.=[I do]n’t think you ha:ve (0.8)  
68 PT:                           [mm. ] 
69 DR:  °°a-°° primarily: (.) an Alzheimer’s type ↑problem. 
70      (.) 
71 DR:  he:re¿ 
72      (.) 
73 PT:  ↑hm  
74 DR:  but there: can be a sma::ll (.) element of that. 
75 PT:  °mhm:.° 
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The patient responds minimally with a quiet continuer to the doctor’s dismissal 
of her attribution of her difficulties to her age (line 45-52). Her body language 
remains reduced: sitting with her arms crossed. The doctor moves on to his 
explanation for the memory problems – “changes in your brain circulation can 
play a part in this” (lines 53-56). This projects an underlying physical problem as 
the cause of the patient’s problems, most likely vascular dementia. However, 
the patient is unlikely to have heard of vascular dementia and thus this will not 
be a clear indication of the diagnosis to come. Additionally, the qualified 
language (“I would think..may play a part) indicates some uncertainty, and the 
doctor then reports that there is not any shrinkage on the brain scan “which can 
happen in Alzheimer’s disease”. He re-emphasises this seemingly good news 
from the scan, saying it is “normal on that front”. The patient then changes the 
tone of her “mm” responses, with a higher pitch and a smile, indicating that she 
takes this for good news. However, the doctor continues with a qualification of 
this report, saying that it just “may not be visible”. He then immediately reaffirms 
his original positive statement (albeit in a qualified format) – that the patient 
does not have “primarily an Alzheimer type problem, but there can be a small 
element of that”.  
 
The patient ends up receiving a diagnosis of mixed Alzheimer’s and vascular 
dementia. With the knowledge of how doctors come to their diagnostic 
conclusions – that the most important aspects are the reports of memory 
impacting daily functioning and that borderline test results are used as part of 
clinical judgments – it is possible to see how the doctor is building this into the 
test feedback. However, the patient is a 90 year old woman who is unlikely to 
know that there are types of dementia that are not Alzheimer’s disease, or that 
there may be no indication of Alzheimer’s on the brain scan but a diagnosis of 
dementia may still be made. Therefore, in presenting the results in this way, the 
doctor has caused misunderstandings (as evident in the positive patient 
responses in lines 10, 15, 61, and 64 for example) that may be difficult to rectify 
when it comes to the diagnosis and treatment stage.  
 
In summary, feeding back the test and scan results is an effective way for 
doctors to forecast the diagnosis, usually by emphasising the patient’s problems 
are caused by something beyond ageing. Patients can show resistance and 
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negative responses to the test results, but mainly respond minimally. The fact 
that dementia is a diagnosis based on clinical judgment, not on the test results 
alone, can lead to test feedback causing patient misunderstandings. 
 
The introduction, eliciting patient orientation, eliciting patient perspective, and 
test feedback stages are the 4 stages that lead up to the diagnosis delivery. 
The next stage – delivering the diagnosis – will be analysed and discussed in 
detail in the next two chapters. The final two stages are discussing treatment 
and support, and closing. A short overview of these three stages will now be 
presented, in order to present how the rest of the diagnostic feedback 
interaction usually unfolds. 
 
Stage 5: Delivering the Diagnosis 
This stage will be described and discussed in detail in the next two chapters of 
the thesis. 
 
Stage 6: Discussing Treatment and Support 
After the diagnosis has been delivered the meeting moves on to treatment 
options, with medication decisions for patients receiving a diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease or mixed dementia. Discussions also include arranging the 
next appointment with the team, social services support in the home, stopping 
driving, and planning for the future. This stage takes up the largest portion of 
the meeting, and the topics discussed vary according to the support available in 
different services and regions and the individual needs of the patient.  
 
Stage 7: Closing 
In the vast majority of the meetings the doctor gives a summary of what has 
been discussed and tells the patient they will receive a letter with all the 
information from the meeting. This can sometimes also include a negotiation as 
to whether the patient’s companion also wants to receive the letter, and 
discussion of contact details for future appointments.  
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Summary 
There are 7 stages in dementia diagnosis feedback meetings in memory clinics, 
with 4 occurring prior to the diagnosis delivery stage. These 4 stages each 
contain sub-goals that are relevant to the diagnosis delivery. The introduction 
stage and the eliciting patient orientation stage appear to be aimed at seeing if 
the patient knows why they are at the meeting. The eliciting patient perspective 
and test feedback stages are aimed at seeing if the patient has insight into their 
cognitive impairment. The test feedback stage can also forecast the nature of 
the diagnostic news to come. The 4 stages thus enable doctors to establish the 
patient’s orientation and insight, and rectify any difficulties that may occur 
through lack of awareness of the purpose of the meeting, or lack of agreement 
as to the nature of the patient’s symptoms. The doctors thus work to ensure 
patient readiness for the diagnosis prior to the delivery.  
 
 
Quantitative analysis 
 
The average length of diagnosis feedback meetings was 27 minutes and 59 
seconds – ranging from approximately 8 minutes to 64 minutes. The 
frequencies of each stage of the meeting prior and including the diagnosis 
delivery stage, and the length of time taken in each, are reported in Table 6. 
The quantitative description of the Introduction stage (Stage 1) is not reported, 
as it was evident from the data that in many cases the introduction stage had 
either already occurred or had already started when the recordings began. 
Therefore, while there are 60 recordings that include the introduction, reporting 
this would be a misrepresentation of the regularity that doctors introduce 
themselves at the start of memory clinic diagnosis feedback meetings.  
 
The diagnosis delivery stage was the only stage that occurred in all of the 
meetings, with the other stages present in over 80%. There was variety in the 
length of each stage, depending on the nature of what was being discussed. 
For example, the longest history review was over 26 minutes, but this included 
a long discussion of recent traumatic events that had occurred in the patient’s 
family. While nearly all the meetings reported the test results, there was 
variation in whether both the scan and the cognitive test results were fed back 
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to the patient. Additionally, in some meetings the feedback of the testing would 
be extremely brief, for example “and looking at the scan you went to this 
morning – the brain scan – that showed some shrinkage in the middle part of 
the brain” (P50_H43).   
 
Stages Number of meetings  Mean length 
in minutes 
(range) 
Eliciting 
orientation 
67 (83%) 0:57 
(0:05-3:40) 
History 
reviewing 
69 (81%) 04:11 
(0:15-26:30) 
Test 
feedback 
Cognitive test: 63 (78%) 
 
Brain scan: 64 (79%) 
 
Both: 59 (73%) 
 
Either: 78 (96%) 
1:02 
(0:10-5:10) 
1:50 
(0:05-13:15) 
2:42 
(0:20-18:25) 
Diagnosis 
delivery 
81 (100%) 2:39 
(0:25-10:10) 
 
The data shows that doctors place great importance on eliciting patient 
orientation and patient perspective on their symptoms at the start of meetings. 
Given that most doctors will have already decided on their diagnosis prior to 
feedback, it is likely that the purpose of eliciting this information is to inform how 
they should approach the diagnosis delivery and treatment discussions.  
 
Of the 81 patients in the dataset, 50 (62%) demonstrated either a 
misunderstanding or different interpretation of the purpose of the diagnosis 
feedback meeting. Eighteen of these patients answered negatively to explicit 
questioning of their understanding of the meeting purpose in stage 2 of the 
meeting (e.g. “do you know why you’re here?”). The other 32 patients in this 
group gave alternate explanations for why they were seeing the doctor in one of 
the first two meeting stages, for example with statements like “now I’m confused 
with all this going on, I came out this morning to find out about my medication” 
(P150_H41). Twelve patients answered explicit questions in stage 2 of the 
meeting, thus explicitly showing orientation to the meeting being about memory 
problems. The remaining 17 patients demonstrated orientation to the diagnosis 
Table 6: Frequencies and lengths of stages 
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feedback with statements indicating knowledge of the prior stages of the 
process, for example by expressing a desire to find out the test results – “I was 
really anxious to learn the results of the CT” (P85_H24).  
 
Fifty-one patients (63%) displayed some lack of alignment with the doctors’ 
formulation of their symptoms in the stages prior to diagnosis delivery. This was 
demonstrated through patients offering other explanations for the test results in 
28 of the meetings. The other 23 patients minimised the severity of their 
symptoms in the stage where doctors elicit the patient’s perspective by 
downplaying their experience of symptoms. This was often expressed by 
attributing difficulties to age – e.g. “that’s not bad is it for an old woman?” 
(P57_H43). The remaining 30 patients demonstrated explicit concerns about 
their memory having got worse – e.g. “my memory’s appalling…I’m worried, I 
think they’re all worried” (P164_H63). 
 
In summary, the 4 stages prior to diagnosis delivery occur systematically across 
the meetings, with each stage occurring in at least 80% of the data. These 
stages are successful in eliciting patient orientation and insight, thus enabling 
doctors to be aware of this prior to delivering the diagnosis. Over 60% of 
patients are disoriented to the purpose of the diagnosis feedback meeting at the 
beginning of the meeting. Additionally, over 60% demonstrate a lack of insight 
into their symptoms severity, both when perspective was explored in the history 
reviewing stage, and in response to the test feedback.  
 
Discussion 
 
The structure of the diagnostic feedback meetings reflects the complexity of the 
task needing to be accomplished: telling someone they have dementia. The 
structure has similarities to other diagnostic meetings, with discussions of the 
patient’s symptom history and presentation of the test results forecasting the 
nature of the diagnosis. However, it also contains differences from other 
medical settings, with doctors explicitly eliciting patient orientation at the start of 
the meeting. Additionally, doctors need to explicitly account for any knowledge 
they have of the patient’s prior symptom description due to the possibility this 
has been communicated by their companion, and present the test results with 
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strong forecasting to prevent misunderstandings. This is, in many ways, is a 
result of the memory clinic set-up, with initial assessments and brain scans 
occurring separately, and often with different clinicians, from the diagnosis 
feedback. However, it is evident from the data that the structure of the feedback 
meeting is also directly concerned with identifying potential differences between 
patient and doctor expectations concerning diagnosis feedback. 
 
The focus on patient orientation is the primary feature of the structure of 
dementia diagnosis feedback meeting that makes it different from other 
settings. Patient disorientation or confusion as to the purpose of the meeting 
can be detected as early in the meeting as the introduction stage. Following this 
is a stage where orientation is explicitly elicited, either through direct 
questioning or through presentation of the memory clinic process inviting patient 
acknowledgement. Should the patient demonstrate confusion or lack of 
knowledge of the purpose of the meeting, doctors will re-state the meeting 
purpose. That nearly two thirds of patients in our dataset showed some level of 
disorientation to the purpose of the diagnosis feedback illustrates that it is a 
challenge that doctors in memory clinics are facing on a regular basis, one that 
they overcome by eliciting and establishing orientation before continuing with 
diagnosis feedback. 
 
Given the nature of dementia and its effects on short term memory and 
concentration it may be unsurprising that doctors will need to remind people 
why they are at the memory clinic. However, patient confusion as to the 
purpose of the meeting should not automatically be attributed to potential 
cognitive impairment. As described in Chapter 3, the patient appointment letter 
will often not state explicitly that the memory clinic purpose is to assess a 
person for dementia. Only one of the clinics we collected data from reported 
systematically providing pre-diagnosis counseling for patients attending the 
memory clinic to manage expectations. Evidence from the literature describes 
GPs referring people to memory clinics without providing information on 
possible consequences or reasons for referring (Cahill et al., 2008).  
 
Therefore, patient disorientation to what the meeting is for may not be due to 
cognitive impairment, but rather to a explanation from healthcare professionals 
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before the diagnosis feedback. This lack of explanation continued in how 
doctors orientated patients to the meeting purpose within the meeting itself. 
When introducing the purpose of the meetings, doctors rarely mention their 
function as finding out whether the patient has dementia. Patients and their 
companions mirror this by also rarely explicitly stating concerns about dementia 
prior to delivery. Instead, doctors, patients, and their companions are far more 
likely to use euphemistic terms such as “memory problems” or “forgetfulness”. 
When doctors explain the purpose of the meeting they will use these terms, 
most likely to ensure the patient knows what symptoms will be discussed. 
Additionally, they will often state that the meeting will include feeding back the 
test results. However, direct descriptions of the meeting specifically 
characterising it as dementia diagnosis feedback are rare. This suggests that 
orientation to the relevant symptoms (and not the possibility of dementia) may 
be all that is required by doctors at this stage of the meeting to ensure a smooth 
progression of the diagnostic interaction. However, this may not be an optimum 
strategy in terms of ensuring patient readiness and understanding.  
 
Doctors are thus, while ensuring patients are oriented to the meeting purpose, 
still approaching the dementia diagnosis itself delicately prior to the diagnosis 
‘proper’. This is likely to be a result of the related challenge of delivering a 
diagnosis – that of patient resistance. As discussed in the introduction, while 
there may be dementia-specific reasons for disagreeing with the doctor’s 
diagnostic formulation, there are other reasons that patients may resist their 
diagnosis that are also present in other diagnosis settings, for example denial, 
stigma, or alternative viewpoints as to the cause of their difficulties (Cheston, 
2005, Clare et al., 2016). These can also be intertwined, as with mnesic 
neglect, where information that is threatening to the self is less likely to be 
remembered (Christopher and Cheston, 2015). It is thus not surprising that 
many of the strategies that were observed to occur in the memory clinic data 
are similar to that which has already been described in other settings. For 
example, Monzoni and Reuber found that doctors delivering non-epileptic 
seizure diagnoses also reviewed the history that had already been collected 
with patients (Monzoni et al., 2011b). Similar to the memory clinic data, the 
authors found that doctors used this information to then engage the patient in a 
two-way, ‘bilateral’, discussion to build up to the, potentially unexpected, 
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psychological explanation for their seizures. Gill and Maynard report similar 
activities in developmental disabilities settings, with doctors eliciting the parent’s 
perspective prior to diagnosis delivery, which “allows for persuasion” should 
parents disagree on the nature of their child’s difficulties (Gill and Maynard, 
1995, :16). This practice is also similar to Stivers’ description of pre-diagnostic 
commentary in veterinary settings, where vets forecast the diagnosis in the 
earlier stages of the meeting, which works to enable space for vets and pet-
owners to negotiate treatment options (Stivers, 1998). That the memory clinic is 
another example of doctors using this strategy shows how using caution in 
approaching the diagnosis is an effective method of dealing with patient 
resistance, allowing room for manoeuvre prior to naming the illness. 
 
Eliciting the patient’s perspective is therefore primarily aimed at establishing the 
extent that patients are outwardly acknowledging their symptoms, and thus 
whether they may potentially display resistance to diagnosis, treatment, and 
support. This is likely to account for why despite doctor probing the patient’s 
perspective, patient worries about their symptoms or consequences of the 
testing are rarely elicited. While patients may discuss family members with 
dementia, and thus demonstrate close experience with its consequences, 
doctors do not explore and patients rarely express how they feel about the 
possibility of having that diagnosis. While these aspects potentially could have 
been discussed in the initial assessment meeting, doctors do not allude to them 
in diagnosis feedback. It therefore appears that while gauging both orientation 
and acknowledgment of symptoms are demonstrated as important by doctors in 
the early stages of the meeting, gauging the emotional aspects of the patient’s 
experience is not a priority. The avoidance of emotional aspects of diagnosis is 
consistent with what has been found in the literature, both in dementia (Zaleta 
and Carpenter, 2010, Werner et al., 2013) and other settings (Beach et al., 
2005, Yoon et al., 2015). 
 
The main stage of the meeting where patient concerns are expressed, although 
it does occur rarely, is the test feedback stage. The fact that it is more common 
for patients to make jokes in this stage than express explicitly negative 
responses is an illustration of how laughter is commonly used by patients in 
delicate situations such as negative test feedback (Haakana, 2001). Humour 
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was also identified in the literature review in Chapter 2 as a resource for people 
with dementia to save face when confronted with evidence of their cognitive 
impairment (Lindholm, 2008, Saunders, 1998b). Humour has also been 
described in the literature as a coping mechanism for both people with 
dementia (Wilson et al., 2007) and their companions (Buffum and Brod, 1998). 
It is therefore not surprising that humour is present in these meetings, and when 
it does occur it illustrates a likely expectation of bad news that has been 
forecasted by the test feedback, such as in extract 12 above.  
 
As illustrated in neurology and developmental disabilities, as well as in cancer, 
HIV, and primary care, test results are a useful resource for doctors to forecast 
the diagnosis. However, a diagnosis of dementia involves a clinical judgment 
that, while backed up through the scan and the testing, is primarily formed using 
information from the patient’s history. This can lead to confusing feedback, with 
seemingly high scores on the testing, or clear brain scan results, forecasting 
good news from a lay perspective but being used to forecast bad news by the 
doctor. Similarly, reporting the results of the testing indicating that the patient 
does not have Alzheimer’s disease, but then going on to deliver a diagnosis of 
dementia (such as in extract 12) does occur, and can also lead to confusion. 
The fact that the different tests may have different forecasting uses depending 
on the nature of the results, may be the reason for the fact that while tests are 
fed back in nearly all meetings, there are many meetings where only one is 
reported. If the cognitive test is borderline but the scan shows signs of 
dementia, the scan may be discussed instead of the test, and vice versa.  
 
It is important to note the impact of potentially confusing test feedback on 
patients. Studies of patient and companion experience of memory clinics name 
the testing process as one of the most anxiety-provoking aspects (Samsi et al., 
2014, Robinson et al., 2011). Additionally, studies of people’s interpretations of 
their dementia diagnoses illustrate that it is not only the naming of the dementia 
that affects how they view their condition, but the additional information that 
doctors do or do not provide will also have an effect and this will in turn affect 
how people engage with treatment and support (Clare, 2003, Byszewski et al., 
2007). If doctors are not careful in explicating the reasoning behind certain 
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clinical judgments they can instead hinder patient orientation to and thus 
readiness for the diagnosis, such as in extracts 11 and 12 above.  
 
It therefore appears that while the structure of the feedback meetings in 
memory clinics has developed to address the challenges of delivering a 
dementia diagnosis there are still difficulties evident in overcoming these 
challenges. Patient lack of orientation to the purpose of the meeting is common, 
with over 60% not oriented to the diagnosis feedback. However, when doctors 
orient patients to the purpose of the meeting, use of ‘dementia’ terms are rarely 
used. This delicacy in explicit descriptions of the purpose of the meeting could 
reflect concerns of causing distress or resistant reactions. This delicacy also 
accounts for doctors establishing patients’ perspective on, and acknowledgment 
of, their symptoms prior to diagnosis, and then building upon these when 
approaching the delivery. Doctors will selectively choose aspects of the test 
results to feed back in order demonstrate the existence of symptoms when 
there is resistance, as well as forecast the nature of the diagnosis to come. 
However, the complex clinical judgments required to make a diagnosis of 
dementia can sometimes disrupt the forecasting if the results of the testing are 
not delivered with consistent assessments as to their meaning. 
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Chapter Five: 
“We call that dementia” 
Delivery of the Dementia Diagnosis 
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Contrary to findings in previous studies, all doctors explicitly named dementia 
when communicating with the patient and their companion (Dooley et al., 2015, 
Peel, 2015). While the length and complexity of the diagnosis delivery varies 
across the 81 feedback meetings, there are systematic patterns in how the 
diagnosis is approached. While the previous chapter described the overall 
structure of the diagnosis feedback meeting, the diagnosis delivery stage itself 
contains its own structure. The turns prior to and including the naming of 
dementia as the patient’s diagnosis will be described in this chapter, and the 
response and ensuing turns will be described in Chapter 6.  
 
Identifying the Diagnosis Stage 
 
Diagnosis delivery is interactionally marked as a separate phase of the 
dementia diagnostic feedback meeting, as found in other clinical settings (Byrne 
and Long, 1976, Heath, 1992, Stivers, 1998). As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
preceding phases included eliciting patient perspective on their symptoms and 
feedback of the test results. The diagnosis phase is often launched with some 
form of marker indicating an upshot from these discussions (Raymond, 2010), 
for example the lip smack and “so” in extract 1 (line 1), and the “now” in extract 
2 (line 1).   
 
(1) [P145_H49] 
1 DR:  tch so, (1.2) the reason we see people in the memory  
2      clinic is that we’re trying to work out whether or not  
3      they ha:ve (0.4) um a dementia 
 
(2) [P178_H63] 
1 DR:  now:. in terms of a applying strict criteria for a 
2      diagnosis, 
 
Given the strong forecasting that occurs in the previous stages (as discussed in 
the last chapter), and the recognised understanding from patients that results 
from testing will lead naturally to diagnosis, it could be reasonably assumed that 
patients may be expecting a diagnosis to be delivered at this stage (Robinson, 
2003a). The design of these turns, placed after the test feedback and 
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containing upshot markers, signify the start of a new action within the meeting, 
that of the diagnosis delivery. There are usually a series of turns prior to the 
naming of the diagnosis itself, which appear to further mark the diagnosis as 
about to occur. 
 
The Pre-Diagnosis Turns 
 
Diagnosis deliveries are similar to other news announcements in that they 
regularly occur over a series of turns of talk that are larger than just delivery and 
receipt (Maynard, 1997). News announcements are often occasioned by pre-
announcements: turn sets prior to news deliveries where the speaker indicates 
to the recipient that the news announcement will be the next action (Maynard, 
2003a, Terasaki, 1998). In Terasaki’s seminal paper on pre-announcement 
sequences, she details how pre-announcements contain sequentially relevant 
features such as naming or a characterisation of the news, or requests/offers to 
tell the news, and are therefore “presentation(s) of some news to come without 
therein providing that news” (page 181). Pre-announcement first pair parts can 
be questions (“did you hear about X?”) or statements (“you’ll never guess what 
happened to me”), but require an adequate second pair part from the recipient 
(i.e. “no I didn’t” or “what?”) for progression to the announcement itself. Pre-
announcements are thus the same as other pre-sequences in that they 
hearably are not discrete units in talk, and are “integrally tied to the ensuing 
actions as their preliminaries” (Schegloff, 2006). 
 
Pre-announcements of this kind are extremely common in dementia diagnosis 
deliveries. However, they appear to have context-specific functions that identify 
them as a sub-type of pre-announcement, and will thus henceforth be referred 
to as pre-diagnoses (Spranz-Fogasy, 2014). Pre-diagnoses occur as pre-
sequences to the diagnosis sequence, and exist as a formal structure designed 
by the doctor so that patients can anticipate that a diagnosis is immediately 
forthcoming within the meeting. They are therefore different from ‘pre-diagnostic 
commentary’, as described by Stivers, as they occur not as a method of 
showing reasoning in earlier stages of the meeting and thus forecasting the 
diagnosis to come, but as a direct indication the diagnosis stage has begun.  
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Furthermore, similar to other pre-sequences, pre-diagnosis sequences have a 
“projective use” (Schegloff, 2006) for the delivery itself. Pre-announcements are 
in the main oriented to assessing whether the news is in fact news to the 
recipient (due to delivering ‘already-known’ news being a dispreferred action) 
(Terasaki, 1998). However, while patients as recipients may suspect particular 
diagnoses, they do not have the medical expertise required to know their 
diagnosis for certain without the doctor’s input. Therefore, pre-diagnosis 
sequences appear to be designed to ensure a particular environment for the 
diagnosis delivery to occur.  
 
There are 5 practices doctors use in the pre-diagnosis location. Four practices 
function as typical pre-sequences as described above. The first three examples 
appear to have the function of marking the diagnosis as imminent, thus 
ensuring the patient is oriented to the diagnosis being the next action. One 
practice appears to go further than simply projecting that the diagnosis will be in 
the next turn, and instead characterises the nature of dementia, naming it as 
the patient’s diagnosis. The final practice is different in nature, and contains an 
evaluation of the patient’s condition in the form of a diagnosis, but without 
naming the condition as a dementia (or type of dementia). Examples of these 
practices will be presented, along with examples of what occurs when patients 
block the progression from pre-diagnosis to diagnosis. Frequencies will be 
reported along with basic quantitative analysis to complement the qualitative 
findings.  
 
Practices that mark the projected diagnosis 
The key feature of these practices is the explicit identification of the projected 
action – i.e. marking the diagnosis itself as the immediate next action. There are 
3 ways that doctors design these turns to achieve this function. 
Asking for the patient’s consent 
The pre-diagnosis can entail offers or requests by the doctor to tell the 
diagnosis to the patient.  
 
(3) [P62_H03] 
1 DR:  do you want to know what we:: (.) what we’d ca:ll that 
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2      memory probl[em¿] 
3 PT:              [↑ye]ah. 
4 DR:  °yeah° (.) so we we:’d call it (.) a: (.) vascular 
5      dementia. 
6    (1.1) 
 
The doctor asks if the patient wants to know “what we’d call that memory 
problem” (lines 1-2). These questions indicate that there is a definite memory 
problem that has a name, and, subject to the patient’s preference to know the 
name, makes the diagnosis delivery the next relevant action. As described in 
the pre-sequence literature, patients can choose to respond with a ‘go-ahead 
token’, indicating their readiness for the next action to take place (Schegloff, 
2007). In this case, the token required is an affirmative answer to the consent 
question for progression to the diagnosis. The yes/no interrogative format in 
lines 1-2 in the extract above (extract 3) prefers a yes in response, and there is 
places a stronger expectation of an affirmative response. The patient solicits 
this progression with a “yeah” (line 3), and thus the doctor continues to deliver 
the diagnosis of vascular dementia. 
 
The following extract provides an example of what happens if the patient does 
not provide an affirmative answer to the consent question, and thus halts the 
progression to the diagnosis delivery.  
 
(4) [P109_H41] 
1 DR:  um- (.) would you:? I mean I think there are: definite 
2      problems with your memory.=some (PT long blink) of  
3      [the thi]n:gs (.) tha:t u:m (0.3) haven’t been 
4 PT:  [°mhm°  ]  
5 DR:  working very we:ll. 
6      (0.4)  
7 DR:  and I >just wondered< if you’d like to kno[w: wha]t  
8 PT:                                            [°ye:s°]  
9      (.) 
10 DR:  what what conclusions we’ve come to whether you’d like 
11      to know what we think this might be due to:. 
12      (1.2) 
13 PT:  well you you- ahh- (.) because of me being (1.1)  
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14      illegitimate. 
15      (0.9)  
16 PT:  or a bastard or what ever you’re called, (0.3) my nana 
17      brought me u:p (0.5) a:nd er (.) now:, (.) I didn’t 
18      really have many frie:nds.  
19      (0.4) 
20 DR:  okay. [well >what] we’re talking about< now is (.) is  
21 PT:        [um        ] 
22 DR:  you being here: in the memory clinic¿ 
23 PT:  yeah 
24      (.) 
25 DR:  and this being a clinic appointment, (.) and I’m asking 
26      you: if you would like to know what we think (0.3) the 
27      problem is with your memory: and [your co]ncentration 
28 PT:                                   [yeah.  ] 
29 DR:  .hh (.) and your ability to learn new things.=because 
30      there is a problem there:. 
31 PT:  yeah. 
32      (0.3) 
33 DR:  would you like to know what we think this is all (.) due 
34      to:? 
35      (1.4) 
36 PT:  well I’ve got this far: I mean I’m eighty-three. 
37      (0.9) 
38 PT:  >I shouldn’t< be on this earth very much longer in any 
39      ca:se 
40      (.) 
41 PT:  [>with a bit of< lu:ck] 
42 DR:  [I think you might    ] be! 
43      (0.7) 
44 PT:  ↓oh fhhh hh hh for heaven help you s(h)on! 
45 CN:  ah [ha ha ha ha ha    ] 
46 PT:     [I love you to bits] 
47      (0.6) 
48 DR:  ah [so is ] that a yes you would like to know: what we  
49 CN:     [uh huu] 
50 DR:  think this is due to? 
51 PT:  ye:s [okay:.] 
52 DR:       [you wo]uld okay 
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The doctor begins and then abandons what may have potentially been a 
consent question (line 1). She then chooses to state that “there are definite 
problems” with the patient’s memory, that there are “things” that have not been 
“working very well” (lines 1-5). The patient acknowledges this (line 4), but her 
utterance is extremely quiet and her eyes are closed in a long blink. She opens 
her eyes, and then her mouth slightly, when the doctor says “that” (line 3), and 
then her expression stays unchanging throughout the rest of the doctor’s turn 
and the following pause (line 6). The doctor then asks if the patient would like to 
know “what conclusions we’ve come to”, then reformats the question with a 
more specific “what this might be due to” (lines 7-11), with the “this” referring to 
the problems stated previously (lines 1-4).  
 
The patient answers by offering a candidate explanation of her problems, 
referring to her difficult childhood (lines 13-18). This is evident as an inadequate 
response for the doctor to continue to the diagnosis delivery, as she instead 
responds by re-orienting the patient to the memory clinic (lines 20-22). The 
doctor re-iterates the previously discussed problems with her memory and 
concentration, and emphasises that “there is a problem there” (lines 25-30) with 
a questioning intonation, which the patient acknowledges (line 30). The doctor 
then re-states the previous consent question (line 32), and after a 1.4 second 
pause the patient provides another answer, again not confirming with the 
preferred “yes” response and thus again blocking the projected diagnosis 
delivery. However, this time the patient’s answer gives an indication that she 
may realise that a diagnosis is imminent, joking about being close to the end of 
her life (line 36-41). The doctor reassures her but the patient continues the joke, 
bringing her son and his wife into the interaction, and they join in the laughter 
(lines 44-46). When the laughter finishes there is a short pause and the doctor 
offers an interpretation of the patient’s answer and a stronger version of the 
consent question, asking “is that a yes you would like to know” (lines 48-50). 
The patient then answers in the affirmative, and both the patient and the doctor 
utter the shift-implicative “okay”, and proceed to the diagnosis (lines 51-52).  
 
The consent question therefore references a cause for the patient’s symptoms 
and marks the diagnosis as the immediate next action by explicitly asking the 
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patient if they want to know their diagnosis. The question format requires an 
affirmative answer from the patient, which, if not immediately given, is pursued 
by the doctor before continuing to diagnosis delivery. 
 
Eliciting the patient’s perspective  
Another practice in the pre-diagnosis location is the perspective display 
elicitation. Gill and Maynard described doctors implementing perspective 
display sequences in developmental disabilities clinics, where doctors elicit the 
person’s viewpoint on a potential diagnosis prior to delivery as a method of 
forecasting the news (Gill and Maynard, 1995). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, these types of questions are often present in the earlier stages of the 
meeting, but those in the pre-diagnosis location take two main forms. In some 
cases, doctors appear to be questioning the patient’s memory specifically of 
prior discussions with clinicians of dementia as a potential diagnosis. In the 
following extract the doctor finishes feeding back the brain scan results before 
asking if the patient remembers her previous appointment. 
 
(5) [P31_H21] 
1 DR:  and it sho:ws a bit of shrinkage all o[ver,] 
2 PT:                                        [(?) ] yeah, 
3 DR:  and that’s probably what’s causing your memory: 
4 PT:  °mm°  
5      (0.4) 
6 DR:  um, (0.6) >and I< think, (.) >I think< the other doctor 
7      talked about that but I don’t know if you remember tha:t   
8 PT:  no 
9 DR:  oka:y (.) so we think that you have a <dementia:,>  
10      (0.6) 
 
The doctor finishes the report of the findings from the brain scan, strongly 
forecasting a diagnosis (line 1-3). After a very quiet continuer from the patient, 
she then elicits the patient’s memory of a meeting she had previously with 
another clinician (lines 6-7). While we do not know what this previous 
discussion included, the “I think the other doctor talked about that”, refers back 
to the shrinkage from the scan as “what’s causing your memory”. In this site the 
scan would have been conducted after the patient saw the “other doctor” for the 
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initial assessment some weeks or months previously. Therefore it is likely that a 
possible diagnosis would have been discussed in the context of the brain scan 
referral, and also possible that this was named as dementia. The doctor’s 
statement “I don’t know if you remember that” is no preferring, thus showing her 
expectation that the patient has probably forgotten the prior discussion with 
another doctor. When the patient confirms this in line 8, the doctor continues 
with the diagnosis delivery (line 9).  
  
Doctors also use more traditional perspective display format in the pre-
diagnosis location – asking the patient for any preconceptions as to the cause 
of their symptoms. 
 
(6) [P34_H23] 
1 DR:  tell me (.) are you conce:rned that your memory problems 
2      might be due to anything in particular  
3      (0.6)  
4 DR:  are you worried about anything (.) [any] diagnosis 
5 PT:                                     [°no°]  
6 PT:  °no:° (0.8) no: I mean, (0.4) I’m worried about my (?) 
7      [(?)     ] 
8 DR:  [I kno:w ] (0.4) I know I know  
9      (0.4) 
10 PT:  um, (.) I’m worried about my (0.4) my children  
11      [(?)   ] 
12 DR:  [I know]  
13 PT:  my [wife.] 
14 DR:     [but  ] (.) but, (.) but are you worried abou:t 
15      memory are you worried that it [migh]t be::  
16 PT:                                 [yeah] 
17 PT:  I mean I’m merely old. 
18 DR:  ri::ght 
19 PT:  (?) the family 
20 DR:  yea:h  
21 PT:  my wife, (0.4) (grandson)  
22 DR:  mm 
23 PT:  and (.) I’m misunderstanding  
24 DR:  mm:::  
 131 
25 PT:  #I’:m (.) sometimes I# (.) misunderstand  
26 DR:  yea:h  
27 PT:  questions 
28 DR:  kuh kuh okay.  
29      (0.8)  
30 DR:  and you want me to talk to you about the diagnosis yes? 
 
The doctor in lines 1-2 elicits the patient’s expectations as to a diagnosis – if his 
symptoms are “due to anything in particular”. While some of the patient’s 
answer is unclear (he has had a stroke which has affected his speech), he 
answers in the negative (line 6), and instead states concerns about his family 
(lines 10 and 13). When the doctor reformulates the question in lines 14-15, the 
patient displays his candidate explanation for his symptoms, that he is “merely 
old”. While his speech again is unclear, he talks about his family and then 
states that he’s aware that he can “misunderstand questions” (lines 19-27). The 
doctor receipts this description with an “okay” (line 28), and moves on to a 
consent question prior to delivering the diagnosis (line 30).  
 
This extract illustrates that while perspective display sequences are pre-
diagnosis sequences in that they mark the diagnosis as imminent, they rarely 
occur on their own in this environment as a pre-diagnosis practice. In all the 
examples the patient will either display a lack of memory of the previous 
discussion of dementia (like extract 5), or not display an expectation that they 
might be about to receive a diagnosis (extract 6). This thus blocks the 
progression to the diagnosis itself, and another practice is used to solicit an 
adequate go-ahead to continue to the diagnosis. 
 
Statement of the purpose and process of the memory clinic 
The final pre-diagnosis practice in this group is a statement the purpose of the 
meeting in the pre-diagnosis location, highlighting the need to make a diagnosis 
and thus making relevant it the relevant immediate next action. 
 
(7) [P90_H24] 
1 DR:  .hh so: I ↑think (0.8) .hh tch uhm what we have to do: 
2      today is to (.) put together (0.6) three things.=we have 
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3      to put together the history of the memory problems:: (PT 
4      nods) as you described so we:ll¿  
5      (0.5) (PT nods) 
6 DR:  the: scan resu:lt¿  
7      (0.3) (PT nods) 
8 DR:  and the results of the (.) memory testing that we’ve 
9      done, 
10      (.) (PT nods) 
11 PT:  ri:ght.  
12 DR:  and we have to:: (0.3) think of what most what might 
13      be the most likely diagnosis.=or the most like[ly     ] 
14 PT:                                 (PT nodding)   [ri:ght.]  
15      (0.3) 
16 DR:  explanation for why you’re having these memory problems 
17 PT:  r[ight.] (nodding) 
18 DR:   [over ] over the last four or five years 
19 PT:  right. 
20 DR:  and given that your scan hasn’t shown any changes in the  
21      blood vesse:ls or an[ything    li]ke that (.) .hh I  
22 PT:                      [right (nods)] 
23 DR:  think the most likely diagnosis is that you’ve- got an  
24      early (.) Alzheimer’s dementia:, 
25      (0.3) 
 
The doctor in this extract begins with an in-breath and the upshot-marker “so”, 
and then presents the clinic purpose as “what we have to do today” (line 1). She 
then lists the “three things” that are required for a dementia diagnosis, and have 
been discussed in the preceding stages of the meeting. The doctor pauses after 
naming each of these pieces of evidence (lines 5, 7, and 10), and the patient 
nods at each pause. The doctor has reached the end of her list by line 9, and 
the patient adds a verbal acknowledgement token – “right” (line 11). The doctor, 
having got recognition of each of these pieces of evidence from the patient, 
finishes her description of the purpose of the clinic (lines 12-18). She uses the 
institutional “we”, marking her status as a medical professional, and that she 
needs to “think of” “the most likely diagnosis” or “explanation”. This statement of 
a cause of the problems makes the diagnosis the next relevant action. The 
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patient gives another minimal acknowledgement (line 19), which the doctor 
takes as a go-ahead to continue with the diagnosis (lines 20-24).  
 
These descriptions of the meeting purpose often occur in conjunction with other 
pre-diagnosis practices, for example prior to the consent question. Many 
doctors use more than one pre-diagnosis practice, often in reaction to a block of 
the progression to the diagnosis delivery, as described above, but also often 
when patients only provide a minimal response. There are two further practices 
that are often used in conjunction with the three described, that appear to have 
different functions from simply marking the diagnosis as the next action. 
 
Practice to characterise the projected diagnosis 
One pre-diagnosis practice aims to characterise the nature of the projected 
diagnosis prior to delivery. 
 
Characterising dementia 
Doctors sometimes deliver a characterisation of dementia in the pre-diagnosis 
location. 
 
(8) [P34_H23] 
1 DR:  °mm° just putting:: the: sca:n together with (0.3) u:m 
2      the findings: .hh HH HH >sorry< the commonest cau:se 
3      for: dementia (0.4) in this country: is a condition 
4      called Alzheimer’s disea:se 
5 PT:  yes:. 
6    (0.8) 
7 DR:  now:: we can never make make that diagnosis with a 
8      hundred per cent certainty, 
9    (.) 
10 DR:  >because the only way of doing that is £looking at the 
11      brain under a microscope£< 
12    (.) 
13 PT:  ye:s. 
14    (.) 
15 DR:  u::m (.) but we: try and: identify this condition as 
16      early as we ca:n,  
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17      (0.5)  
18 DR:  because there is some: medication that we can offer 
19      people 
20      (0.3) 
21 DR:  which ca::n (.) slow down the progression of this 
22      condition. 
23      (0.3) 
24 DR:  .hh tch (.) the medication is something ca::lled 
25      donepezil or Aricept is it’s other name, 
26    (1.3) 
27 DR:  it doesn’t work for everyone 
28    (.) 
29 DR:  it probably works for:: °up to° sixty per cent of people 
30      that take it, (0.4) but the only way <that we know> 
31      >whether it’s going to work for someone or not< is for 
32      them to have a try with the medication. 
33      (.) 
34 PT:  yes: yes. 
35    (.) 
36 DR:  tch .hh so I think just putting >all of this 
37      together=the most< (.) .h common °th-° the most likely 
38      diagnosi:s (0.6) u:m for your memory lo:ss is (.) early 
39      Alzheimer’s disease? 
40    (0.7) 
41 PT:  yea:h, 
 
The doctor initiates the diagnosis phase by beginning to re-state the evidence, 
but she coughs, apologises, and then abandons this to name Alzheimer’s 
disease as “the commonest cause for dementia” (lines 1-4). The doctor and 
patient have met before, and at the start of the meeting there is a reference to a 
discussion at their last meeting on the possibility of receiving a diagnosis of 
dementia, which explains why this is an explanation of Alzheimer’s as a subtype 
rather than the umbrella term dementia. The patient acknowledges this 
explanation (line 5). The doctor makes explicit the uncertainty involved in the 
diagnostic process (lines 7-11), which the patient acknowledges after a small 
delay (lines 12-13). The doctor then indicates that the main function of making a 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease is for people to start taking the medication, 
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stating that while the medication is not effective for everyone it is important for 
patients to “have a try” (15-32). This definition strongly forecasts that the 
diagnosis is the relevant next action by topicalising both the process involved in 
making the diagnosis and the outcome of a diagnosis, i.e. treatment with 
medication. That this practice marks the diagnosis as the next stage is 
evidenced by the slightly impatient nature of the patient’s “yes yes” (line 32) 
(Heritage), after which doctor the continues to deliver the diagnosis (lines 34-
36).  
 
However, this practice provides a specific characterisation of dementia beyond 
just forecasting it as the imminent diagnosis. The doctor, in downplaying the 
certainty of the diagnosis and emphasising the medication, characterises the 
diagnosis in a way that minimises the impact of the diagnosis before delivery. 
These characterisations of dementia can be quite lengthy, and there is only one 
case in the data where the patient does not acknowledge the characterisation 
and solicit a move by the doctor to progress to the diagnosis delivery. 
Characterising dementia in the pre-diagnosis location therefore appears to be a 
powerful mechanism to obtain a go-ahead from the patient to deliver the 
diagnosis. 
 
Practice as a diagnostic assessment  
This practice is different from the previous group in that it is designed as a 
diagnostic turn – i.e. an evaluation of the patient’s symptoms as being caused 
by a medical condition (Heritage and Maynard, 2005). This works as a strong 
forecasting of the diagnosis to come in the proximate turn, but differs from the 
first group of practices in its structure and expectation of patient response.  
 
Statement of a “Problem” with a “Cause” 
This practice contains an assessment that the patient’s “problem” has a medical 
cause, but does not contain the diagnostic label.  
 
(9) [P164_H63] 
1 DR:  .hh so your scan means that there is (0.3) significant 
2      (0.4) >sort of< you know damage to the brain >because of 
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3      the< (0.3) the vascular changes.=the blood circulation 
4      isn’t as efficient a:s it once used to be perhaps when 
5      you were in your twenties and forties  
6      (.) (PT half nod and flexes hand) 
7 DR:  .hhh um (.) .hh and- in my view: (.) that is what is 
8      causing your me- memory problems. 
9      (.) (PT small nod, CN small nod) 
10 DR:  .hh and, (0.9) a:nd, (.) m- the name we use for this 
11      (.) condition is ca:lled (.) vascular: (.) dementia.  
12      (0.8) (PT nods and blinks) 
 
The doctor in this example has been describing the brain scan results for just 
over 2 minutes, before producing the in-breath and upshot marker “so” (line 1), 
giving a summary of the results. These include “significant” changes, where the 
blood circulation “isn’t as efficient as it once used to be” (lines 1-5). With the use 
of “that” in line 7, the doctor then indexes these physical signs as “what is 
causing your memory problems” (lines 7-8). The doctor has thus definitively 
stated that there are “memory problems” that have a cause. This topicalisation 
of a cause, without giving a name to a condition, projects the next action as 
naming the cause, i.e., the diagnosis. The patient responds with a non-verbal 
continuer (line 9), and the doctor delivers the diagnosis of vascular dementia 
(lines 10-11). 
 
Doctors will thus state the existence of problems with a medical cause in the 
pre-diagnosis location. These statements contain the structure of a news 
announcement, which, in a news delivery sequence, would be the base 
sequence and not thus not a pre-sequence in the strictest terms (Schegloff, 
2007). In this sense, this practice is different from the prior practices, as the 
news announcement format places a different requirement on the patient to 
respond. However, this practice always occurs in the pre-diagnosis location: 
that is, before the utterance where “the patient’s problem is described as a 
medical category” (Peräkylä, 2005, p220).  
 
A further indication of the pre-diagnosis nature of these statements is that the 
data demonstrates that both doctors and patients are oriented to the fact that 
the naming of the diagnosis is the likely next action. Patients typically respond 
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minimally, with continuers, as in the example above. However, patients can also 
challenge the doctor’s evaluation of their problem, which halts the progression 
to the diagnosis delivery.  
 
(10) [P117_H40] 
1 DR:  um (0.3) and so: .h (0.6) the fact that there's more 
2      atrophy here: than in other parts of the brai:n .hh 
3 PT:  m 
4 DR:  um: (.) would (0.5) u u support a diagnosis of (.) >you 
5      know< a problem in the brain causing the memory problem, 
6      (.) that that we're (.) that we're measuring on these 
7      tests:. 
8      (.) 
9 PT:  and (.) is thi:s (0.5) a serious problem? 
10      (.) 
11 PT:  .hh u:m (.) for me: at the moment I would not think 
12      (1.1) that my memory is so bad that I would forget (0.4) 
13      lots and lots of thin:gs it's usually: °m°   
14      (0.6) 
15 DR:  yea:h [so] 
16 PT:        [sm]all things [not  ] you know:: (.) rather 
17 DR:                       [I th-] 
18 PT:  than:: 
19 DR:  I think you're right (.) an:d what (.) you know we would 
20      call this a you know (.) >it's certainly at< the (.) 
21      mi:ld or early end of (.) the spectrum of of  
22      [  mem]ory problems. 
23 PT:  [yeah¿] 
24 DR:  .hh (.) and (PT leans slightly towards DR and tilts 
25      head) (.) the the commonest cause for a a a a a scan 
26      like this and the: memory (.) er difficulties that we're 
27      measuring on the test (0.3) the commonest cause for that 
28      would be something (0.4) called Alzheimer's disease.  
29      (.) 
30 DR:  .hh and I suspect that's probably what's going on. 
31 PT:  that I'm starting Alzheimer's 
32 DR:  yeah 
33 PT:  that's horrendous. 
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Similar to extract 9, the doctor has just finished showing the patient her brain 
scan results, and begins the diagnosis phase with an upshot marker before 
telling the patient that the scan results “would support a diagnosis of you know 
a problem in the brain causing the memory problem” (lines 1-5). This statement 
strongly projects a diagnosis as the next action in the use of the word 
“diagnosis”, but also again introduces the “problem in the brain” as the cause of 
the “memory problem”. It is also worth noting that the “memory problem” is also 
classified as something “that we’re measuring on these tests” (lines 6-7). The 
cognitive test results had also already been discussed, so the doctor is re-
referencing both the scan and cognitive test results to account for the diagnosis. 
The repeated statement of the evidence from the testing within the pre-
diagnosis sequence may be a result of prior resistance (Peräkylä, 1998).  
 
The patient’s response to this pre-diagnostic statement is in the form of a 
question about the severity (line 9). She then expresses resistance to the 
doctor’s formulation of a “problem” with a “cause”, minimising her difficulties 
(lines 11-13). Her response blocks the diagnosis as the next action, describing 
her symptoms as not “so bad”, and that she just forgets “small things”, 
something that is common in older age and thus would not support a medical 
diagnosis. This re-description of her symptoms as a form of resistance, while 
not questioning the validity of the evidence, is similar to resistance to diagnoses 
in primary care (Peräkylä, 2002), and is thus recognisable as a block of the 
doctor’s progression to the diagnosis. 
 
It is the doctor’s response to this block, and carefully executed progression to 
the diagnosis itself, that indicates his orientation to the naming of the diagnosis 
to be the necessary next action. The doctor, patient, and her husband have all 
been looking at the brain scan on the computer screen prior to this sequence, 
with the doctor turning to the patient in line 4. The patient however is still 
looking at the computer screen when she asks this question in line 9, and the 
doctor delays answering but moves his entire body and chair away from the 
computer screen and towards the patient. The patient continues after a micro-
pause (line 10), describing the reasoning behind her question (lines 11-16).  
The doctor puts down his pen and nods along with the patient’s descriptions of 
 139 
her problem, but interrupts as she pauses (lines 13-14), and comes in in 
overlap (lines 15-16). The patient then eventually turns from the computer 
screen to the doctor after she says “not” (line 16), and the doctor takes this 
opportunity to continue with his presentation of her “problem” (lines 17-19). In 
starting his turn with the phrase “we would call this a..”, he is indicating that 
there is a “this” that has a name, and thus seeming to start to deliver a 
diagnosis. However, he abandons this, and repeats the pre-diagnosis practice, 
evaluating the problem (“it”) as being “at the mild or early end of the spectrum of 
memory problems”. His emphasis of the “mild” and “early” (line 18-19) 
downgrades his previous description of “memory problems” (line 5) towards the 
patient’s description of her symptoms not being “so bad” (line 11). The patient 
this time utters a “yeah” (line 20), but the fact it is in overlap with the “memory 
problems” means that there is some uncertainty as to whether this is a go-
ahead for the delivery itself. This may account for the doctor’s hesitancy (line 
21), but the patient leans towards the doctor and tilts her head, indicating 
recipiency for what is to follow. The doctor therefore continues and delivers the 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, which the patient responds to with a strong 
negative assessment (lines 21-33).  
 
This example strongly demonstrates doctor and patient orientation that this pre-
diagnosis statement is not a completed news delivery. The patient resists the 
doctor’s evaluation of her problems in the pre-diagnosis form, and the doctor 
downgrades this. This downgrade appears to be aiming to minimise the 
patient’s resistance prior to naming the condition as Alzheimer’s disease. The 
patient’s gesture towards the doctor after this downgrade, soliciting more 
information, also indicates an expectation of more diagnostic news. The 
difference in the patient’s reaction to the diagnosis naming than the pre-
diagnosis also illustrates that the patient also orients to the delivery turn itself as 
the news announcement. However, it is worth noting that patient responses to 
diagnosis are not usually this extended, and this will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter.  
 
Summary 
In summary, the doctors often start the diagnosis stage with one, or a 
combination of multiple, practices in the pre-diagnosis location. There are 5 
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practice types evident in the data. Three of these appear to primarily function to 
mark the diagnosis as the next action, orienting the patient to the diagnosis 
stage. A different form of pre-diagnosis practice is to characterise dementia 
prior to delivering the patient’s diagnosis, often downgrading its severity and 
highlighting the importance of treatment. Another practice doctors use is to 
explicitly evaluate the patient’s problem as being caused by a medical 
condition, thus providing a strong forecasting of the diagnosis as the next action 
without naming the dementia. 
 
Frequencies of the Pre-diagnosis Turns  
Table 7 illustrates the frequencies of the different pre-diagnosis turns described 
above, as well as how many of these were deployed prior to the diagnosis 
being delivered. In 83% of meetings doctors utilise the pre-diagnosis space, 
implementing at least one of the 5 practices. Clinicians will often use more than 
one method of prefacing the diagnosis when patients block the move from the 
pre-diagnosis to the diagnosis, either through not providing a response or 
showing non-alignment. In 38% of the meetings doctors use 2 or more of these 
practices, showing that patient non-alignment with the pre-diagnosis is 
common. In 11% of the meetings 3 or 4 pre-diagnosis practices are used before 
delivering the diagnosis.  
 
Practice Frequency 
Statement of the purpose and 
process of the memory clinic 
11 (13%) 
Asking for the patient’s consent 20 (25%) 
Eliciting the patient’s perspective 11 (13%) 
Characterising dementia 17 (21%) 
Statement of a “problem” with a 
“cause” 
31 (38%) 
Number of practices used: 
0: 22  (27%) 
1: 31  (37%) 
2: 21  (26%) 
3: 5    (6%) 
4: 3    (4%) 
 
Table 7: Pre-diagnosis frequencies 
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The Diagnosis Delivery 
 
The diagnosis delivery was identified as the turn in which dementia is first 
named as the cause of the patient’s symptoms.  
 
As with all aspects of talk, dementia diagnosis deliveries are not straightforward 
applications of the diagnostic label, but are designed in order to have a 
particular impression on the patient as the recipient (Sacks et al., 1974). It is 
evident from the data that the doctors are naming dementia as the patient’s 
diagnosis in a way that both minimises the negative impact of the diagnosis and 
works against possible resistance. However, there is also evidence that doctors 
are aiming to enhance patient understanding that they are receiving a dementia 
diagnosis. There are four primary methods that the doctors use within the 
diagnosis turn: introducing dementia as a medical label, minimising the severity 
of dementia, re-referencing the evidence for the diagnosis, and choosing to 
present the diagnosis directly or through inference. 
 
1. Introducing dementia as a medical label 
 
(10) [P154_H41] 
1 DR:  we think that what you’ve got is a: condition ca:lled 
2      (.) Alzheimer’s di[sea:se.] 
3 PT:                    [ah:::  ] 
4      (.) 
5 PT:  ↑ri:ght. 
 
Many doctors classify dementia as a medical condition within the diagnostic 
turn – using terms such as “condition” (line 1) or “illness”. This is a common 
feature of the deliveries and defines dementia as a medical label, and therefore 
an area where the doctor holds epistemic authority. Should the patient or their 
family have beliefs about dementia, this introduction of the label as being 
something within the doctor’s domain as a medical professional can allow the 
doctor to present the diagnosis differently to their preconceptions. This can work 
against negative responses to diagnosis – so building towards a portrayal of 
dementia as something different from what people might have read about in the 
 142 
media or seen people they know experience. Additionally, if the patient sees 
their problems as attributable to old age, the emphasis of the “condition” 
demonstrates that there is a medical cause, and thus this labelling within the 
delivery can also manage potential resistance. 
 
2. Minimising the diagnosis severity 
 
(12) [P35_H22] 
1 DR:  um (0.4) so (.) I think (0.6) um (0.6) that that what’s 
2      causing this problem is the very very early stages of a 
3      condition called Alzheimer’s disea:se 
4 PT:  °mm:° 
 
The second feature of dementia diagnosis deliveries is the minimisation of the 
severity of dementia. This is evident in extract 12, where the doctor emphasises 
“the very very early stages” of the Alzheimer’s disease. The patient in extract 12 
has an ACE-III cognitive test score of 60, which is 22 points below the cut-off for 
making a diagnosis. Although test results are not the sole criterion for 
measuring severity, this suggests she is not in the early stages of the condition. 
Additionally, statistical analysis showed no link between cognitive test scores 
and downgrading the severity (M=69, SD=14.3) or not (M=68, SD=13.4) within 
the diagnostic turn (t(63)=-0.287, p=0.775) (details in Appendix D 1). This 
minimisation of the patient’s dementia severity therefore appears to have a use 
other than explaining the patient’s symptoms. Characterising the patient’s 
dementia as “mild” and thus different from images they may hold of late stage 
dementia and the lack of independence that may bring works to soften the blow 
of the diagnosis. Additionally, this can work against resistance: the emphasis on 
the mild form of the patient’s condition may provide a reason why the patient 
has the dementia but not be acting how they may consider someone with 
dementia to act.  
 
3. Re-referencing the evidence 
 
(13) [P50_H43] 
1 DR:  now all that informa:tion, (0.5) the the questions and  
 143 
2      the sca:n, (0.3) with what you have to:ld us  
3 CR:  yeah 
4 DR:  bo:th to my colleagues,  
5 PT:  yeah 
6 DR:  it seems (.) you are developing: (0.3) Alzheimer's 
7      disease.=>which is a< type of (.) dementia. 
8      (.) 
 
Within the diagnostic turn the doctor in extract 13 references “all that 
information”, which he specifies as being from “the questions”, indicating the 
test results, “the scan”, and “what you have told us both to my colleagues” (lines 
1-4). As discussed previously, doctors will reference the evidence in diagnosis 
delivery when they need to demonstrate their accountability for the diagnosis 
(Peräkylä, 2005). This also occurs in primary care when there is a temporal gap 
between the examination and the diagnosis, which there always will be in the 
memory clinic structure (even when the tests and diagnosis happen on same 
day), and when there may be some resistance on the part of the patient, which 
is also common in dementia. Referencing the evidence in diagnosis deliveries 
also increases the likelihood of patients engaging in diagnosis discussions 
(Peräkylä, 2005). Therefore, by re-referencing the previously discussed 
evidence from the testing in the diagnosis itself, doctors could be encouraging 
patients to respond, and thus eliciting their understanding or acceptance of the 
diagnosis.   
 
4. Direct versus Inferential diagnosis delivery formats 
The last feature of the design of the diagnosis turn was related to whether 
doctors delivered the diagnosis directly or through inference. At one end of the 
scale – a direct diagnosis delivery – the diagnostic label is introduced as what 
Maynard (Maynard, 2004, :53) calls “an attribute of the person”, i.e. something 
that the patient “has” or “is”.  
 
(14) [P23_H21] 
1 DR:  I think you ha:ve what we wou- ca:ll Alzheimer’s 
2      disease?  
3      (1) 
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On the other end of the scale – an inferential diagnosis delivery – the diagnosis 
is named as a medical explanation for the symptoms displayed on the testing, 
an action Maynard terms “labelling the evidence” (Maynard, 2004, p64). The 
diagnosis is not attached to the patient, but an inference or syllogism has to be 
made that if the patient has done tests that show X, and X constitutes a 
diagnosis, then the patient has the diagnosis.  
 
(15) [P104_H40] 
1 DR:  .tch so I think u:m, (0.4) wha:t u::m (0.4) if- the most 
2      common cau:se for that kind of pictu:re (0.4) and this 
3      kind of (.) picture on the (.) on the memory tests (.) 
4      is a: is a problem called Alzheimer’s disea:se  
5      (0.4) 
 
As discussed in the introduction, previous CA work has shown that syllogistic 
diagnostic formats requiring inference from the results of diagnostic tests are 
particularly utilised when patients are showing resistance (Maynard, 2003a, 
Monzoni et al., 2011b). Given the fact, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, patients 
in memory clinics often display resistance to the formulation of their symptoms 
as severe enough to be a dementia, a diagnosis delivered through inference 
may be advantageous for doctors in order to avoid disagreement. Additionally, 
these diagnosis deliveries that require patient inference allow the patients to 
come to the realisation that they have the diagnosis themselves, and are less 
abrupt than direct diagnoses. However, people with dementia may have 
impaired reasoning skills and difficulties with abstract thinking, and thus a 
diagnosis based on inference might be more difficult to understand than for 
patients without cognitive impairment. Therefore, doctors in memory clinics 
have a dilemma in delivering the diagnosis in a format that is sensitive to likely 
disagreement and negative impact versus a format that will ensure 
understanding in the face of possible cognitive impairment.  
 
In examining the directness of dementia diagnoses, there were 4 different 
diagnostic formats identified. These formats differ in the inferential leaps 
required for the patient to recognise that they have dementia.  
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4.1 No Inference Needed 
In these diagnosis deliveries the dementia label is explicitly presented as an 
attribution of the patient, and thus the patient does not need to make an 
inference between the naming of dementia and dementia being their diagnosis.  
 
The most common configuration of these deliveries consist of the doctor stating 
the patient “has” or “has got” dementia (line 1).  
 
(16) [P31_H21] 
1 DR:  oka:y (.) so we think that you have a <dementia:,>   
2      (0.6) 
 
To say someone “has” a condition is demonstrating that it belongs to them, and 
thus the diagnosis and the patient are immediately connected. Maynard 
describes these formats occurring in developmental disabilities clinics, with 
doctors also stating that the patient “is” a condition (“he is retarded”) (Maynard, 
2004). There are no cases in the memory clinic data where the doctor says the 
patient “is” their diagnosis. However, in a minority of cases the doctor names 
the diagnosis as something that the patient is experiencing.  
 
(17) [P183_H49] 
1 DR:  .hhh (0.4) putting that all together, (.) I think that 
2      (0.9) although it’s only a clinical diagnosis, .h there 
3      probably is a suggestion (.) that you are in: the very 
4      early stages of an Alzheimer’s dementia. 
5      (0.5) 
 
The preposition “in” (line 3) describes something as enclosed or surrounded by 
something else. To say someone “is in” something is again to directly connect 
the person with that thing. Therefore, there is also no inference required for the 
patient to see that they are receiving a diagnosis.  
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4.2 Inference from own problem to diagnostic cause 
This format requires a small amount of inference. In these formats the doctor 
attributes a “problem” to the patient, and in the same turn names the diagnosis 
as the cause of this problem.  
 
(18) [P89_H24] 
1 DR:  u:m so I think probably:, the cause of your memory 
2      problems is what we call a Parkinson’s disease dementia. 
3      (0.5) 
 
The diagnosis is delivered as “the cause” of the symptom that is directly 
attributed to the patient: “your memory problems” (line 1). This describes an 
explicit relationship between the diagnostic label and the patient’s problem. The 
patient’s problem is presented as something that belongs to them, and this is 
immediately connected to the diagnosis, which means that there is only a 
minimal inferential leap to be made by the patient to understand they have a 
diagnosis of dementia.   
 
This format can vary slightly in naming the patient’s “diagnosis” rather than their 
“problem” (line 3). 
 
(19) [P16_H02] 
1 DR:  sh m from my assessment (.) last year: (.) and from 
2      (0.6) uh:: what (CN name) suggested (.) every uh: (0.6) 
3      how things have evolved ever since (0.4) your diagnosis 
4      is (0.9) one of what we call (0.4) a (0.3) mild (0.6) 
5      dementia type of illness. 
6    (1.2)  
 
The diagnosis is something that the patient owns (“your diagnosis” line 3), and 
then this diagnosis (rather than the patient) is labelled as “one of what we call a 
mild dementia”. It may be that in labelling the “diagnosis” rather than the 
“memory problems” the doctor presents an easier inference for the patient to 
make, as this does not require an acceptance of the memory problems in order 
to process the diagnosis being delivered. However, it is the “diagnosis” rather 
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than the patient themselves that is attributed the label of dementia, and thus 
there is some inference required. 
 
4.3 Inference from diagnosis definition to own situation 
In these formats the doctor gives a generic definition of dementia and attributes 
this to the patient’s test results or living situation. What is noticeable in these 
formats is the increased use of indexical terms (e.g. “that”, “it”) in the place of 
attributions or diagnostic labels. 
 
(20) [P42_H50] 
1 DR:  .pt .hhh and (.) in order to have >a diagnosis of 
2      dementia< you see: it's not just memory problems, (.) 
3      .hh it's memory problems (0.6) plus other problems .hh 
4      that have .h (.) got to have an effect on how you live 
5      your life 
6 CN:  m[m.     ]  
7 DR:   [>so you] don't< live (.) it as well as you used to. 
8 CN:  yeah.  
9      (0.3) 
10 DR:  .hhh >and I-< and I think that's probably what's going 
11      on in your ca:[se.=.hh] I- I think i- it would all fit  
12 PT:                [mm: m  ] 
13 DR:  with a dementia wha[t’s wha]t's happe[ning to] you. 
14 CN:                     [mm     ]  
15 PT:                                       [mm:    ] 
 
The doctor begins the diagnosis with an overview of how one comes to “have a 
diagnosis of dementia” (lines 1-9). The use of the phrase “in order to have..” 
and “it” (line 2) places this description into a generalised story-telling format, 
and therefore while “you” is used twice (lines 4 and 7), these are generic and do 
not reference the patient. There has been no discussion of the patient’s day-to-
day life at a prior point in the meeting that this symptom description of “you 
don’t live it (life) as well as you used to” (line 7) could be referring to. However, 
this could have been discussed in the assessment stage, and thus the doctor’s 
pause at this point is potentially aimed at eliciting acknowledgement. He gets 
this verbally from the patient’s wife, and the patient produces a tiny nod.  
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The doctor then attributes the symptoms to the patient (lines 10-11). The “that” 
(line 9) indexes the prior description (lines 1-6), which the doctor presents as 
happening to the patient – “going on in your case”. While this could be seen as 
the initial diagnosis delivery with a syllogistic format, the doctor rushes through 
re-stating the diagnostic label (lines 10 and 13). Again there is the indexical “it”, 
which “fits with dementia”. However, this is not explicitly linked to the patient 
until the end of the doctor’s turn (line 13), where the “it” is seen to refer to 
“what’s happening to you”. Therefore, by the completion of the doctor’s turn the 
patient’s experience is tied to dementia and thus the diagnosis is delivered.  
 
This format of delivery commonly occurs in multi-unit turns, which, as described 
in Chapter 2, may lead to misunderstandings in people with cognitive 
impairment. The deliveries that use this format also require multiple levels of 
inference. Firstly, it may be expected that if the doctor is providing a generalised 
description of what a dementia diagnosis is, the patient will start to infer that this 
description applies to him. The doctor specifies the description and attributes it 
to the patient’s own experience – but in doing so uses the indexical “that”, 
requiring the patient to make the inference that the “that” refers back to his 
symptoms. Furthermore, when it comes to the diagnosis, dementia is named as 
something that “it would all” fit with, requiring the patient again to make the 
inference that the “it” refers to his symptoms. The doctor’s addition of “what’s 
happening to you” at the end of the turn perhaps seeks to rectify this, but again 
is indexical and does not specify “what” is happening. Therefore, the patient will 
need to make multiple inferences that this diagnostic label is connected to his 
memory difficulties in order to come to the conclusion that he has a diagnosis of 
dementia. 
 
4.4 Fully inferential diagnosis deliveries 
Deliveries using this format contain no attribution of a diagnostic label or 
symptom to the patient. The patient’s symptoms are established in the earlier 
stages of the meeting (through test feedback and elicitation of perspective on 
symptoms), and while the test results are usually referred to in the delivery, this 
is done in an abstract manner with no attribution to the patient. While the 
diagnosis is always named, which is not always the case in other settings 
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(Maynard, 2004, Monzoni et al., 2011a), it is done through the use of indexical 
terms linking back to a generic symptom description.  
 
(21) [P138_H40] 
1 DR:  it’s hh (.) they- we we ca:ll this combination of 
2      (.) you know: m memory difficulty and blood vessel 
3      change in the brai:n 
4 PT:  mm: 
5 DR:  we call that vascular dementia. 
6      (.) 
 
The doctor states the patient’s symptoms but does not attribute them to the 
patient, using “this” instead of “your” that is used in the first two formats (lines 1-
2). He then delivers the diagnosis (line 5), linking the diagnostic label back to 
the generalised symptom description with “we call that..”. He is therefore 
labelling the evidence, not the patient, with the diagnosis, similar to the previous 
format. However, in these cases the fact that the evidence is also not attributed 
to the patient means that an additional inference has to be made. 
 
When these formats of delivery are used the patient has to make a full 
inferential jump back to the test feedback stage of the meeting. The generic 
reference to the patient’s symptoms, with the indexical “this”, requires the 
patient to remember that her test results showed those particular symptoms. 
The naming of the illness then refers back to the evidence with the “that”, thus 
labelling the evidence with the dementia diagnosis rather than the patient or the 
patient’s symptoms, requiring further inference. Therefore, at no point in these 
deliveries is the diagnosis or the symptom attached to the patient. 
 
There are thus 4 diagnostic formats used in memory clinics, varying in the 
amount of inferential reasoning the patient needs to make from the diagnosis 
being named to them having the diagnosis. Patients will either need to make no 
inference when the diagnosis is delivered directly, make an inference that their 
problem is caused by dementia, make multiple inferences that their symptoms 
are the same as that which is caused by dementia, or make the inferential leap 
from the definition of dementia as a certain set of symptoms to those symptoms 
discussed in the testing as fed back earlier in the meeting.  
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Frequency of diagnosis delivery features 
 
Diagnosis Feature Frequency 
Introducing dementia as a medical label 40 (49%) 
Minimising the diagnosis severity 34 (42%) 
Re-referencing the evidence 45 (55%) 
Delivery format 
  No inference 
  Inference from own problem to  
  diagnostic cause 
  Inference from own problem to  
  diagnostic definition 
  Fully inferential diagnosis 
 
33 (41%) 
8   (10%) 
 
9   (11%) 
 
31 (38%) 
 
While the first three features of the diagnostic turn occur independently in 
approximately half of the meetings, the vast majority (n=76, 94%) contain at 
least one of these features. In memory clinics there are more cases where the 
diagnosis requires some level of inference than those that require none (see 
Table 8). However, in 41% of cases the doctors deliver the diagnosis directly to 
the patient, ensuring that there is no need for inference.  
 
Quantitative analysis demonstrates that there is a relationship between 
cognitive test scores (only ACE-III scores used because they were in the 
majority n=65) and the diagnostic format requiring no inference (M=63.72, 
SD=13.3) versus those requiring some level of inference (M=70.78, SD=13.3) 
(t(63)=2.07, p=0.042) (Appendix D 2). In other words, doctors are using direct 
diagnostic formats more often when patients are more cognitively impaired. 
 
Summary 
Doctors are using different diagnostic formats requiring different levels of 
inference for patients to understand that they have a diagnosis of dementia. 
Diagnosis deliveries requiring inference are the most common formats used, 
similar to other settings with contentious diagnosis deliveries. However, direct 
diagnosis deliveries that require no inference from the patient’s symptoms to 
their diagnosis make up 41% of the diagnoses. Quantitative analysis shows 
Table 8: Frequencies of diagnosis features 
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doctors use diagnosis deliveries requiring no inference more commonly with 
patients with more cognitive impairment.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Dementia diagnosis delivery sequences reflect the delicate balance involved in 
delivering a dementia diagnosis: minimising likely resistance and distress, while 
simultaneously maximising understanding given likely cognitive impairment. 
The majority of deliveries begin with doctor turns indicating that there is a 
diagnosis, but without using the diagnostic label. The turns in these locations 
are primarily utilised by doctors to ensure patients are oriented to the diagnosis 
phase of the meeting. Additionally, these turns can also be used to characterise 
dementia in a particular way, and thus downplay the diagnosis prior to delivery. 
Doctors also characterise dementia when delivering the diagnosis by 
introducing the diagnosis as a medical term and emphasising the early or mild 
stages of the patient’s illness. Additionally, evidence is often re-referenced in 
the delivery. In the majority of diagnosis deliveries doctors avoid attributing the 
illness directly to the patient (“this is dementia”), thus requiring the patients to 
infer that they have received a diagnosis from the information presented, which 
is a method to avoid both disagreement and strong negative responses. 
However, 41% of dementia diagnoses are delivered in a direct format (“you 
have dementia”), requiring no inference from the patient and thus enhancing the 
likelihood of understanding the diagnosis.  
 
Before discussing the effect of these strategies on managing this balance 
between ensuring understanding and avoiding resistance and distress, it is 
important to discuss how much of what has been observed in memory clinics is 
specific to the setting. It is certainly the case that many of the behaviours 
observed in dementia diagnosis delivery have also been shown to occur both in 
bad news interactions more generally and in other diagnosis settings. There is 
evidence throughout the dementia diagnosis sequence of hesitancy, in-breaths, 
pauses, and re-starts, which are common in all bad news deliveries (Maynard, 
2003b). The use of pre-diagnosis practices has not been systematically 
documented in other settings: so while they may be aimed at the re-orientation 
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of patients with likely short-term memory and concentration deficits, there may 
also be wider functions linked with deliveries of diagnostic news more generally. 
For example, the build up to the diagnostic news through pre-diagnosis is also 
demonstration of the shrouding and delay of bad news evident in many 
diagnosis deliveries (Maynard, 2003b, Turowetz and Maynard, 2016). 
Additionally, pre-diagnoses not only orient patients to the diagnosis being the 
next action, but also strongly forecast the nature of the news, a device that also 
occurs in other medical settings (Maynard, 2003a, Stivers, 1998). Further 
research is needed to see whether the particular pre-diagnosis practices 
described are used in other diagnostic settings in order to see whether these 
are specific to dementia diagnosis or are characteristic of diagnostic interactions 
more generally. 
 
Pre-diagnoses may also be a result of ‘breaking bad news’ training that doctors 
receive in medical school. The majority of doctors are not trained to deliver 
diagnoses of particular conditions, but receive training on delivering bad news 
more generally, which will include feedback of unsuccessful treatment or 
reporting deaths to families. Additionally, while some breaking bad news 
guidelines are more common than others (Kaplan, 2010, Silverman et al., 
1998), the doctors are unlikely to have all received all the same training. 
However, many breaking bad news guidelines include similar features to those 
in the memory clinic data. For example, the SPIKES protocol for delivering bad 
news advises doctors to give a “warning” to patients (e.g. “I’ve got bad news I’m 
afraid”) with the idea that this will lessen the shock when the diagnosis is 
delivered (Kaplan, 2010). The pre-diagnosis practice where doctors state a 
problem with a cause may be an example of doctors providing this warning, 
although is not as explicit as that which is recommended in the guidance. 
Additionally, an elicitation of how much information the patient wants to know 
regarding their diagnosis is advised in many breaking bad news guidelines, as 
well as the NICE and the MSNAP national guidelines for dementia (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2006, Hodge et al., 2014). However, it should 
be noted that this part of the diagnosis guidelines is usually taken to mean that 
consent to name the diagnosis should be discussed prior to, rather than within, 
the diagnosis feedback meeting (Guss, 2014). 
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However, the analysis suggests that while the pre-diagnosis practices could be 
a result of generalised guidance provided to clinicians, or particular interactional 
features of delivering bad news, how they are applied appear to be specific to 
the dementia context. People with dementia often have memory difficulties 
and/or difficulties in attention and concentration, particularly in the early stages 
of Alzheimer’s disease, which makes up a large proportion of the sample. 
These symptoms may result in difficulties following lengthy discussions 
containing detailed information. Despite the diagnosis phase usually following 
strong forecasting in the test feedback stage, patients may have lost 
concentration or forgotten the information discussed at any point during the 
interaction. The fact that three pre-diagnosis practices explicitly marking the 
diagnosis as the next action were identified and used in the vast majority of the 
meetings illustrates doctors placing great importance on patient orientation to 
the diagnosis feedback right up to the moment where they deliver the diagnosis. 
Additionally, it was evident from the data that if patients did not provide a go-
ahead to the pre-diagnosis – i.e. blocked the move to diagnosis delivery – 
doctors would halt the progression to the diagnosis and pursue a response until 
a go-ahead was obtained from the patient. The pre-diagnosis sequence 
therefore appears to be particularly important to ensure patient readiness for 
delivery before stating the diagnosis. 
 
Another feature of the pre-diagnosis, which is also evident in the design of the 
diagnostic turn itself, is doctor management of potential patient resistance. 
While patient resistance to diagnosis is in no way specific to dementia, there 
are numerous reasons why patients may resist a dementia diagnosis. 
Throughout the data there were examples where patient responses to pre-
diagnosis were indicative of resistance to the projected diagnosis (e.g. extract 
10, page 137). When this occurred, doctors again halted the progression to the 
delivery turn and implemented another pre-diagnosis practice, sometimes 
repeatedly, until eliciting an adequate signal from the patient to continue. The 
fact that these signals could be extremely minimal (often just nods or minimal 
continuers such as “mm” or “yes”), demonstrates doctor authority in progressing 
the meeting – with passivity from the patient being the preferred option 
(Robinson, 2003a). The management of this resistance continues into the 
delivery turn, with doctors presenting the dementia diagnosis explicitly as a 
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medical term through the use of phrases such as “a condition called..”. This 
placement of the diagnosis in the clinician’s epistemic domain presents it as 
something different from the patient’s preconceptions of dementia, and thus is 
attentive to potential resistance. 
 
Doctors also re-state the evidence for the diagnosis – the scan, test results, or 
patient symptom history – within the diagnosis sequence. Both Peräkylä and 
Maynard have demonstrated the utility of presenting the evidence within the 
diagnosis phase of the meeting to indirectly contradict any patient opposing 
views of the diagnosis (Maynard, 2003a, Peräkylä, 2005). Re-stating the 
evidence emphasises the doctor’s diagnostic reasoning and thus shows 
accountability for the diagnosis, but is also again a display of epistemic 
authority and therefore minimises opportunities for patient resistance. In 
Peräkylä’s primary care data, while evidence was indexed or placed adjacent to 
diagnosis in the majority of cases, doctors were shown to explicate the 
evidence in 39% of deliveries. Explicating the evidence is much more common 
in memory clinics, occurring in 80% of meetings either within the pre-diagnosis 
sequence or the diagnostic turn. Additionally, Peräkylä found a statistical link 
between the contentiousness of the diagnosis and whether doctors referenced 
the evidence in delivery. Given the fact that dementia is very likely to be a 
contentious diagnosis regardless of whether patients believe they have 
symptoms or not (due to the stigma and equation of symptoms to normal 
ageing, as discussed previously), the fact that evidence is re-stated so often in 
memory clinic diagnosis sequences supports Peräkylä’s findings.  
 
Another factor in delivering a dementia diagnosis is the negative impact of the 
diagnosis. Studies of patient initial responses to diagnosis show that shock and 
distress can be common (Aminzadeh et al., 2007, Carpenter et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is evidence within the pre-
diagnosis and in the design of the diagnosis turn that doctors aim to minimise 
the negative effect of the diagnostic news. Characterising dementia in the pre-
diagnosis sequence appears to work in a number of ways in managing the 
patient’s responses. Doctors were observed to emphasise uncertainty in 
coming to their diagnostic conclusions, and also topicalise medication and 
support available to people with dementia diagnoses. This was also noticeable 
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within the diagnostic turn itself, with many doctors emphasising the patient’s 
dementia as being “mild” or “early”. The fact that the use of these terms does 
not appear to be associated with the severity of cognitive impairment on the 
testing suggests that doctors implement this strategy particularly to manage the 
negative effect of the diagnosis on the patient. Patients and their families report 
that while they want diagnostic information communicated clearly, they also 
want to be able to maintain hope after receiving a dementia diagnosis, and thus 
strategies such as this may mean they can maintain that hope (Mastwyk et al., 
2014). However, patients and their families report that the uncertainty is one of 
the primary challenges surrounding assessment and diagnosis (Campbell et al., 
2016), and it may be that too much emphasis on continued uncertainty will have 
a negative effect in itself.  
 
Doctors thus appear to be managing the patient’s orientation, potential 
resistance, and negative responses within the design of the pre-diagnosis and 
diagnosis turns. The fact that doctors deliver diagnoses using different levels of 
attribution of dementia to the patient, requiring different levels of inference for 
the patient to understand they are receiving a diagnosis of dementia, relates to 
all of these factors. The utility of inferential diagnostic formats (where the 
diagnosis is not attributed to the patient – “this is dementia” rather than “you 
have dementia”) has been demonstrated repeatedly in settings where 
resistance to diagnosis is common (Maynard, 2004, Monzoni et al., 2011b). 
Additionally, delivering diagnoses as upshots of evidence from the testing – 
thus requiring patients to make the inference that they have the diagnosis – is a 
method to minimise the strong negative responses within the clinic (Maynard, 
2003a, Yoon et al., 2015). In Monzoni and Reuber’s data on non-epileptic 
seizures diagnosis discussions, they state that “overt attributions..were a 
minority”, and that “rare were the cases” that neurologists used explicit 
diagnostic labels (Monzoni and Reuber, 2015). Gill and Maynard describe 
“asserting the condition” with evidence from testing being demonstrated as 
being “more common” than not including evidence (Gill and Maynard, 1995). 
Additionally, Maynard described these formats as being common in oncology 
and HIV settings (Maynard, 2003a). Therefore, it is not surprising that these 
formats are used in the majority of the memory clinic diagnosis deliveries. 
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However, in oncology, HIV, neurology, or with parents of children with 
developmental disabilities, it is likely that people will be able to make the 
inferential leap required from the statement of the evidence to understanding a 
diagnosis has been delivered. There is evidence that some people with 
dementia have difficulty holding representations of information necessary to 
always successfully make these connections (Weirather, 2010, Almor et al., 
1999). This will be made even more difficult by the fact these types of 
diagnoses are often delivered over multi-unit turns, which may be difficult to 
follow with cognitive impairment (Elsey et al., 2015). This may be one of the 
primary reasons that a large proportion, over 40%, of diagnoses delivered in 
memory clinic are direct attributions of diagnosis to the patient, thus requiring 
no inference for the patient to realise they have dementia. A further 27% of the 
diagnosis deliveries contained some level of attribution of the illness to the 
patient – either through placement of the diagnosis as the name of the patient’s 
problem or diagnosis, or through linking the diagnosis to the patient’s situation. 
These formats require less inference by the patients to understand that they are 
receiving a diagnosis than straight indirect formats, and thus may also be a 
method to maximise understanding. This is supported by the fact that doctors 
were more likely to use direct diagnosis formats when patients have lower 
cognitive test scores supports the use of these formats to enhance patient 
understanding. It would be interesting to compare the frequencies of direct and 
inferential diagnosis formats with other settings to see if direct deliveries are 
more common in memory clinics, which would further add to the theory that 
doctors are using these formats to compensate for possible cognitive 
impairment and ensure understanding.  
 
When considering the use of direct deliveries versus deliveries requiring patient 
inference, the dilemma faced by clinicians delivering dementia diagnoses is 
thus evident. Patients may resist the doctors’ formulation of a diagnosis of 
dementia for any number of reasons. Therefore, using indirect diagnosis 
formats, showing the logical progression from the evidence to the diagnosis 
without directly labelling the patient, is an important strategy to encourage 
acceptance. Additionally, patients are likely to find the fact they have dementia 
distressing. Therefore, the use of indirect diagnosis formats, avoiding abrupt 
delivery of the bad news, will lessen the shock of receiving a diagnosis. 
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However, people with dementia will also have problems processing and 
understanding complex information. Therefore, direct delivery formats, 
minimising the inference needed for patients to understand they have a 
diagnosis, will enhance understanding. Doctors therefore have to choose 
between the delicate, indirect approach that should avoid resistance and 
negative emotional responses, and more abrupt, direct deliveries that maximise 
patient understanding of their diagnosis. Given that there has been an 
emphasis in increasing early diagnoses of dementia to encourage decision 
making, it might be that maximising patient understanding is expected to be 
given greater emphasis. 
 
This chapter illustrates how doctors deliver dementia diagnoses. Strategies 
have been identified that, while also being features of bad news delivery in 
general, appear to have particular functions in dementia diagnosis delivery. We 
have not yet discussed in detail the effect of how doctors approach and deliver 
the diagnosis on patient responses and the progression of the diagnostic 
feedback meeting. As Byrne and Long (1976) demonstrate, both doctors and 
patients are oriented to diagnosis deliveries as projecting treatment 
recommendations. Therefore, how the interaction unfolds after diagnosis, i.e. 
how the patient responds and how doctors deal with these responses, are of 
particular interest when it comes to examining dementia diagnosis delivery.  
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Chapter Six: 
“Have you heard of the word 
dementia before?” 
Responses and Pursuits of 
Responses to Dementia Diagnosis 
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This chapter will present the response to the diagnosis in three sections: the 
initial response, doctor pursuit of response, and the patient’s later response. 
 
Patient Initial Responses to Diagnosis 
Minimal Initial Responses to Diagnosis 
The majority of patients initially responded minimally to the dementia diagnosis. 
 
(1) [P83_H23] 
1 DR:  but I think (0.4) u::m, (.) .tch .hh my my se:nse (0.4) 
2      i:s, (0.6) putting all this together I I think the most  
3      likely explanation fo:r your memory problems (.) is 
4      probably early Alzheimer’s disea::se.    
5 PT:  °mm.°   
 
The patient utters a quiet, low-intonation “mm” after the diagnosis delivery. He 
has little non-verbal response, looking down just after uttering “mm” but with no 
other movement. Diagnosis delivery sequences are routinely accomplished in 
this manner, with the doctor providing the diagnostic label and minimal patient 
acknowledgement being the typical next action (Heath, 1992, Peräkylä, 2005). 
By contrast, treatment recommendation discussions normatively require 
agreement from patients for the doctor to progress to the next stage of the 
meeting, and therefore minimal tokens can be heard as withholding a response 
where one is required, indicating resistance (Stivers, 2005). However, minimal 
acknowledgement tokens in diagnosis sequences are generally treated as 
unproblematic, regardless of the severity of the diagnosis involved (Heath, 
1992, Peräkylä, 2005, Maynard, 2003b). 
 
There is nevertheless a range among the minimal patient responses. The 
patient’s response in extract 1 is a typical minimal response: “mm” with non-
changing intonation. These tokens are unmarked and thus hearably 
indistinguishable from back channels or continuers, but signal reception via 
their placement after a completion of an information-providing turn. By contrast, 
some minimal responses are marked, in pitch or intonation. 
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(2) [P150_H41] 
1 DR:  okay. .hhh well what we think is going on here is that 
2      you’ve got (.) u:m Alzheimer’s disea:se, 
3      (0.3) 
4 PT:  m::m. 
 
(3) [P185_H44] 
1 DR:  from what the test is showing te- was saying .hh a:nd 
2      wha: the: scan was saying is that it is a part of .hh a 
3      dementia¿ 
4      (1.2) 
5 PT:  m:hm¿ 
 
The emphasis on the “mm” in extract 2 and “mhm” in extract 3 both indicate 
more active participation that the unmarked “mm” in extract 1 above (Nenova et 
al., 2001). The lengthening and downward intonation of the “mm” in extract 2 
can be a sign of recognition and “thought-worthiness” (Ward, 2006, :13). 
Additionally, these emphasised, downward intoned responses are “backwards 
looking”, with patients actively passing up the opportunity to speak and shape 
the following interaction (Heath, 1992). In contrast, the rising intonation “mhm” 
on the patient’s response in extract 3 is hearable as a continuer and thus 
potentially a request for more information (Ward, 2006). An exploration of how 
the doctors follow these initial responses will be the topic of the next chapter. 
 
Patients can also respond with “yes” or “yeah”. 
 
(4) [P177_H44] 
1 DR:  .hh it’s looking like an ear:ly form of a dementia:. 
2 PT:  yeah. 
 
Heath (1992) and Peräkylä (2005) both class “yeah” as the same as “mm” or 
“mhm” – a minimal acknowledgement of the diagnosis. Gardner (1997) however 
argues that “yeah” shows stronger alignment with the previous statement than 
“mm”. Jefferson (2009) demonstrated that “yeah” indicates a desire to “shift 
from recipiency to speakership”, and thus displays a wish to play an active role 
in the interaction. However, she also illustrated that some people use “yeah”  
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both as a neutral continuer and to shift to speaking, and thus it may have 
numerous functions.  
 
Many patients do not respond verbally, but just nod or make another non-verbal 
acknowledgement gesture, such as shifting in the chair or moving closer to the 
doctor. There are also some patients who do not respond verbally or non-
verbally. While silence may be a request for elaboration (Maynard, 1997) and 
thus not necessarily indicate lack of engagement, there has been little research 
on its role in diagnosis delivery sequences (Peräkylä, 2005). An exploration of 
the link between patient initial response and later response to the diagnosis will 
be addressed later in this chapter.  
 
Extended Responses to Diagnosis 
Peräkylä defines extended responses to diagnosis as when patients “do 
something more than minimally acknowledge the diagnosis” (Peräkylä, 2005, 
p234). He categorises the types of patient responses as ‘displaying agreement’ 
or ‘resisting the doctor’s diagnosis’. In the latter case of resistance, Ijäs-Kallio et 
al (2011) describe patients replacing conventional acknowledgement markers 
such as those described above with a misaligned action such as describing a 
contrary symptom or different doctor report. There are no overtly resistant initial 
responses in the memory clinic data. Instead, even the non-minimal, i.e., 
extended responses tended to be minimal in content. 
 
(5) [P186_H68] 
1 DR:  .hh we do think you have (0.4) uh:: what we ca:ll, (0.9) 
2      m- memory difficulties which are more than your age=what 
3      we call dementia:. 
4 PT:  ↑oh: really.  
5 DR:  mm:: 
 
Responses such as “oh really” (line 4) are news receipts, in that they indicate 
that the diagnosis is news for the patient. However, oh-prefaced news receipts, 
while sometimes requiring a confirmation in the next turn (which the doctor 
provides, line 5), often mark the end of news announcement sequences and 
thus generally discourage further elaboration of news (Maynard, 2003a).  
 162 
 
Patients’ oh-prefaced news receipts sometimes include a negative assessment, 
and therefore an explicit demonstration from the patient that the news is bad.  
 
(6) [P145_H49] 
1 DR: .hh and I think- (.) you are in the early stages (0.4) of 
2      a dementia¿  
3     (0.3)  
4 PT: oh dear.  
 
The emphasised “oh” of the patient’s response indicates the newsworthiness of 
the diagnosis, and the “dear” provides a negative assessment. In bad news 
deliveries in general conversation, recipients rarely offer negative assessments 
when the news affects them directly, because it illustrates self-pity, which is 
dispreferred in interaction (Pomerantz, 1978). This also holds in clinic settings, 
where stoic responses are the norm (Maynard, 2003b). This may explain why, 
when these negative initial assessments do occur, they are often in a minimal 
news receipt format and thus discourage elaboration from the doctor. 
 
While negative initial responses to the news are not common, they do also 
occur in more expansive formats, illustrating negative perceptions of the 
consequences of dementia. 
 
(7) [P19_H07] 
1 DR:  um (1.5) it- it looks very much (0.5) like you've got 
2      Alzheimer's disease. 
3      (5.8) 
4 CN:  w- what are the main variation[ns?] 
5 PT:                                [and] tha:t's progressive¿  
6 DR:  °mhm° yes it is (.) yes. 
 
In this extract the doctor pauses for nearly 6 seconds waiting for the patient to 
respond (line 3). This length of pause, with the doctor keeping silent to 
encourage patient response, is a rare occurrence in diagnosis delivery 
sequences in other settings (Robinson, 2003a). The patient is looking at the 
doctor during the diagnosis, but her eyes drop down to the floor after the 
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delivery. The patient’s son answers first, but the patient responds in overlap, 
looking back up to the doctor as she does so (lines 4-5). It is the patient’s 
response that the doctor attends to, confirming the progressive nature of the 
illness (line 6). In requesting confirmation of the negative prognosis of dementia 
the patient acknowledges the diagnosis delivery and demonstrates her negative 
understanding of dementia: that it is a condition that gets worse. Furthermore, 
she encourages the doctor to elaborate on the diagnosis discussion, requesting 
further information. 
 
Patients can also respond to diagnoses with clarifications or requests for more 
information which are non-valenced, i.e. they do not contain assessments. 
 
(8) [P31_H21] 
1 DR:  oka:y (.) so we think that you have a <deme:ntia:,>   
2      (0.6) 
3 PT:  ↑what does that mea::n. 
4 DR:  °that’s what I was about to say.°=it means basically  
5      just what I sai:d¿ that, .hhh (0.4) because your brai:n 
6      has shrunk a little bit, (0.4) it’s (0.4) u:m, (0.4) 
7      making you: it’s making you remember <things less 
8      well,>  
 
The patient’s question in line 3 acknowledges the news and encourages 
elaboration, but demonstrates a lack of knowledge of dementia (line 3). The 
doctor responds with a definition of dementia, prefaced with a claim that this is 
what she was intending to do regardless of the patient’s request, and marking 
this as a repeat of prior talk (lines 4-7). 
 
Initial Responses to Diagnosis: Quantitative analysis 
Patients most often responded to the dementia diagnosis non-verbally or with a 
minimal, non-marked, acknowledgement token (frequencies in Table 9). Not 
responding to the diagnosis was not uncommon, with 13% of patients not 
responding verbally or non-verbally. Nearly a quarter of patients responded with 
either “yeah” or “mm” marked with a questioning or emphasised intonation. 
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Patient Response to Diagnosis Frequencies 
None or 
Minimal 
n=59, 73% 
No response 10 (13%) 
Non-verbal 20 (25%) 
Minimal 
acknowledgement 
11 (13%) 
“Yeah”  9 (11%) 
Marked “mm” 9 (11%) 
Extended 
n=22, 27% 
News receipt or 
change of state 
token 
11 (13%) 
Clarification 
question 
3 (4%) 
Negative 
assessment 
8 (10%) 
Similar proportions of the patients responded not at all or non-verbally (38%) 
and with a minimal response (35%), with 73% of patients not responding with 
more than a minimal acknowledgement token to the dementia diagnosis. These 
proportions are similar, slightly larger, to the 67% minimal responses reported in 
primary care (Peräkylä, 2005).  
 
Over a quarter of patients initially responded to the diagnosis with something 
more than a minimal response. Half of these responded with a change of state 
token (“oh”) or a news receipt (“really”), thus demonstrating that the diagnosis is 
news to them. Fourteen per cent of patients responded more extensively, with 
negative assessments of the news (10%) or questions (4%).  
 
There was no association between type of dementia and initial response to the 
diagnosis (Appendix E 1). Patients were more likely to initially respond 
extensively to the diagnosis when doctors delivered the diagnosis directly (“you 
have dementia”), compared to when it was delivered through inference (“this is 
dementia”) (X2(1, N=81)=4.213, p=0.040) (see Table 10, more details in 
Appendix E 2). 
 
Table 10: Delivery format and type of response 
 Minimal Response Extended Response 
Delivered through 
inference 
39 9 
Not delivered through 
inference (direct delivery) 
20 13 
Table 9: Frequencies of initial responses to  
dementia diagnosis 
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Patients who initially responded minimally to the diagnosis had higher scores on 
the ACE cognitive test (M=71.42, SD=12.58), so were less cognitively impaired, 
compared to people who initially responded extensively to the diagnosis 
(M=60.50, SD=13.25) (t(63)=3.182, p=0.002) (Appendix E 3).  
 
Summary  
Patients did not initially demonstrate explicit resistance or explicit, extended 
agreement with the doctor’s diagnosis in memory clinics. The majority of 
patients responded minimally, non-verbally or not at all to the dementia 
diagnosis, thus conforming to the normative diagnosis delivery and response 
sequence format. However, there was variation in the minimal responses, with 
some responses marked with changing intonation and emphasis. When 
patients do produce extended responses they can discourage or encourage 
elaboration. Negative initial responses to diagnosis are rare. Extended initial 
responses to the diagnosis are more likely when doctors directly attribute the 
diagnosis to the patient in the delivery, and when patients are more cognitively 
impaired. 
 
Doctor pursuit of patient responses 
 
As discussed in the introduction, previous CA studies of diagnosis delivery 
show that minimal response is oriented to as sufficient by doctors and patients, 
with doctors typically moving discussions on from diagnosis straight to 
treatment (Stivers, 2005, Robinson, 2003a, Maynard, 2003a). In fact, when 
doctors halt this progression to treatment in primary care, patients will ask about 
treatment in order to re-initiate the normal transition of activities (Robinson, 
2003a). However, in nearly all of the dementia diagnosis feedback meetings 
doctors do not move straight on to treatment, but instead appear to pursue 
patient responses beyond the initial response to the diagnosis. This occurs after 
both minimal and non-minimal initial responses.  
 
As demonstrated in analysis of pursuits in general conversation, speakers 
pursue responses not only when no response has been given, but also when 
 166 
the response supplied is deemed by the speaker as insufficient (Jefferson, 
1981, Bolden et al., 2012). Stivers’ study of treatment recommendations 
demonstrated that if patients either do not respond to treatment proposals or 
provide an insufficient response (such as resistance), doctors will expand and 
modify the recommendation in order to gain the desired response from the 
patient (Stivers, 2005). It could therefore be that doctors in memory clinics are 
using similar strategies for the diagnosis itself. As demonstrated above, 
extended initial responses to dementia diagnosis are either news receipts, 
negative reactions or clarification questions. Hence, doctors may be aiming for 
a different sort of response from patients before progressing to treatment 
discussions. The methods that speakers use to pursue responses can provide 
an indication of what it is in the initial response that is either missing or 
inadequate (Pomerantz, 1985). This will be explored in the following description 
of practices doctors use to pursue responses in memory clinics, as well an 
examination of the few cases where doctors do not pursue a response.  
 
Elaboration of diagnostic information as pursuit of response 
A common method to pursue a response is to add further information that 
makes a response relevant without explicitly orienting to a problem with the 
previous response through direct questioning (Bolden et al., 2012). This is 
evident in the dementia diagnosis deliveries, where doctors will elaborate on the 
diagnosis by adding additional diagnostic information. Similarly to how Peräkylä 
describes psychoanalysts pursuing client response to interpretations (Peräkylä, 
2011), doctors add further elements to the diagnosis and thus provide further 
opportunities for patients to respond.  
 
(9) [P52_H51] 
1 DR:  >so it's< so it's (0.2) probably som:ething that we'd 
2      (.) we’d (.) call an Alzheimer disea:se.  
3      (0.5)  
4 DR:  so so it is a: it is a re- it is a dementia type of 
5      illness:. 
6      (1) 
7 PT:  °heh° (0.3) I hate all this word dementia. 
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The doctor delivers the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease (line 1-2), and receives 
no verbal or non-verbal response (line 3) with the patient keeping his face very 
still, although he relaxes his mouth slightly in the pause (line 3). The doctor 
follows the patient’s silence with a pursuit via recompletion of the turn, in 
essence re-delivering the diagnosis using another diagnostic term (‘dementia’, 
line 4). In doing this, the doctor is pursuing a particular response in that he 
“provides material via which the recipient might construct a revised analysis of 
the utterance in question” (Jefferson, 1981, p50): the patient may react to 
‘dementia’ rather than ‘Alzheimer’s disease’. Furthermore, the use of a different 
diagnostic term shows that it is the diagnosis itself that requires a response. As 
“dementia” is uttered, the patient leans a little back in his chair, and starts 
moving his mouth. In the pause the patient is blinking and exhales silently, 
before responding with a quiet chuckle (line 6). He looks back and forth to his 
daughter and the doctor while providing a negative assessment of the 
diagnosis.  
 
Elaboration of diagnostic information is similar to Maynard’s descriptions of 
elaborations of all types of news, in that they “offer the focal piece of the news, 
or provide details, such that a recipient can assess the news in a precise 
manner” (Maynard, 2003a, :108). While these elaborations are not always 
designed as typical pursuits (i.e. there is no questioning intonation), the doctor’s 
gaze towards that patient, and the long pause that follows, indicates an 
expectation that the patient responds (Stivers and Rossano, 2010).  
 
There are numerous elements of information that doctors can use to elaborate 
on the dementia diagnosis. Many doctors provide further medical information or 
labels as in extract 9 above, often including the subtype of the dementia or 
describing the causes of dementia. Elaboration of diagnostic information by the 
doctor can however also appear to be specifically targeted at a potential reason 
for the patient’s lack of response. These elaborations are similar to the 
“remedial bids” Gill describes doctors using to manage resistance to diagnosis 
from parents of children with developmental disabilities (Gill and Maynard, 
1995, p20). 
 
(10) [P131_H44] 
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1 DR:  based on that we would (0.7) think that it is more 
2      likely .hh to be: a mild Alzheimer’s dementia:. 
3      (0.7) 
4 DR:  .hh[h  ]  
5 CN:     [mm:]:.  
6 DR:  but >whatever it is< it’s early stages [>because it’s<] 
7 PT:                                         [↓ye(h):s      ]                      
8 DR:  clearly (.) you’re functioning very well and the test 
9      score: .h is on the: side where it is early [ or m]ild 
10 PT:                                              [mm:. ]  
11 DR:  [put it that] way. 
12 CN:  [mm::       ] 
13      (.) 
14 PT:  ↓yeah. 
15 DR:  .HH so:, (.) that is (0.4) er that is what it is looking 
16      li:ke from the scan and from the [test and  ] fro[m er ] 
17 PT:                                   [↑oh ri:ght]    [AKHH ] 
18 DR:  .hh uh:  
19      (.)  
20 DR:  so it it would mean that >like and because< it’s early 
21      stages .h  
22 CN:  m[m ] 
23 DR:   [th]ere is a role for tablets medication to help slow 
24      down the illness. 
 
The doctor is looking at the patient’s wife when she finishes the diagnostic turn 
(line 2). After a pause the patient’s wife responds minimally to the diagnosis 
(line 5), while the patient nods and shifts in his seat. The doctor turns to the 
patient and elaborates on the diagnosis by downgrading the severity of the 
patient’s illness (lines 6-11). The patient responds with an emphatic and 
lengthened “yes” immediately after the doctor’s downgrade (line 7), and nods 
and acknowledges the information with a downward-intoned, emphasised 
“yeah” at the end of the turn (line 14). However, the patient’s eyes are closed in 
a prolonged blink when saying this. The doctor then re-explicates the evidence 
from the scan and the cognitive testing (lines 15-16), which had already been 
discussed prior to this extract. Re-referencing the evidence is a practice of 
accounting for the diagnosis and thus soliciting a response (Gill and Maynard, 
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1995, Peräkylä, 2005). The patient does respond to this in overlap with an 
emphasised news receipt – “oh right” – with an upward intonation on the “oh” 
indicating surprise. The patient then coughs, shifts in his seat, and looks away 
(lines 17-19). These non-verbal actions, alongside the news receipt 
discouraging further elaboration, are designed to curtail the diagnosis 
discussion. The doctor then progresses to the next stage of the medical agenda 
– the treatment and support discussions (lines 20-24).  
 
Downplaying the severity of the dementia and re-referencing the evidence are 
two methods that doctors implement to encourage patient response. Another 
element doctors can add when elaborating on the diagnostic information is 
explicating the uncertainty of a dementia diagnosis in its early stages. Again, 
this is similar to the methods doctors use in developmental disabilities clinics – 
downplaying the certainty of the diagnosis in order to elicit agreement from 
patients (Gill and Maynard, 1995).  
 
(11) [P183_H49 (part 1)] 
1 DR:  .hhh (0.4) putting that all together:, (.) >I think 
2      that< (0.9) >although it’s only a< ↑clinical diagnosis, 
3      .h there probably is a suggestio:n (.) that you a:re in: 
4      the very ear:ly stages of an Alzheimer’s dementia. 
5      (0.5) 
6 DR:  tch .hhh now:, (0.3) I say probably:, (.) .hh becau:se 
7      there’s no hard and fast test (.) .hh that we can do  
8      that gives us a definite answer .hh that somebody has 
9      dementia or somebody doesn’t,=.hhh and with you it is 
10      quite tricky:, (.) .hh to make that diagnosis. 
11 PT:  >(ri:gh-/why:.)=why[:¿]< 
12 DR:                     [.h]hh because you’re still 
13      functioning at a very high level¿ 
14      (.) 
15 DR:  tch .hhh ahh heh heh! .hh £from what your wife tells 
16      u[s:£] 
17 CN:   [heh] heh. 
18 DR:  tch [.hhh um::            ] 
19 PT:      [>g(h)osh did sh(h)e¿<] ah ↑heh 
20 DR:  tch an:d although there are examples >I think< for 
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21      example perhaps the travel¿ 
 
The doctor has already alluded to the difficulty in coming to the diagnosis within 
the delivery, saying that it is a “clinical diagnosis” and framing it as a 
“suggestion” (lines 1-4). The patient nods after the delivery turn is completed 
(line 5). The doctor elaborates, explicating uncertainty about a diagnosis of 
dementia, talking first in general terms that “there’s no hard and fast test” to say 
that “somebody has dementia” (lines 6-10). The patient is nodding along to this 
explanation, and the doctor then moves to more specific language – “with you it 
is quite tricky”. Peräkylä demonstrated in primary care that displaying 
uncertainty encourages patient questions, which suggests that the doctor is 
pursuing patient engagement in the diagnostic discussion (Peräkylä, 2005). It is 
successful in this case, and the patient responds with two latched tokens. While 
it is unclear whether the first part of the patient’s utterance is “right” or “why”, the 
second part “why” seeks further clarification as to the reason for this (line 11). 
The doctor explains further, and states that the patient is still “functioning at a 
very high level”. The questioning intonation, with the doctor leaning closer to the 
patient, invites agreement. The patient does not respond in the micro-pause but 
with the doctor’s mouth click and in-breath (start of line 15) he looks away with 
widened eyes and raised eyebrows, in a comic expression of disbelief. As the 
doctor laughs, she moves closer and gestures and smiles to the patient’s wife, 
and the patient exaggerates his disbelieving facial expression by stretching his 
mouth to the sides. The patient’s wife laughs, and the doctor starts to continue 
(lines 16-18). The patient looks at his wife and continues to joke (line 19), and is 
still smiling while the doctor continues. The doctor re-refers to examples of the 
patient’s symptoms that have been discussed in the assessment stages, 
providing an account of the diagnosis, which is another common way of 
elaborating upon the diagnostic information and encouraging patient response. 
 
Extract 11 illustrates the potential difficulty of elaborating on the diagnosis to 
pursue a patient response. The doctor has changed the focus from the 
diagnosis to the wife’s report of the patient’s functioning, and it is the wife’s 
report that the patient has responded to rather than the diagnosis itself. This is 
also evident in extract 10 above, where the patient responds to the “early 
stages” aspect of the diagnosis. This is a phenomenon observed in 
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psychotherapy, where the slight shift in topic introduced by the psychoanalyst 
when pursuing patient responses can lead to a discontinuity in the patient’s 
response from the content of the initial interpretation (Peräkylä, 2011). Doctors 
in memory clinics are oriented to the potential trouble caused by patients 
agreeing with certain aspects of the diagnosis (i.e. uncertainty of the diagnosis 
and downgrading of the diagnosis) that could lead to resistance to later 
treatment discussions. This is evident in the continued diagnostic discussion in 
extract 12 presented below. One minute and 52 seconds has passed: the 
doctor has completed her description of the difficulties the patient is 
experiencing when planning their travelling, and then her phone rings which she 
answers quickly but turns out to be a wrong number. She then feeds back the 
cognitive test results in detail, which were only discussed in overview (“you 
haven’t done quite as well as three years ago”) before the diagnosis delivery. 
The patient interrupts as she is doing so, asking if they will have the information 
in writing because he knows he will forget what he is being told. The doctor then 
continues with the diagnostic discussion, which is where the second part of this 
extract begins. 
 
(12) [P183_H49 (part 2)] 
92 DR:  um, tch (0.4) so you scored eighty eigh:t (.) back in 
93      two thousand and twelve.=.h[hh ] (.) this time you  
94 PT:                             [mm.]  
95 DR:  scored seventy six,  
96 PT:  °°that’s right°° 
97 DR:  but it’s a three year ga:p so:, (.) you know (.) I:, 
98      (0.5) °°m- m-°° (0.6) tch (0.8) I would expect you to do 
99      better than seventy six:, but with dementia I might have 
100   expected you: to have a bigger drop.  
101      (0.5) 
102 DR:  am I making sen[se?] 
103 PT:                 [ ye]s. 
104 DR:  .hhh 
105 PT:  tha- yes. 
106 DR:  um tch (.) [so,] 
107 PT:             [so ] so the dementia is not °m hm°  
108      [v- very serious.=is it?] 
109 DR:  [I- I  hh .hh           ] exactly I think what I’m 
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110      saying is that .hh I ↑think it probably is dementia, 
111      .hh but it’s progressing very slowly. 
112      (0.7) 
113 DR:  tch .hh 
114 PT:  it’s A- Alzheimer’s? 
115 DR:  y(h)eah 
116 PT:  dementia ↓oh yes [I s[ee.] 
117 DR:                   [yea[h  ]: so,] dementia’s the 
118 CN:                       [  m]m:.  ] 
119 DR:  umbrella ter:m that we use to [descri:be ] um:, (.)  
120 PT:                                [(h)oh yes¿] 
121 DR:  tch 
122      (0.6) 
123 PT:  °all t[he:<] 
124 DR:        [memo]ry problems that are impacting on 
125      function¿ 
 
The doctor resumes her explanation of the test results (lines 92-95). The patient 
utters a quiet confirmation (line 96). The doctor explicates her reasoning that 
she would expect the patient to score better than 76, but that it is a small drop 
in points over three years (lines 97-100). The patient nods after a short pause 
(line 101). The doctor checks whether the patient is following her reasoning, 
with the design of the question indicating awareness that it is complicated – “am 
I making sense?” (line 102). The patient answers in the affirmative; the doctor 
signals to continue but the patient starts then abandons another turn (lines 103-
105). The doctor thus begins another utterance, but then the patient interrupts 
with a question – “the dementia is not very serious is it?” – indicating 
recognition he has received a dementia diagnosis, and a question seeking 
confirmation that it is in the mild stages (lines 106-108). The doctor restates the 
diagnosis “I think it is a dementia”, but with a shift from the patient’s “not very 
serious” to “it’s progressing very slowly” (lines 109-11). This answer is non-
conforming to the yes-preferred patient question presupposing lack of severity 
(Hayano, 2013), saying it is still a serious diagnosis due to the progressive 
nature of the illness. The patient nods, and the doctor starts to continue (lines 
112-113). The patient however requests further clarification – “it’s Alzheimer’s” 
(line 114) – a query potentially arising from the doctor’s shift of diagnostic terms 
from “Alzheimer’s dementia” to “dementia”. The doctor confirms this (line 115), 
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and the patient appears to be processing this information, signalling further 
realisation with an oh-prefaced receipt and explication of his understanding – “I 
see” (line 116). The doctor continues defining Alzheimer’s disease as a type of 
dementia after this extract finishes, before continuing to medication discussion. 
 
As this extract shows, elaborations of diagnostic information can be lengthy, as 
the doctor pursues a response from the patient. The doctor in extract 12 
chooses to follow her elaboration by directly exploring the patient’s 
understanding with an understanding check (line 102), which results in the 
patient actively participating in the discussion with questioning. Understanding 
checks are a common strategy to pursue responses from the patient, with many 
doctors checking understanding immediately after the diagnosis delivery, i.e. 
prior to elaboration of diagnostic information.  
 
Understanding checks as pursuits of response 
Extract 13 is an example of an understanding check used immediately after 
diagnosis to pursue a response. 
 
(13) [P66_H03] 
1 DR:  .hh so we thi- we think (.) we think y- the memory 
2      problems .h you have are caused by >w- °er wha- we-°< 
3      what we call .hh vascular dementia 
4 CN:  °yeah that’s what I thought.°  
5 DR:  °°ri[ght°°]  
6 PT:      [   ye]a:h.  
7      (0.3)  
8 DR:  hh .hh which i:s .hh so what- >do you¿ do you¿< have you 
9      ever hea:rd of the: (.) the wo:rd dementia before or¿ 
10      (.) 
11 PT:  >I say< I’ve bee:n before yeah there: (0.9) there- 
12      there- [      yeah I’ve been here bef]ore:, I: and  
13 CN:         [yeah we have talked about it.] 
14 PT:  [>you know< just] a 
15 DR:  [yeah yeah.     ] 
16      (0.5)  
17 DR:  m.hhh so I mea:n, (.) dementia’s er is just a (.) >a-  
 174 
18      a-< a wor:d for (.) for for (.) for the memor- memory 
19      problems and other problems of the thinking that that 
20      .hh u:m .hh uh >that you’re experience< and we think the 
21      c- we think the cau:se of that is is is (.) basically  
22      (.) the blood sup[ply to the brain be]ing not as good as  
23 PT:                   [°ri::ght.°         ]  
24 DR:  i- it used [used to be.  ] 
25 PT:             [°we:ll it is°] the old age  
26      [like I said here] now 
27 DR:  [yeah yeah yeah  ]  
28 PT:  [(heheh you know you’ve got-)        ] 
29 CN:  [well [it’s m]ore [to do] with the st]roke Dad and the 
30 DR:        [well, ]  
31 CC:                    [oh:, ] 
32 CN:  [blood [circ]ula[tion that’s] what it’s do do with 
33 CC:   [    ye[ah: ] 
34 DR:          [mm. ]   [yeah.      ] 
35 PT:  yeah:.  
36 DR:  yeah. 
37 CN:  °mhm° 
38 PT:  oh I just ↑what can you: do just ahh heh heh heh carry 
39      o(h)n  carry on and that [there’s nothing:] 
40 DR:                           [well I think    ] I think 
41 CC:  no. 
42 DR:  I think (0.4) I think one: wo- you’re you’re you’re 
43      you’re right actually >and I think the sort of< the- the 
44      best (.) the (.) the best advice I can give you is to 
45      (.) carry on: enjoying what (.) what you do actually  
 
The patient’s daughter responds to the diagnosis, with a confirmation of her 
expectations, while the patient opens his mouth, nods and then provides a 
minimal acknowledgement (lines 4-6). The doctor acknowledges the daughter’s 
remark and turns to the patient, potentially starting to give a definition of 
dementia. However, he abandons that turn, potentially because of the strong 
recognition in the daughter’s response, and instead asks “have you heard of the 
word dementia?” (lines 8-9). This directly checks the patient’s understanding of 
the diagnosis. The patient responds immediately, nodding as he says he’s 
“been before”, gesturing outwards, but then appears to have some difficulty 
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completing the utterance, filling with the “yeah there” and gesturing more rapidly 
(lines 11-12). Gesturing can signal communication difficulties (Lavelle et al., 
2013). The patient has been demonstrating word finding difficulties throughout 
the meeting, likely a symptom of his dementia compounded by English being 
his second language, and thus it takes a couple of restarts for him to formulate 
the sentence. This leads to the daughter responding for him in overlap in the 
second part of his turn (line 13), but the patient raises the volume of his voice to 
confirm “I’ve been here before” (line 12-14). This can be taken to mean the 
memory clinic, and thus could be an indirect way of demonstrating that he knew 
the diagnosis was a possibility.  
 
The doctor acknowledges the daughter’s response in overlap with the patient 
(line 15), before giving a definition of dementia. This definition is similar to those 
that occur in the pre-diagnosis position (see Chapter 5), with a minimisation and 
formulation of dementia as a medical term “just a word” (line 17-18). 
Additionally, he re-refers to the patient’s symptoms (lines 19-21), and the 
evidence from the brain scan (lines 21-24), thus accounting for the diagnosis. 
The patient had attributed his difficulties to old age in the test feedback stage, 
which he re-iterates at this point (lines 25-26). He starts smiling and then 
chuckling, indicating the delicate situation of attributing the brain scan results to 
a different cause than the doctor (Haakana, 2001). The doctor’s repeated 
“yeah” continuers (line 27) acknowledges the patient’s view point but indicates a 
shift to speakership (Jefferson, 2009), but the patient’s daughter instead 
interrupts the patient stating “it’s to do with the stroke” (lines 29-32). This 
medicalises his symptoms and rejects the patient’s attribution of his difficulties 
to age.  
 
The nurse and the doctor confirm the daughter’s formulation (lines 33-34), and 
the patient responds with a lengthened, downward intoned acknowledgement 
token (line 35). The doctor and patient’s daughter pass up the opportunity to 
continue by also providing minimal acknowledgement tokens, and the patient 
elaborates (lines 36-39). He starts with an oh-prefaced response, thus holding 
his stance or at least claiming knowledge of his situation (Heritage, 1998). 
However, he abandons this and shifts the topic instead to negatively assessing 
the utility of the diagnosis in terms of getting treatment or help (lines 38-39). 
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Despite the remaining potential resistance on part of the patient, the doctor 
accepts this topic shift and moves on to discuss the future (lines 40-45). The 
doctor’s emphasis that the patient can still have a positive outlook on the future 
(“the best advice I can give you is to carry on enjoying what you do”), is a 
common method of transitioning to the next stage of the meeting, and will be 
examined further in the next section. 
 
Understanding checks therefore allow the doctor to explicitly pursue the patient 
response immediately after the diagnosis. Many doctors follow this with an 
elaboration containing a definition of the diagnosis, which can elicit further 
patient response.  
 
Asking the patient’s perspective as pursuit of response 
Another method for doctors to pursue non-minimal patient response after the 
diagnosis delivery is directly asking for the patient’s perspective on the 
diagnosis. 
 
(14) [P87_H22] 
1 DR:  so I think, (0.4) what you ha:ve (0.4) is an early form 
2      of Alzheimer’s disea:se. 
3 PT:  °°mhmm°° 
4      (.) 
5 DR:  what do you think about tha:t  
6      (1.8) 
7 PT:  I ↑wouldn’t think I had i:t, 
8      (0.8)  
9 PT:  but u:m, (2.6) I’m hoping it’s not a gra::ve thing, 
10 DR:  I don’t think that it is a grave thing  
11 PT:  °°okay°°  
12 DR:  some people don’t like hearing it because, (0.6) e:r 
13      >because it< can be a scary thing someti:mes,  
14      (0.4)  
15 DR:  but I think what I’m saying toda:y is that we’ve got 
16      (0.4) you’ve been having these little problems over 
17      ti::me and now what we’ve been able to do is we’ve got a 
18      na:me for it we know what it i::s 
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19 PT:  yes very goo:d  
20 DR:  so generally- that I think that’s good because it means 
21      that we, (0.4) everyone can be aware of i:t, 
22 PT:  °mm°  
23 DR:  so you can kno:w but also your family ca:n, (0.6) and 
24      also so that we can start to think about the right 
25      treatment for i:t 
 
The patient responds minimally to the diagnosis (line 3). The doctor, after a 
slight pause, asks the patient’s perspective – what she thinks “about that” (line 
5). After a delay of nearly 2 seconds, the patient appears to directly reject the 
diagnosis (lines 6-7), albeit qualified as a display of her own opinion “I wouldn’t 
think I had it”. The doctor nods and the patient, who has looked away at the 
floor after the diagnosis, then looks back up to the doctor and starts to respond 
further, then leaving a long pause before stating “I’m hoping it’s not a grave 
thing”. This “citing of hope” (Beach et al., 2005, p900) illustrates optimism where 
the description of “a grave thing” shows a prior concern of the severity of the 
diagnosis. This statement also seeks reassurance from the doctor, which he 
provides – acknowledging and normalising the patient’s fears using generalised 
language “some people don’t like hearing it” (lines 12-13). The patient nods 
after “don’t like hearing it”, but only blinks as a response at the pause (line 14). 
The doctor continues with a “bright side telling” of the news (Maynard, 2003a, 
p179), focussing on the positive aspects of having a label for the patient’s “little 
problems” in leading to treatment (lines 15-18). By defining the diagnosis as a 
“name”, the doctor is also minimising its importance, similar to how doctors 
approach the diagnosis prior to delivery (Chapter 5). The patient accepts and 
positively assesses (“yes very good” line 19) this framing of the diagnosis, and 
the doctor moves on to talk about treatment and support, both for the patient 
and her family.  
 
Moving straight to treatment discussions with no pursuits of response 
The three cases where doctors move straight to treatment seem to reflect an 
alteration in the systematic pattern of dementia diagnosis. In each case the 
doctor asks the consent question prior to the diagnosis, which as discussed in 
Chapter 5 is a commonly used pre-diagnosis practice (as in extracts 3 and 4, 
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Chapter 5). However, in all three of these cases the patients do not provide the 
expected positive response, instead explicitly engaging in discussion with the 
doctor about the purpose of the diagnosis – i.e. whether they would receive 
treatment. These are the only cases in the dataset where patients do this: other 
meetings where the consent question is blocked are more similar to extract 4 
(chapter 5), where the patient changes the subject rather than answering the 
question.  
 
(15) P38_H23 
1 DR:  do you want me to talk to you about a diagnosis? would  
2      you like to know what I think the diagnosis i:s?  
3 PT:  well is there a treatment for i:- for this?  
4      (.) 
5 PT:  >am I< (0.4) am I going to be treated for it or is it 
6      just, (0.4) um, (0.6) for: information?   
7 DR:  .tch .hhhh (0.8) it’s partly for information there a:re  
8      there is so::me so::me (0.6) intervention we can offer  
9      you:  
10      (0.8)  
11 DR:  would you like me to tell you abou:t what I think your 
12      diagnosis i:s,  
13 PT:  yes  
14      (0.6)  
15 PT:  ri[:ght.]  
16 DR:    [   ok]a:y  
17      (0.6)  
18 DR:  .hhh well the name that we gi:ve to:: people with  
19      progressive (0.6) memory impairment or cognitive  
20      impairment (0.4) is a condition called dementia.  
21      (0.6)  
22 DR:  now dementia is (0.4) can be caused by a number of 
23      different (0.6) um causes (0.4) .hhh and I think (.) be:  
24      (.) cause of the changes we’ve seen in your sca:n (0.4)  
25      I think the most (.) likely cau:se (0.6) i::s (0.4) e::r 
26      is one of vascular dementia=I think that’s the most  
27      likely diagnosis  
28      (0.8)  
29 DR:  .hh no:w, (0.6) the::, (0.4) u::m, (0.4) in terms of 
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30      treatment we don’t have treatment that can reve:rse 
31      (0.8) e:r this condition,      
 
The doctor in lines 1-2 asks the consent question – if the patient would like to 
know the diagnosis. The patient’s well-prefaced response projects an indirect 
answer (Heritage, 2015), and she asks if there is treatment, contrasting with the 
alternative that the diagnosis would be “just for information” (lines 3-6). The 
doctors’ response shows some delay – it transpires that the patient has 
vascular dementia so she would not be able to have medication – but she says 
that there is “some intervention” (lines 7-9). The patient nods in line 10 and the 
doctors re-states the question (lines 11-12), with the patient now responding in 
the affirmative (lines 13-15). The doctor then goes on to deliver the diagnosis 
(lines 18-27), attributing the diagnosis of vascular dementia to the patient 
(through inference, as described in Chapter 5) in lines 23-27.  The patient nods 
as the doctor finishes line 27 but passes up the opportunity for further response 
in the pause in line 28. The doctor, rather than elaborating or asking the patient 
an understanding or perspective question, moves straight onto treatment 
discussions.  
 
The fact that all the cases where doctors move straight from diagnosis to 
treatment follow this pattern provides additional information as to why doctors 
normally appear to pursue a response after diagnosis. In these cases the 
patient has explicitly engaged in the possibility that a diagnosis from the 
memory clinic may lead to treatment or support prior to the diagnosis delivery. 
That the doctor does not pursue further input after the diagnosis suggests that 
this is sufficient input from the patient to progress to treatment discussions. 
 
Frequencies and Relationships in Doctor Pursuits 
Ninety-six per cent of doctors pursue responses to dementia diagnoses (Table 
11). Forty one per cent of doctors pursue a response by elaborating on 
diagnostic information only. In over half (55%) of meetings doctors explicitly 
pursue a response to the diagnosis using perspective or understanding check 
questions. 
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Doctor Pursuit of Response Frequencies 
Elaboration of diagnostic information 33 (41%)      
Understanding check  29 (36%) 
Perspective Questions 16 (19%)   
Straight to treatment discussions 3 (4%) 
As discussed above, in three of the meetings doctors progressed immediately 
to treatment discussions after the diagnosis was named with no pursuit of a 
patient response. In 40% of meetings more than one type of pursuit of patient 
response was used.  
 
Content of Elaboration of 
Diagnostic Information 
Frequencies 
Prognosis 42 (52%) 
Medical definition of dementia 24 (30%) 
Deliver sub-type of dementia 22 (27%) 
Re-reference symptoms 18 (22%) 
Downgrade severity 12 (15%) 
Make uncertainty explicit 11 (14%) 
Re-reference evidence from testing 10 (12%) 
 
The content of the elaboration of diagnostic information was also quantified to 
illustrate what kind of information doctors conveyed to the patient in this position 
(Table 12). Many doctors covered more than one topic when elaborating on the 
diagnosis. The prognosis of dementia, that it is degenerative, was highlighted in 
the diagnosis discussion in just over half the meetings. Other doctors 
elaborated on the diagnosis by defining dementia or specifying the dementia 
subtype. There were 34 (42%) meetings where the elaborations included at 
least one of the following: re-referencing the symptoms and evidence, making 
uncertainty of the diagnosis explicit, and downgrading the severity of the 
diagnosis. As discussed above, these behaviours are indicative of doctors 
pursuing agreement. 
Table 11: Frequencies of types of pursuit of response 
Table 12: Content of elaboration of diagnostic information 
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Summary 
Doctors in memory clinics pursued patient response to the diagnosis prior to 
progressing to treatment and support. They elaborated on the diagnosis with 
information about dementia, and explicitly checked the patient’s knowledge of 
dementia and perspective. Often they used a combination of these strategies to 
elicit responses. Elaborations consisted of specification of the dementia 
subtype, explanations of the cause of the patient’s dementia, re-referring to the 
patient symptoms or evidence from the testing and downgrading the severity or 
certainty of the diagnosis. Prognosis was only discussed in this position in half 
of the meetings. Doctors moved straight to treatment after diagnosis in 
instances where patients had already engaged in discussions about treatment 
within the diagnosis delivery sequence. 
 
 
Patient Later Responses to Diagnosis 
 
The majority of doctor pursuits of patient responses to the diagnosis are 
successful in eliciting a non-minimal response prior to progressing to the 
treatment phase. While there was no explicit resistance in the initial responses 
to the diagnosis, many patients showed resistance to the diagnosis once the 
doctors pursued a response. Some patients reiterated their age as the main 
reason for their memory difficulties, as with the patient in extract 13 (page 173) 
above. Other patients invoked their ability to function, or gave reasons why their 
symptoms are not bad enough to be called dementia. Some patients worked to 
close down and avoid further discussion.  
 
(16) [P109_H41] 
1 DR:  well, (0.3) it looks like you:, have probably got  
2      Alzheimer’s disease. 
3 PT:  °↓oh ri:ght yeah.° 
4      (.) 
5 DR:  you don’t have any idea what that might amount to? 
6      (4.2) 
7 PT:  tch 
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8      (4.4)  
9 PT:  I don’t ↑know: >i- uh< 
10 DR:  have you heard [of it] before? 
11 PT:                 [uh¿  ] 
12 PT:  ye:s and uh (1.1) hhh >you know< (.) >you think< well 
13      what happened °>to me<° many years ago:, (0.5) it’s gone 
14      it’s history I >don’t really want to know in ↑any case<  
15      (0.3) 
16 DR:  okay. 
17      (0.8) 
18 DR:  .hhh 
19 PT:  as long as I’ve got my: (.) sons.  
20      (0.4) 
21 DR:  okay. 
22      (.) 
23 DR:  .hh there’s something else I’d like to a:sk you   
24      though.=before we move on to talk about the Alzheimer’s  
25      disease and that’s abou:t how much alcohol you 
26      dri:nk.=now:. 
27      (.) 
28 PT:  no: I don’t. 
 
The patient responds to the diagnosis with a news receipt, showing registration 
of the diagnostic news (line 3). The “oh” demonstrates change of state 
(Heritage, 1984), and double token responses (as in “right, yes”) are often used 
in the pre-closing position (McCarthy, 2003), meaning that, especially as this is 
also a news receipt format which discourages elaboration, the patient’s 
response is already demonstrating reluctance to continue with the diagnosis 
discussion. The fact that the doctor pursues further response, despite the initial 
response being non-minimal, provides further evidence that doctors are seeking 
more than an acknowledgement of the news before moving on to treatment. 
The doctor uses an understanding check, a negatively polarised yes/no 
interrogative (line 5), presupposing the person will respond with a negative 
answer.  
 
There is nearly a 7 second pause with just a mouth click from the patient before 
she answers. She states that she does not know, and is moving her mouth as if 
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to continue when the doctor reformulates her question, specifically asking if the 
patient has “heard of it” (line 10). The patient answers with an emphasised 
“yes”, and after a pause and more hesitation, including a reference to 
something that has happened in her past (which is unclear from the interaction 
thus far), she says that it is “history”, and she “doesn’t want to know in any 
case” (lines 12-14). She is not looking at the doctor throughout this turn, again 
indicating an avoidance of the diagnosis discussion. The doctor acknowledges 
her preference, and after a pause starts to continue, when the patient 
elaborates on her statement, indicating that her sons are all that matter to her 
(16-19). The doctor acknowledges this again and shifts the topic to questioning 
whether the patient is drinking alcohol (lines 21-26), and after this moves on to 
treatment and support discussions.  
 
Other patients do respond to the diagnosis, usually with questions or 
statements about dementia. These questions and statements, while 
encouraging further discussion, are non-valenced, in that they do not contain 
assessments that would indicate how the patient feels about the diagnosis. 
 
(17) [P42_H50] 
1 DR:  .hh so it might be >that there's< (.) there's a c couple 
2      of processes going [on that's caus]ing the  
3 PT:                     [mm::.         ]  
4 DR:  dementia.=there's .h a bit of Alzheimer’s disease and a 
5      and a bit of the hardening of the ar[teries >a sort of<] 
6 PT:                                      [mm:.              ] 
7 DR:  a (.) a [mixed] picture. 
8 CN:          [mm.  ] 
9      (0.8) 
10 PT:  and is it likely to get (.) worse:? 
11 DR:  .h on the whole I think it will:. 
12 CN:  mm 
13 PT:  over a:  
14 DR:  bu- 
15 PT:  short period >a long< period? 
16 DR:  we can't say. 
17 PT:  n[o: er ] 
18 CN:   [right.] 
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19 DR:  I mean usually i- it's over a period of a quite a few 
20      years. 
21 PT:  mm::. 
22 CN:  °°m°° 
23     (0.8) 
24 DR:  >and of course< .hh there are things: you can do: which 
25      can help. 
26 PT:  yes. 
 
Prior to this extract the doctor delivered the diagnosis, with a minimal response 
from the patient. The doctor had discussed the cognitive test results prior to the 
diagnosis, but after the diagnosis shows the patient the brain scan for the first 
time to explain the diagnosis subtype, which he explains as being “a mixed 
picture” of Alzheimer’s and vascular dementia (lines 1-7). The patient and his 
wife show engagement in this explanation with minimal continuers (lines 3, 6, 
and 8). The doctor pauses once he has finished his explanation and nods at the 
patient, inviting a response, which leads to a question about prognosis (line 10). 
The doctor confirms the patient’s understanding “likely to get worse”, albeit in a 
mitigated manner with “on the whole” and “I think”. The patient presses for more 
information (line 13-15), and the doctor emphasises the uncertainty of the 
prognosis, stating an optimistic projection of “quite a few years” (lines 19-20). 
After minimal but emphasised acknowledgement from the patient, and quiet 
acknowledgement from his wife (lines 21-22), the doctor shifts to a good news 
exit about treatment options, which the patient responds to (lines 24-26). This 
pattern occurs in the vast majority of cases where patients respond to pursuits 
with questions or statements: the doctors will answer or respond to the patient 
input and, if the patient does not elicit further response, move directly to 
treatment discussions.  
 
Patient questions thus often demonstrate some prior knowledge of dementia, 
and thus show engagement in the diagnostic discussion. Patients can also 
engage in the discussion through non-valenced statements about their 
condition or symptoms (e.g. “the last couple of years I thought to myself I can’t 
remember things” P50_H43). These questions and statements show some level 
of alignment with the diagnosis and maintain a stoic stance with no negative 
assessment of the news, as is the norm in diagnosis discussions.  
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Some patients do demonstrate explicit negative responses. In many of these 
cases, patients demonstrate an understanding of the nature of dementia in its 
later stages, and a desire not to be that way. The following extract is presented 
in two parts to demonstrate first how the patient’s response to the diagnosis 
develops from minimal to negative after pursuit from the doctor, and then how 
the doctor responds to the patient’s response. 
 
(18) [P67_H03 (part 1)] 
1 DR:  .h so >I mean we-< (0.3) we think (.) on the basis of of 
2      >of all< that (.) that (.) .hh u:m (.) that your memory 
3      problems are caused (0.4) uh (.) by: an illness called 
4      Alzheimer’s disease. 
5 PT:  °oh:.° 
6      (.)  
7 DR:  °°okay .hh°°  
8      (0.3)  
9 DR:  uh mi:ld¿ 
10      (0.3) 
11 PT:  [yea:h] 
12 DR:  [but  ] that that’s what we think >the the< the cause 
13      i:s. 
14      (0.7)  
15 PT:  ↓oh: right.  
16      (0.3) 
17 DR:  okay .hh (1) have you- >have you< heard of (.) have  
18      [have¿      ] 
19 PT:  [°oh yeah°  ] 
20 CN:  [her brother] had it  
21 DR:  yeah:. 
22      (.)  
23 DR:  and what what do you: (.) what do you know about  
24      Alzheime[r’s disease¿] 
25 PT:          [well my bro-] my brother had it. 
26      (0.3)  
27 DR:  °mm:° 
28 PT:  my brother had that. 
29 DR:  ri:ght.  
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30      (1.5) 
31 CN:  [°is-°] 
32 CC:  [so-  ] 
33 PT:   and I’d ha:te to get like it.  
34      (.) 
35 PT:  °m m°  
36      (.) 
37 PT:  I really would. 
38      (.) 
39 DR:  [°mhm°]   
40 PT:  [I’d  ] rather be dead. 
41 DR:  °°m°° 
42 CC:  °mm:° 
43 PT:  I would.  
44 CC:  mm:. 
45      (2.1)  
46 CN:  °mm° 
47      (1.4)  
48 CN:  .HH  
49      (19.4) (DR & CC get up to get tissues, DR hands the 
50      tissues to PT & CR, who are both crying) 
 
In this extract the patient initially responds to the diagnosis minimally and 
quietly, with the “oh” indicating change of state and thus recognition of the news 
(Heritage, 1984) (line 5). Again, despite this being a non-minimal response (in 
that it is a news receipt rather than an acknowledgement token), the doctor 
elaborates on the diagnosis, indicating that a more extended response is being 
pursued. He begins by downplaying the severity (“mild” line 9), with an upward 
intonation encouraging patient response (Stivers and Rossano, 2010). The 
patient provides acknowledgement (line 11), and the doctor re-states the likely 
cause of her memory problems, without the diagnostic term but with “that” 
referring back to “Alzheimer’s disease” (line 12). Again the patient responds 
with a news receipt – “oh right” – which passes up the opportunity to respond 
further and discourages further elaboration (line 15). The doctor uses an 
understanding check – “have you heard of..?” – with some delay and re-starts 
(line 17-18). The patient’s response – “oh yeah” – is oh-prefaced, indicating a 
problem with the question (Heritage, 1998) and emphasising the response (line 
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19). The reason for this design is evident in the daughter’s answer to the 
question, which confirms the patient’s close experience of dementia, having had 
a brother with the condition (line 20). The doctor’s acknowledgement (“yeah”) 
suggests some prior knowledge of this, which he is likely to have obtained from 
the initial assessment (line 21). 
 
The doctor however pursues further response with a more specific question 
about what the patient knows about Alzheimer’s disease (lines 23-24), and the 
patient re-iterates her daughter’s statement twice (lines 25 and 28). The doctor 
acknowledges this and pauses, and the patient’s daughter and the nurse both 
begin utterances but stop as the patient elaborates. The patient offers a strong 
negative assessment of her brother’s dementia, saying she’d “hate to get like it” 
(line 33). After a pause the patient continues with her negative formulation, 
emphasising her prior statement and upgrading, stating “I’d rather be dead” 
(lines 37-43). The patient at this point has started to cry, and her daughter also 
has tears in her eyes. The doctor and nurse move to get tissues and there is a 
pause of nearly 20 seconds before the patient’s daughter asks about 
medication, which is where the next extract begins.  
 
(19) [P67_H03 (part 2)] 
51 CN:  is there:: anything li:ke is ↑there medica:tion you can 
52      get? 
53      (0.9) 
54 DR:  ↑there- yes there i::s, (.) um, (.) >I mean [I< I- I]  
55 CC:                                              [°mm:°  ]   
56 DR:  ↑think (.) hh .hh (0.7) I- (0.8) >I mean I’ve given it< 
57      a (.) a ↓na:me, 
58      (0.7) 
59 DR:  I:: >I mean I-< (0.3) I think, (0.8) >the important< (.)  
60      thi:ng to say:: i:s (0.6) tha:t (0.6) we ↑do: >you ne-< 
61      w- we ↑do think it’s it’s mi::ld, 
62 PT:  yeah. 
63      (0.3) 
64 DR:  .hhh an:d (0.3) as I say:, (.) I mean it (0.5) on lots 
65      of the test (0.4) you did well.=>so it’s< .hh it’s not 
66      th[at   ] 
67 PT:    [°°m°°]  
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68      (.) 
69 PT:  no: it’s not ba[:d no. no.                             ] 
70 DR:                 [not >that there’s< >>problems all the<<] 
71      you know there’s particularly the memory that that 
72      that’s .hhh that that seems to be a problem. 
73 PT:  mm:. 
74      (0.5) 
75 DR:  ↑I:: (0.3) do:n’t thi- >I mean I< can’t guarantee this 
76      but I don’t expect things to (0.5) to progress (0.6) 
77      quickly::? 
78 PT:  no:, 
79      (.) 
80 DR:  I- I mea:n (0.7) I’m hoping things will remain stable 
81      for (0.3) for year:s rather than (.) than months or or 
82      or [wee:ks] so, .hh >I mean I< ↑think that’s really  
83 PT:     [yeah. ] 
84 DR:  important (.) to say: we- we have (.) given it a na:me  
85      (.) tod[ay:.] 
86 PT:         [  ye]ah: 
87 DR:  .hh but I would- (.) you know: I- (.) I’d like you to 
88      (.) >kind of< (0.3) just carry o:n pretty much (.) as 
89      [nor:ma:l ] 
90 PT:  [as normal] ye[ah ] 
91 DR:                [.hh] >and- and-< and focus on doing the 
92      things that you: (0.8) enjoy:,   
93 PT:   yeah, (.) [yeah ↓m.] 
94 DR:             [doi:ng, ] and in fa:ct (1.1) keeping a:s 
95      (0.4) mentally and physically active as possible (0.3) 
96      is is part of the treatment really 
 
The doctor’s response to the patient negative response, while slightly more 
elaborate than other examples, includes some key features of doctor 
management of patient responses to the diagnosis. The patient’s daughter has 
asked about medication (lines 51-52). The doctor confirms that this is available, 
but makes an effort to address the patient’s concerns prior to progressing to 
treatment discussions (lines 54-57). The difficulty in delaying the progression to 
the next stage of the meeting and instead providing an adequate response to 
the patient’s emotional response is evident in the doctor’s numerous delays and 
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restarts. He then continues with a series of statements about the diagnosis, 
encouraging agreement from the patient after each statement. This response to 
crying has been demonstrated in other institutional settings, and continues the 
progression of the interaction in a way that expressing empathy or sympathy 
may not (Hepburn and Potter, 2012). 
 
The doctor’s first approach is thus “subordinating the label”, minimising the 
importance of the diagnostic term to encourage appropriate responses (Gill and 
Maynard, 1995, :23). This is similar to how doctors design the diagnosis 
delivery itself, as illustrated in extract 14 (page 176). The patient acknowledges 
this with a nod (line 58), and the doctor moves to his second strategy: the re-
emphasis of the “mild” aspect of the illness (lines 59-61). The patient 
acknowledges this with a minimal “yeah” (line 62), and the doctor elaborates, 
using the evidence from the test results to support the mild nature of her illness 
(lines 64-66). This is designed as a laudable event proposal (Maynard et al., 
2016) – on “lots of the test” the patient “did well” – and thus encourages 
agreement.  The use of the evidence in managing the patient’s emotional 
response, where it has been shown previously to manage resistant patient 
responses (Peräkylä, 2005), shows the flexibility of the test evidence as a 
resource for doctors. The patient shows strong alignment, completing the 
doctor’s turn (line 69), and thus demonstrating an effort to control her negative 
emotional response and align with the doctor’s optimistic portrayal.  
 
The doctor then discusses the prognosis of dementia, which the patient has 
displayed knowledge about due to her experience with her brother. He uses 
another common strategy in the management of patient responses: an 
optimistic projection of the patient’s future (“years rather than months” lines 80-
82). He downplays the effect this will have on the patient’s life, emphasising that 
the patient should “carry on pretty much as normal” (lines 87-92). The patient 
acknowledges this (lines 90 and 93). Optimistic projections often indicate a shift 
from one topic of discussion to another (Jefferson, 1980), which is the case in 
this example as the doctor proceeds to discuss the treatment and future 
planning (lines 94-96).  
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These optimistic projections or bright side tellings are thus used as good news 
exits from the diagnosis (Maynard, 2003a), and are very frequent in the 
transition from diagnosis to treatment discussions. They are a method of 
dealing with emotional responses, but are also commonly used in resistant 
responses, such as extract 13 (page 173), and in response to patient 
questioning, such as extract 16 (page 181). Optimistic projections are used 
even when patients do not respond to the diagnosis, despite some pursuit from 
the doctor.  
 
(20) [P118_H40] 
1 DR:  the- (.) the commonest cau:se of a: mild memory problem 
2      like thi:s (0.4) is probably something like Alzheimer’s 
3      disease  
4      (0.5) 
5 DR:  and I suspect (.) that that is what’s going on. 
6 PT:  °mhm.°  
7      (.) 
8 DR:  that (.) that you probably ha:ve (.) ear:ly Alzheimer’s 
9      disea:se,  
10      (0.6)  
11 DR:  which is a: a disease in the brai:n which affects 
12      memory.  
13      (1) 
14 DR:  .pt um .h (0.8) a:nd (.) I think that’s (.) it’s good 
15      to:: star:t thinking about that as a possibility, (.) 
16      because: there are some, (.) things that we can try to  
17      do::, (0.3) medications that we can [try]:: (.) which  
18 PT:                          [mm ]     
19 DR:  can help to:, (0.6) slow dow:n the progression of- of  
20      the memory problem. 
21      (.) 
22 DR:  tch .hh  
23 PT:  ah: that’s good. 
 
The patient responds initially to the diagnosis with a small nod, and continues 
nodding as the doctor continues with his delivery, responding with a quiet 
acknowledgement token as he completes his turn (lines 1-5). The diagnosis is 
 191 
delivered through inference (see Chapter 5), and as a pursuit of response the 
doctor changes the format to a direct diagnosis (lines 8-9). The patient 
responds with a very small nod, and the doctor pursues further with a definition 
of dementia, and another pause (lines 10-13). The patient again passes up the 
opportunity to speak (line 13), and the doctor thus progresses to a good news 
exit – explicitly assessing the diagnosis as “good” (line 14), because the patient 
will be able to start medication. He uses “we” in this assessment, further 
encouraging the patient to take part in the discussion (line 16). The patient does 
not respond at the end of the turn, and the doctor clicks his mouth and breathes 
in as if to continue, when the patient finally issues a non-minimal response, 
aligning with the doctor’s good news assessment (lines 21-23).  
 
The methods that doctors use to move the medical agenda forward from 
diagnosis to treatment discussions are therefore similar across the meetings, 
using optimistic projections of the future and minimising the impact of the 
diagnosis. These strategies occur regardless of whether the patient responds to 
the pursuit with questioning, negative responses, resistance, or even if they do 
not respond beyond non-minimal acknowledgement. An interesting feature of 
these good news exits is that, although they implicitly refer to the fact that 
dementia is a progressive illness, prognosis is not always explicitly referred to.  
While in many cases patients demonstrate knowledge of the prognosis of 
dementia, often indirectly through mentioning a family member who has the 
condition (or asking if it will progress for example), doctors do not often explicitly 
refer to the fact the patient’s symptoms will get worse. When prognosis is 
discussed, it generally occurs in the framing of an optimistic projection, as the 
doctor moves out of the diagnosis discussion in to the treatment stage. 
 
Frequencies and Relationships in Patient Later Responses to Diagnosis 
Patients were more likely to respond to the diagnosis if they were asked 
questions on their perspective or understanding, rather than when doctors only 
elaborate on diagnostic information (X2(2, N=81)=6.497, p=0.026) (more detail 
in Appendix E 4).  
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Table 13 illustrates the nature of patient responses after pursuits. Just over a 
third of patients (36%) did not participate in dementia diagnosis discussions 
beyond minimal acknowledgement token after doctor pursuits, although 7 of 
these had responded extensively initially (27% of patients do not provide more 
than a minimal acknowledgment token at any stage of the diagnosis 
discussion). Just under a third of patients (30%) responded to pursuits with 
 
Patient Responses after Pursuit Frequencies 
None or minimal  
    Initial Response none/minimal 
29 (36%) 
    22 (27%) 
Question or non-valenced comment  
    Initial response none/minimal 
24 (30%) 
    14 (17%) 
Resistant 
    Initial response none/minimal  
13 (16%) 
    12 (15%) 
Negative  
    Initial response none/minimal 
12 (15%) 
    6 (7%) 
Off-topic 
    Initial response none/minimal 
3 (4%) 
    3 (4%) 
questions or non-valenced statements about symptoms or the diagnosis. 
Sixteen per cent of patients explicitly demonstrated resistance, and 15% 
showed negative responses. Three patients responded with a topic shift, all 
moving the topic to other physical conditions. In 35 of the 52 cases where 
patients responded extensively after doctor pursuit (67%), they had not 
responded initially to the diagnosis.  
 
There was a trend in how patients initially respond to diagnoses and how they 
respond after the pursuit from the doctor (X2(28, N=81)=33.191, p=0.071) (more 
detail in Appendix E 5). Patients who withhold responses initially to the 
diagnosis were more likely to resist at later stages in the discussion, with none 
of the patients who responded extensively to the initial diagnostic turn later 
showing resistance. Furthermore, a larger proportion of patients who respond 
initially with a marked “mm” (so with changing intonation or emphasis), resisted 
than those with other minimal verbal or non-verbal responses (55% versus 5-
22%).  
 
Table 13: Frequencies of patient responses after 
pursuit 
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Half of the patients who ultimately negatively assessed the diagnosis had 
initially responded minimally or non-verbally, and therefore explicitly passed up 
the opportunity to speak. Additionally, four of the patients had responded 
initially with news receipts, thus discouraging further discussions (Maynard, 
1997). Only 2 of the patients who initially responded negatively extended their 
negative responses after doctor pursuit. This demonstrates the preference for 
stoic responses to diagnoses, with patients trying to not respond negatively 
immediately on hearing the diagnosis.  
 
Patients who initially responded to the diagnosis with unmarked “yeah” or 
“mm”s had similar patterns of later responses – potentially indicating no 
difference between their stances as minimal acknowledgement tokens. Off-topic 
later responses, showing explicit inability to process and respond appropriately 
to the diagnostic information, occurred only after minimal or no initial responses 
from patients. 
 
Summary 
While the majority of patients initially respond minimally to the diagnosis, doctor 
pursuit of responses led to a range of responses. Patients were more likely to 
provide non-minimal responses if doctors explicitly questioned their perspective 
or understanding. Patients can show resistance through attributing their 
symptoms to age or actively avoiding further discussion. They can participate in 
the diagnosis discussion through questioning or statements on symptoms, or by 
negatively assessing the diagnosis.  
 
Minimal initial responses were linked with different types of later responses: 
marked minimal responses were more likely to be followed by resistance, and 
unmarked minimal responses were more likely to lead to negative, off-topic, or 
further minimal responses. 
 
Doctors managed the different types of patient non-minimal responses very 
similarly, minimising the severity of the dementia and downplaying the effect the 
diagnosis will have on the patient’s life. Should the patient not respond to the 
attempts to pursue a response, doctors will eventually abandon pursuing a 
response and move on to the next stage of the medical agenda. Optimistic 
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projections of the patient’s future or diagnostic trajectory were used to shift from 
diagnosis discussions to treatment discussions, regardless of how the patients 
responded to the diagnosis.  
 
Discussion 
 
Patients generally respond initially to dementia diagnoses with minimal 
acknowledgement tokens, non-verbal acknowledgement gestures, or with 
silence. Even when patients responded with non-minimal responses, their initial 
responses were still restrained, generally indicating the newsworthiness of the 
diagnosis rather than explicitly demonstrating the patient’s perspective. In 
nearly all meetings, the doctors pursued extended responses from patients, 
either through elaboration of the diagnostic information, or perspective or 
understanding questions, or both. Elaborations contained more medical 
information about dementia, such as the cause or the subtype, or elements 
designed to minimise the diagnosis, such as downplaying the severity or the 
certainty of the diagnosis. When doctors did not pursue a response it was 
because patients had engaged in treatment discussions prior to diagnosis. After 
pursuits of responses from the doctors, the majority of patients responded more 
extensively to the diagnosis. Resistance and negative responses to the 
diagnosis increased from the initial response, and patients asked questions 
about dementia, for example about its progression. Doctors ended diagnosis 
discussions using optimistic projections about the patient’s future, which shifts 
the focus to the treatment stage. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, it is typical for patients to respond minimally to 
diagnosis delivery, both in primary care when diagnoses are usually treatable, 
and in serious conditions such as cancer or HIV. Therefore, that nearly three 
quarters of patients respond minimally or not at all to dementia diagnoses is not 
surprising. However, the fact that patients with lower cognitive test scores were 
more likely to respond non-minimally to the diagnosis was interesting, and may 
be an indication of a loss of inhibition that can occur in people with dementia 
(Smith and Buckwalter, 2005). 
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While the patients’ initial responses to dementia diagnoses followed patterns 
described in the literature, the near constancy of doctor efforts to pursue a 
response contrasts with what has been reported in other settings. This was 
firstly illustrated in the common use of direct delivery formats, discussed in 
Chapter Five to be used more often with people with higher cognitive 
impairment, which was found in the current analysis to be more likely to lead to 
non-minimal responses to diagnosis. Additionally, higher levels of cognitive 
impairment were found to be associated with non-minimal responses. The 
association between cognitive impairment, direct diagnosis delivery formats, 
and non-minimal responses needs to be explored in multivariate analyses to 
come to a conclusion as to the nature of these relationships. However, it 
appears that direct deliveries are potentially an effective method of encouraging 
patient response with people with cognitive impairment.  
 
Doctor priority to elicit patient non-minimal responses was most clear in the 
pursuit of response after diagnosis. As discussed above, diagnosis delivery 
sequences described in the literature typically end with patient minimal 
acknowledgement and immediate progression to treatment discussions 
(Robinson, 2003a). Stivers (2005) reported that in primary care doctors do not 
pursue patient responses to diagnoses. This also occurs in secondary care 
diagnosis discussions, with reports of doctors in oncology avoiding extended 
responses so that they can complete their clinical tasks (Yoon et al., 2015, 
Maynard, 2003a).  
 
Maynard describes two exceptions to this rule (Maynard, 2003a). In one HIV 
clinic counsellors specifically pursue patient negative emotional responses, 
because they argue that if the patient does not respond emotionally to the 
diagnosis, they will “avoid carrying out the healthcare regimens necessary to 
the prolongation of health and life” (Maynard, 2003a, :194). As discussed 
before, pursuits of responses can also occur with parents of children being 
diagnosed with developmental disabilities, as a “remedial bid to attain 
agreement” (Gill and Maynard, 1995, :20). Doctors follow the diagnosis by 
providing further information and questioning in order to manage any 
disagreement and ensure the doctor and parent share a common 
understanding of the child’s diagnosis and its implications.  
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However, the aim of doctor pursuit of patient responses in memory clinics is 
less clear than these examples. Pursuits can contain minimisation of the 
diagnosis through emphasising the mild nature of the patient’s dementia or the 
uncertainty involved in making the diagnosis. This is similar to how doctors in 
developmental disabilities clinics aim to achieve diagnostic agreement by 
characterising the condition as something that the parent will agree with. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this may be a reflection of doctors trying to 
maintain a positive outlook for the patient, which patients themselves report as 
a priority (Wolverson et al., 2010). However, when patients in memory clinics 
respond specifically with the downplaying, or the portrayal of the diagnosis as 
uncertain, doctors change the focus back to the diagnosis in order to ensure 
recognition that the diagnosis has been made. Additionally, 58% of the 
diagnostic elaborations consist only of medical information such as naming the 
subtype or showing more detail from the brain scan, without minimisation or 
mitigation (for e.g. extract 9 (page 166) and 19 (page 187) above). These types 
of pursuits are thus not as explicitly oriented to encouraging agreement as in 
other settings. Similarly, questioning patient knowledge of dementia (“have you 
heard of that?”) or perspective on the diagnosis (“what do you think about 
that?”), are open questions that generate a variety of responses, and thus do 
not appear to be directly designed to manage resistance.  
 
The fact that doctors do not seem to be aiming for a particular type of patient 
response beyond a non-minimal response is supported by how the interactions 
unfold after the patients have responded. Doctors respond to all types of non-
minimal response by moving the medical agenda forward to treatment 
discussions. An example of this is extract 13 (page 173), where the patient 
repeatedly avoids acknowledgement of his diagnosis, instead stating “oh what 
can you do? Just carry on.” The doctor does not pursue agreement, but follows 
the patient’s topic shift to treatment. This topic shift after extended responses 
occurs not only after resistance, but also when patients respond to diagnosis 
discussions, such as in extract 17 (page 183) and extract 14 (page 176), or 
pass up any opportunity to respond extensively, such as in extract 10 (page 
167). The regularity of this progression to treatment after patient responses is 
also evident in the difficulty the doctor shows in halting the shift when 
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addressing the patient’s strong negative response to the diagnosis in extract 19 
(page 187). 
 
Doctors do not therefore appear to be pursuing either displays of understanding 
or emotional processing before progressing to treatment discussions. One 
explanation for this could be due to the nature of dementia. Clinicians in HIV 
and developmental disabilities settings are aiming for emotional engagement 
and agreement in order to ensure the patients will persist in long-term 
engagement with medical and support services (Maynard, 2003a). However, 
dementia is a terminal illness, most often developing in later life, and even with 
medication people with dementia will experience worsening memory and a 
degenerating ability to understand the world around them. It may therefore be 
the case that doctors do not view explicit agreement or emotional processing as 
much as a priority as in other diagnostic settings where patients need lifelong 
adherence with healthcare services. The necessity to demonstrate explicit 
awareness of receiving a dementia diagnosis has been explored in terms of 
patient experience in the literature: with some suggestion that explicit 
knowledge of a diagnosis of dementia, without the appropriate coping 
mechanisms in place, may cause lower mood (Clare et al., 2006).  
 
However, if it is the case that doctors are not aiming for patient agreement or 
emotional processing of the diagnosis, why are doctors pursuing responses to 
dementia diagnoses? It could be that doctors are compensating for the impact 
dementia will have on people’s language processing and production. Studies 
show that some people with dementia will compensate for difficulties processing 
others’ talk by displaying agreement regardless of content (Davis and 
Guendouzi, 2013, Sugarman et al., 2007). Therefore, even though minimal 
responses to diagnosis are common in all medical settings, doctors cannot 
assume understanding of the diagnosis with minimal acknowledgement tokens 
from people with dementia. Additionally, it can take more time than usual for a 
patient with dementia to process they are receiving a diagnosis, and elongating 
the diagnosis discussion provides for this. Doctors may therefore be pursuing 
non-minimal responses not necessarily to judge acceptance or emotional 
impact, but instead to ensure sufficient acknowledgement of the diagnosis to 
enable smooth progression to treatment discussions. If this is the case, it 
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appears that the nature of the patient’s response is not important, and 
agreement is not a requirement. This is supported by the fact that 27% of 
patients do not respond beyond minimal acknowledgement of the diagnosis – 
initially or after further pursuit by the doctor– and in these cases doctors will 
move on to treatment discussions regardless, similar to primary care or other 
settings where pursuit is unusual.  
 
However, the majority of patients display a response to the diagnosis after 
pursuit, and there are a wide variety of responses to dementia diagnosis. 
Patients demonstrate explicit resistance, negative assessment of the diagnostic 
news, as well as questions about and comments on the diagnosis. That doctors 
pursue non-minimal responses, and that these pursuits were successful for the 
majority of patients, enabled an analysis of the link between initial responses 
and the nature of later non-minimal responses. The potential meaning of initial 
responses has been discussed in previous studies of patient responses to 
diagnosis, but not extensively explored (Peräkylä, 2005, Heath, 1992). In the 
memory clinic data, the relationship between how patients responded initially 
and how they responded after pursuits were particularly interesting with minimal 
or non-verbal initial responses. The number of different types of minimal 
responses in the data was too small to demonstrate strong associations. 
However, it appears that marked minimal responses (with intonation or stress 
changes e.g. “mhm?” or “mm hm.”) were indicative of a more extensive patient 
initial response than unmarked tokens: patients using these responses were 
more likely to later resist the diagnosis. Additionally, the non-verbal or minimal 
unmarked acknowledgement tokens as a response to dementia diagnoses, as 
well as news receipts that discourage further elaboration, often led to negative 
responses. This supports Maynard’s description of stoicism as a response to 
bad news where the recipient is the person affected: people withhold responses 
in order to encourage “proposals of remedy” (Maynard, 2003a, :152), which in 
the clinic setting will be treatment discussions. However, if the doctor does not 
immediately progress to treatment, and instead pursues a more extended 
response, the alternative, usually repressed, response to stoicism – “flooding 
out” of emotions (Maynard, 2003a, :151) – becomes more likely. 
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While there were only three meetings where doctors do not pursue a response 
– the similarities between these cases was striking. The fact that these three 
patients were the only patients that engaged in treatment discussions in the 
pre-diagnosis location gives an indication that doctors may be trying to get 
patients to engage in the diagnosis precisely so that they engage in treatment 
discussions. This is also reflected in how doctors manage patient extended 
responses to diagnosis. Focusing on hope and optimistic framing of outcomes 
has been often reported in diagnosis discussions of serious conditions, 
particularly as a method to shift from diagnosis to treatment discussions 
(Leydon, 2008). As demonstrated by the doctor in 19 (page 187), when patients 
show negative emotional responses to the diagnosis, doctors will respond by 
minimising the importance of dementia as a label, downplaying the effect that 
dementia will have on their life, and giving optimistic projections of their future. 
This also occurs in response to resistance (as demonstrated in extract 13, page 
174), and optimistic projections are also used when patients only respond non-
minimally (e.g. extract 20, page 190). The positive link that doctors are making 
between receiving a diagnosis and receiving treatment or support that will 
benefit them suggests that this is the message that doctors are aiming to 
portray in diagnosis delivery. That optimistic projections are so common, but the 
prognosis of dementia, i.e. that it is a degenerative condition, is only explicitly 
mentioned in half of the diagnosis discussions illustrates that many doctors are 
avoiding the negative aspects of dementia. The prevalence of this minimisation 
and positive framing of the diagnosis further indicates that this is a tactic not 
specifically to reassure patients, but a strategy to characterise dementia in a 
certain way prior to treatment discussions. 
 
This optimistic framing of diagnosis is unsurprising. It is part of our social world 
that interactants are consistently aiming to maintain “the benign order of 
everyday life” (Maynard, 2003a, :198). Thus, just as bad news is delivered very 
cautiously, it also requires palliative treatment before conversation can move to 
other topics. This has been shown to be common throughout medical settings, 
with doctors adhering to a “principle of optimisation” where the preferential 
outcome for patients is always positive (Heritage, 2009, :14). Furthermore, 
research has been conducted into how patients wish for diagnoses to be 
delivered, and a balance of hope and honesty is important for coping (Mastwyk 
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et al., 2014). It is therefore common in all diagnostic settings for doctors to 
highlight the positive aspects of receiving a diagnosis, such as access to 
support or treatment or likelihood of recovery, over negative consequences, 
such as poor prognosis and side effects of medication (Leydon, 2008). 
However, this has been shown to lead to misunderstandings of diagnoses and 
their consequences, both in dementia and other clinical settings (Leydon, 2008, 
Yoon et al., 2015, Dooley et al., 2015).  
 
As highlighted in the literature review (Chapter 2), there are two aspects specific 
to dementia that may make the reliance on optimistic communication of the 
diagnosis particularly troublesome. The first is the effect of cognitive impairment 
on the processing of the diagnostic interaction. As Leydon describes in 
oncology, if doctors immediately follow bad news with good news, patients may 
disregard the bad and thus have unrealistic treatment expectations (Leydon, 
2008). For people with dementia, whose impaired short term memory difficulties 
will impair their information processing, following bad news with good news will 
make this even more likely (Jones et al., 2016, Bayles, 2003). The second 
aspect is related to the first, which is that the patient’s cognitive impairment, and 
thus their difficulty in understanding, is going to get worse. There is no cure for 
dementia, and the medication is not always effective (Bullock et al., 2005). As 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the main aim of increasing dementia 
diagnosis rates, and for ensuring they occur at early stages of the illness, is to 
allow people with dementia to plan for their future while they are still able to do 
so. Therefore, any misleading information as to the progression of the illness 
may lead to patients and their families not putting support in place in a timely 
fashion. The repercussions of this are reflected in the patient interviews 
collected for the ShareD study, where patients showed confusion as to whether 
their illness would get worse and when this would happen (Xanthopoulou and 
McCabe, 2016).  
 
In conclusion, doctors in memory clinics appear to be pursuing patient 
responses after delivering dementia diagnoses not necessarily to elicit 
agreement and understanding, but to have an indication of the patient’s 
perspective prior to progressing to treatment discussions. The fact that people 
with dementia will have impaired processing means that minimal tokens such as 
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“mm” or nodding cannot necessarily be understood as acknowledgement, and 
therefore it may be that doctors are compensating for this by encouraging 
extended responses. For the majority of patients this is successful, with over 
70% of patients responding more than minimally to the diagnosis. However, 
when it comes to managing responses before shifting to treatment discussions, 
doctors are using similar tactics as found in other diagnostic settings – 
optimistic and positive framing of the diagnosis. The difficult balance between 
ensuring understanding and instilling hope has been identified in other 
diagnostic settings. However, the nature of dementia means that optimistic 
communication of diagnostic information may have implications beyond that of 
other diagnoses, with impaired comprehension leading to further 
misunderstandings.  
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Chapter Seven: 
“How do they want to know?” 
Doctor Perspectives on Delivering 
Dementia Diagnoses 
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A 2013 systematic review on stakeholder perspectives of disclosing dementia 
diagnoses found that it is repeatedly reported that while doctors see the benefit 
of telling a person they have dementia, the stigma of the condition and lack of 
beneficial treatment can provide a barrier for doing so (Werner et al., 2013). 
Many professionals report practices of “veiling the information” (page e79): 
often not naming the illness at all and avoiding prognosis discussions. However, 
most of the papers exploring the viewpoints of medical professionals on 
disclosure were published between 2004 and 2008. As previously discussed, 
there has been a dramatic shift in the policy and culture of dementia diagnosis, 
with an emphasis on increasing diagnosis rates in the early stages of the 
condition in order to maximise access to treatment and support. There have 
been few studies that have examined the effect that these changes have had 
on how professionals view dementia diagnosis delivery (Dubois et al., 2015). 
One study interviewed GPs in the UK and found that they viewed the drive to 
increase diagnosis rates more positively, and accepted their role as important in 
this drive, since the 2009 National Dementia Strategy (National Audit Office, 
2010). However, the research with professionals working in secondary care 
memory clinics is scarce.  
 
What is the relationship between the views of professionals’ about their 
communication elicited in focus groups and findings from applying conversation 
analysis (CA) to their communication with patients? It has been claimed that CA 
dismisses the effects of the social context of the interaction on how the 
interaction unfolds: analysts regard all that is relevant to the interaction as that 
which is visible within the interaction, and there is thus nothing that knowledge 
of the broader context can add to the analysis. However, this is a 
misunderstanding stemming from Garfinkel’s rejection (as developed by Sacks 
and Schegloff) of context as a ‘bucket’ that contains and thus explains the 
actions of speakers (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984). The CA viewpoint is that 
utterances are shaped by context – which includes the larger environmental 
context as well as the local context within the sequence – but that utterances 
also shape the context for the next utterance, and thus context can change at 
any point in the interaction. Therefore, when conducting CA, the context that 
comes from the environment that the speakers are in and the positions they 
hold in that environment should not be completely ignored, but analysts must be 
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aware that the ever-changing nature of context means that these factors cannot 
be “determined in advance and independent of the participants’ own activities” 
(Heritage and Drew, 1992, :21).  
 
Therefore, the inclusion of the findings from focus groups in the thesis 
alongside the CA analysis will not change the results of the previous chapters 
or attempt to explain why the doctors deliver dementia diagnoses as they do. 
Instead, given the aforementioned changes to dementia awareness and policy 
that has occurred in recent years, and the differing nature of dementia 
compared to other diagnoses that have been extensively studied in CA, the 
doctor perspective on diagnosis delivery will be an interesting supplement to the 
findings discussed in the previous chapters.  
 
The aim of the focus groups was thus to explore the views of doctors taking part 
in the study about communicating a diagnosis of dementia within the memory 
clinic structure in the UK.  
 
Methodology 
 
Four focus groups were held between February and April 2015 with the 
clinicians who were taking part in the ShareD study. Two focus groups were 
held in Devon Partnership NHS Trust (with differing participants), one with the 
doctors working in Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, and one with 
doctors working in East London and Barts Health NHS trusts.  
 
The focus groups were held in rooms in NHS buildings close to where the 
clinicians worked. They were audio and video recorded, and only the facilitators 
and participants were present. There were 3-6 clinicians per group, and the 
groups were approximately 90 minutes long.  
 
The aim of the focus groups was to elicit doctor thoughts and feelings about 
communicating with patients in diagnosis feedback meetings in memory clinics. 
As recommended by Kreuger and Casey (2001), a topic guide was used to 
ensure the focus groups followed a structure that was designed to elicit the 
information to this end (see Appendix F). Following the guidelines set by 
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Kreuger and Casey, the topic guide was developed in a group of meetings with 
the ShareD team focussing on issues identified in the systematic review 
(Chapter Two) (Dooley et al., 2015) and study aims. The topic guide was 
reviewed by the Alzheimer’s Society Research Network to ensure clarity. 
 
The focus groups were conducted in a “structured eavesdropping” style, where 
doctors were encouraged to talk among themselves about their beliefs about 
the topics raised by the facilitator (Kitzinger, 1995). This example from one of 
the transcripts illustrated how this unfolded: 
 
Facilitator: Is (prognosis) part of what you talk about? 
Doctor 1: I do a little bit if I’m talking about donepezil because I’m a big, I’m a big 
prescriber. And I sort of believe, you know, in the drugs. 
Doctor 2:  Oh dear!  
Doctor 3:  I’m glad you bring that up 
Doctor 1:  You want people to try the donepezil if they can, and so part of the way 
I’ll introduce that is to talk about trajectories. You know if things have 
been going downhill, then perhaps the leveler. 
Doctor 3:  The leveling off. Yes, that’s what I do. I’ve got a leveling off thing that I 
do. And the other time that I do is with lasting power of attorney. 
 
Therefore, the topic guide primarily ensured the focus group discussions held a 
structure surrounding the topics of communication in memory clinics, but group 
interaction and discussion surrounding these topics was encouraged. The 
resulting data therefore reflects the individual and shared perspectives that 
resulted from these discussions.  
 
Participants 
The doctors were all recruited through their involvement in the research project. 
All except one (H78) are the doctors who are in the video recordings analysed 
in Chapters 4-6. There were 13 old age psychiatrists and 2 geriatricians. 
Participant characteristics can be found in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Characteristics of doctors in focus groups 
Doctor Characteristics  
Gender: 
  Female   
  Male 
 
4 (27%) 
11 (73%) 
Ethnicity: 
  White British 
  Indian 
  Other White Background 
  Pakistani 
 
11 (73%) 
2   (13%) 
1   (7%) 
1   (7%) 
Clinician Type: 
  Consultant Psychiatrist 
  Specialty Doctor  
  Consultant Geriatrician 
  Core Trainee in Psychiatry 
 
9   (60%) 
3   (20%) 
2   (13%) 
1   (7%) 
No of Years working in Dementia 14 (4-25) 
Clinic Location: 
  East London 
  Devon  
  North London 
 
6   (40%) 
6   (40%) 
3   (20%) 
 
Analysis  
The focus groups were conducted as part of the ShareD study. The questions 
were therefore aimed to elicit the doctor perspectives broadly on 
communication in diagnosis feedback meetings in memory clinics, including 
both the diagnosis delivery and how to include patients in management 
decisions. The analysis was conducted with these ShareD research questions 
in mind and thus captured the entire content of the recorded discussions. 
 
The focus groups were transcribed and analysed between November 2015 and 
July 2016. The analysis was planned and conducted collectively by a clinical 
researcher (CB), my supervisor (RM), and myself over a total of 27 analytic 
meetings, ranging from 90 minutes to 4 hours in length. NVivo 11 and Microsoft 
Excel were used to generate codes, categories, subthemes, and themes. A 
thematic analysis methodology was followed, using the 6 phases described by 
Braun and Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with the data: 
CB and I transcribed half the focus groups each. We all watched the video 
recorded focus groups and read all the transcripts to familiarise ourselves with 
the data and ensure the transcripts accurately reflected the recordings. 
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Phase 2: Generating initial codes: 
The transcripts were divided into units consisting of one line of text. An 
inductive approach was taken, with each line given equal attention and a code 
applied. These initial codes were descriptive rather than interpretive, but were 
not simple repetition of the words used by the doctors themselves. Instead, 
these codes aimed to ascribe a “unit of meaning” to each line (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p56), with multiple codes sometimes used for one line of text. 
This line-by-line coding took place over 9 group analytic meetings, with CB 
leading on the analysis in between meetings. Nineteen per cent of the data was 
coded line-by-line as a group. The group meetings were also used as an 
opportunity to reflect on the coding that had been done by CB between 
meetings, for example changing the wording to avoid adding meaning to the 
text that was not in the data and ensuring the context of each line was taken 
into account.  
 
Phase 3: Searching for Themes: 
The next stage of the analysis involved grouping the line-by-line codes into 
categories. There were 599 line-by-line codes at the start of this stage. Seven 
analytic group meetings focused on moving from codes to categories. Codes 
were grouped into categories according to similarities. Similarities within and 
differences between categories were examined repeatedly (Patton, 1990). This 
resulted in 39 categories. 
 
The COREQ guidelines state “specifying the use of multiple coders or other 
methods of researcher triangulation can indicate a broader and more complex 
understanding of the phenomenon” (Tong et al., 2007). Inter-rater reliability 
therefore was calculated at this stage in order to sharpen the definition of the 
categories and ensure coherence and replicability of the analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, Frith and Gleeson, 2004). I double coded one of the focus 
groups that have been coded by CB, which consisted of 35% of the data. 
Cohen’s kappa produced a score of 0.88 indicating high agreement.  
 
Phase 4: Reviewing the Themes 
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The development of the 39 categories into 18 subthemes and 8 themes took 
place over 7 analytic group meetings. Firstly, groups of categories were 
identified and repeatedly examined by looking similarities and differences in 
their underlying meaning, often referring back to the original codes and 
transcripts to ensure homogeneity within and heterogeneity between groups. 
For example, doctors spoke of trying to provide personalised care for patients 
before, within, and after the diagnosis feedback meeting. These categories 
were therefore grouped according to the underlying issue raised by both: 
“Service and personal strategies for maximising continuity within the memory 
clinic structure”. Some categories were sufficiently different from others to 
remain as their own subtheme. 
 
Subthemes were further grouped into overarching themes using a process of 
“subsuming particulars to the general” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p250). The 
aim in this process was to generate higher level groupings of the issues 
identified by doctors in different aspects of the diagnostic communication, and 
thus the grouping followed these principles. For example, doctors had spoken 
about breaking bad news in the context of training and support, practicalities in 
terms of evaluating patient readiness for news, and their strategies for 
delivering bad news. That these subthemes all related to bad news deliveries 
meant that they were grouped into an overarching theme according to the issue 
raised: “Breaking bad news: application and suitability of existing frameworks 
and training”. 
 
Phase 5: Defining and Naming the Themes 
The final grouping themes were developed and named over 4 meetings. The 
naming of themes involved identifying issues that tied the relevant subthemes 
together and capturing the common phenomena pertaining to the these 
subthemes. 
 
Phase 6: Producing the Report 
As stated above, the analysis of the focus groups was conducted as part of the 
ShareD study, aiming to elicit doctor perspective on all aspects of 
communication in memory clinics, not just the communication of the dementia 
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diagnosis. This has been written up as a paper and submitted to Ageing and 
Mental Health for publication. 
 
The data presented in this chapter has been selected from the overall findings 
in order to retain the focus on diagnostic communication in the previous 
chapters. Therefore the theme “Shared decision making: capacity, cognitive 
impairment and companion involvement” will not be included in the results, due 
to its focus on communication around decisions on management of dementia. 
Additionally, the theme “Playing to two audiences” will not be included, as much 
of this theme includes the pre-existing beliefs of the companion surrounding the 
patient’s symptoms and treatment needs. While the challenge of 
communicating to patients when companions are also present is highly relevant 
to the communication in memory clinics, this has not been explored in the 
analysis of the diagnosis delivery and thus will not be presented here in order to 
maintain on-going focus. Additionally, the individual categories “MCI: an 
uncertain diagnostic entity with variable follow up” and “Assessing cognition in 
BME patients who have different explanatory models” will not be discussed 
here, as they are not focused on the analytic issues explored in Chapters 4-6. 
   
Findings from the Doctor Focus Groups 
 
The 39 categories, which were organised into 18 subthemes and 8 overarching 
themes are summarised in Table 15. The 6 themes most relevant to the 
analysis of the diagnosis delivery will be discussed (highlighted in bold in the 
table).  
 
Table 15: Themes, subthemes, and categories 
Theme Subtheme Category 
Public awareness 
and political 
agenda: service 
and individual 
responses 
Media portrayals, stigma, 
and dementia as the 
political agenda 
Dementia diagnosis as a political 
agenda in the face of inadequate 
funding and follow up 
Decreasing stigma, comparisons 
to cancer, and increasing media 
portrayals of dementia 
The evolving remit of 
memory services: managing 
increasing referrals 
Local variations, quality 
improvement, and ways of 
adjusting to increasing referrals 
Evolving remit of memory clinic: 
dementia assessment or ageless 
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catchall? 
Making and 
delivering a 
diagnosis: 
challenges, 
strategies and 
utility 
Making and accurate 
diagnosis with limited time 
and information 
MCI: an uncertain diagnostic 
entity with variable follow up 
Assessing cognition in Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BME) patients 
who have different explanatory 
models 
Limited time: inherent diagnostic 
challenges and being 
‘parachuted in’ 
The utility of a dementia 
diagnosis 
Value of dementia diagnosis: 
understanding symptoms, 
accessing services 
Playing to two 
audiences 
Doctors’ shifting alliances: 
Balancing patient and 
companion needs and 
involvement 
Attending to differing needs and 
contributions of each party in 
triadic consultations 
Triggers for patient 
marginalisation, and strategies 
for inclusion 
Identifying and managing carer 
burden 
Triadic dynamics: old 
patterns, new stresses 
Role of companions in the 
consultation: from advocacy to 
protective caregiving to 
infantilisation 
Longstanding relationship 
dynamics and new stresses 
emerging in feedback 
appointments 
The complex, shifting role of 
companions: insight, 
expectations and 
attributions 
The impact of the diagnosis on 
companions: realisation and 
distress 
Companions’ attributions and 
(mis)understanding of symptoms 
Breaking bad 
news: application 
and suitability of 
existing 
frameworks and 
training 
Limited training and support 
for the complex and 
emotional task 
Breaking bad news training: 
applications and deviations from 
existing frameworks in delivering 
dementia diagnoses 
The emotional impact on 
clinicians: the ‘litany’ of patients 
and lack of supervision 
Context and preparation: 
assessing patient insight 
and readiness for the 
diagnosis 
How patient readiness, insight, 
and context influences the 
delivery 
Differing perspectives on asking 
if patients want to know their 
diagnosis 
Role and availability of pre-
diagnostic counseling 
The process of diagnosis 
delivery: considered use of 
labels, building 
personalised narratives 
The spectrum and 
personalisation of language: 
tailored use of D and A words 
and ‘labels’ 
Communicating non-dementia 
diagnoses and the managing of 
the associated stigma 
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Aligning the evidence to patient 
narrative 
Challenges in explaining 
dementia and its subtypes 
The range of 
insight, 
engagement and 
emotional 
reactions to 
diagnosis 
The spectrum of insight and 
interest in the diagnosis 
The spectrum of insight and 
interest in the diagnosis: from 
fear and help-seeking to 
anosognosia and denial 
Varying emotional 
responses to the diagnosis 
and its practical implications 
The range of emotional 
responses to diagnosis and 
relationship with insight 
Emotional responses to driving 
discussions: the first concrete 
marker of loss of independence 
Balancing 
honesty, hope, 
and uncertainty 
Instilling hope:  the 
message of living well and 
the uncertain efficacy of 
medication 
The multifaceted role of 
medication: uncertain 
pharmacological efficacy, and a 
tool for moderating bad news 
Offering hope and softening the 
blow of the diagnosis 
Communicating practical 
implications and prognostic 
uncertainties 
Approaching driving discussions: 
a tangible consequence, and 
loss of independence 
The challenges of 
communicating prognosis 
Shared decision 
making: capacity, 
cognitive 
impairment and 
companion 
involvement 
Shared decision making: 
triadic communication within 
the context of pre-existing 
relationships 
Communicating and making 
decisions with patients who have 
partial capacity 
Approaches to medication 
decisions: managing 
expectations and the importance 
of practicalities and context 
Information provision and 
cognitive impairment 
Giving information: general 
principles and specific 
adjustments for patients with 
cognitive impairment 
Providing 
continuity of 
personalised care 
within service 
constraints 
Service and personal 
strategies for maximising 
continuity within the 
memory clinic structure 
Flexibility within memory clinic 
pathways: attempts to provide 
continuity of care 
The role of 3rd sector 
organisations in providing post-
diagnostic follow up 
The variable availability of post-
diagnostic counseling and 
impact on what can be left for 
another day 
“Going in cold”: meeting for the 
first time in feedback, and ways 
of getting a sense of the patient 
Balancing personalisation 
and flexibility with 
institutional agendas 
Balancing institutional, patient, 
and companion agendas in 
diagnostic feedback 
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Public awareness and the political agenda  
Media portrayals, stigma, and dementia as a political agenda 
Doctors discussed increased public awareness of dementia and the differing 
effects of this on their practice in the memory clinic. 
 
“I think we’re in the middle of a fairly rapid cultural change at the moment. 
Dementia is on the news every day now isn’t it?.. So more people say 
“have I got dementia?” than maybe a few years ago.” H51 
 
The increase in awareness was reported to be evident in people’s concerns and 
expectations when attending diagnosis feedback, which could lead to 
misconceptions about the prevalence or treatment of dementia. 
 
“There’s this huge misconception, certainly I have this struggle with my 
parents all the time, which is that people think, I think the public thinks that 
everybody gets dementia.. And no matter how much I tell my mum and 
dad that you know ‘only one in five people over 80 have dementia’ they 
still think that.” H40 
 
“Because people come in and say ‘I want this tablet so I can stop this’. 
Because every week in The Mail or The Express there’s an ‘X’ that cures 
dementia.” H50 
 
Doctors still felt that increased dementia awareness was a positive 
development, particularly in the reduction of the stigma associated with the 
condition. This was compared to how the stigma surrounding cancer has 
changed. 
 
“There is a need to de-stigmatise the word, such as, you know people 
didn’t talk about cancer. You know, cancer was potentially a catching 
word, you know, if you, it’s a taboo. And so part of me feels, rightly or 
wrongly, is that using (the word ‘dementia’) normalises it.” H17 
 
The doctors felt that the focus on diagnosis rates in the political agenda was 
causing difficulties in the gap between increasing referrals and provision of 
post-diagnostic support.  
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“It’s a big political issue at the moment. ‘Dementia’ – it’s kind of a named 
illness in various policies and blahdeblah. And all kinds of ill thought out 
dementia screening initiatives, so lots of talk of increasing diagnostic rates 
and coding and registers, but no talk of psychosocial intervention, and no 
talk about the sort of predations on all budgets and social services 
delivering the very things that we know will help these people.” H17 
 
The evolving remit of memory services: managing increasing referrals 
There was an agreement that changes in policy were putting increasing 
pressure on doctors to make dementia diagnoses, and this caused some 
concern as to whether the diagnoses delivered were always accurate. 
 
“Because with the clinic – it’s a diagnostic clinic. It’s an issue of, you know 
‘if you’ve got a hammer everything looks like a nail’ kind of situation going 
on. That we’re there to diagnose dementia not depression or anxiety or 
marital problems. So you often…you know, diagnose dementia! So you 
know I think that’s always a bit of a worry.” H40 
 
“Either your diagnostic accuracy goes down or the delays increase, 
people wait 12 months to get a diagnosis. It is balancing.” H43 
 
Making and delivering a diagnosis: challenges, strategies and utility 
Making an accurate diagnosis with limited time and information 
Doctors described how they decide if a person has a diagnosis of dementia; 
bringing together all the information collected in the referral letter and initial 
assessment meeting. They reported uncertainty in making diagnoses. 
 
“It is very much a balance of probabilities isn’t it – the age, the GP referral, 
the CT scan, the cognitive testing, the informant, the patient history and 
then the clinical history.” H51 
 
“You know we spend half our life guessing on incomplete information. 
That total uncertainty.” H49 
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The fact that in the majority of memory clinics doctors were not collecting the 
information themselves meant that they could face some difficulties if other 
clinicians had not provided the information needed to make the diagnosis. 
 
“You’re at the mercy of the person who’s taken the collateral history, all 
the history, and for us depending on which day that can be variable at 
how skilled the person is at probing and sort of getting to the bottom of 
things.” H40 
 
“You’re also at the mercy of the GP letter, the GP having done the blood 
tests and them being there, which they’re often not. And the radiologist 
having reported on the scan, which they haven’t. So the whole thing can 
feel quite vulnerable.” H41 
 
Some of the information gathered was deemed more important than others for 
making a dementia diagnosis. 
 
“Yeah, because I reckon you can probably make a diagnosis of dementia 
without the scan if you had to, and without an ACE (cognitive test), but 
you couldn’t possibly make it without the history.” H49 
 
The importance of the patient’s history in making a diagnosis meant that 
doctors experienced more uncertainty when they had not met the patient prior 
to diagnosis feedback, and most had not met the patient prior to this point. They 
explained their strategies for engaging patients in discussion prior to delivery to 
determine the accuracy of their diagnosis. 
 
“So sometimes I am doing more information gathering or reviewing mental 
state maybe. Just to get a bit more of a sense of the person who I often 
haven’t met before.” H17  
 
“And how they walk in the room, and how quickly they, their speech flows 
and I think you learn so much from just seeing people briefly.” H49 
 
While doctors did demonstrate that they had adjusted to the difficulties 
surrounding diagnostic accuracy, it was still a cause for concern. 
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“It’s bringing that all together in the short time that we have. I don’t know if 
I’m getting better at it, but it’s, it causes me anxiety sometimes.” H51 
 
The utility of a dementia diagnosis 
The doctors felt that one of the primary reasons for diagnosing dementia was to 
provide patients and their companions with a label that would help them access 
additional support services that would benefit them. 
 
“I know that in (place) we have a fairly good range of services, both for 
people with mild symptoms and more severe. So that makes me feel that, 
you know, it has worth. It’s not just a medical labelling.” H17 
 
“You know from the organisational point, we need to give a diagnosis with 
its name.” H02 
 
The other function of the diagnosis identified by doctors was for the patient’s 
family: to give them license to use the ‘dementia’ label and aid them in making 
future plans. 
 
“I’m definitely aware of that by using the word and saying the diagnosis, 
saying dementia, saying Alzheimer’s, and giving them a leaflet you’re 
giving the carer permission to keep going down that road with them.” H40 
 
Breaking bad news: application and suitability of existing frameworks and 
training 
Limited training and support for the complex and emotional task 
The majority of doctors had not received training on how to tell people they 
have dementia.  
 
“I don’t think I’ve had formal training, apart from the sort of thing (name) 
was alluding to of training in medical school around ‘breaking bad news’ 
as it would be called. In my mind I remember being filmed in medical 
school and doing it and it being about telling an actor, an actor playing the 
role of a wife, that her husband had died. So you know, it’s a very different 
kind of scenario to giving a diagnosis of dementia to someone.” H22 
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Other doctors did apply aspects of their training they had received to diagnosis 
delivery in memory clinics. 
 
“He (the trainer) got us to think about how you can ask permission and 
how you can, how much people would like to know, and at what point they 
would like to stop and to give them the ownership of feeling in control of 
that conversation.” H41 
 
The psychological impact of the task of telling people they have dementia on 
the doctors was also discussed. 
 
“And you know, the point is that there is a lot of pain and angst, you know, 
how do we deal with, you know, the litany of the patients that have to be 
told, the numbers of patients that have to be told that they’ve got an 
incurable illness?” H07 
 
“I’m just parachuted in at the end to tell them and I just think that’s awful.” 
H50 
 
There was no official support for doctors to discuss cases that troubled them, 
but many doctors described the advantages of working in the diagnostic 
feedback clinic with other clinicians as peer supervision. 
 
“We gave the diagnosis with the team psychologist. Which helped 
throughout the session, and after that, we just had you know, 10 minutes 
basically: ‘Alright?’ ‘Okay?’ Yeah, and then we revisited it over the next 
few days because it was very difficult.” H02 
 
Context and preparation: assessing patient insight and readiness for diagnosis 
Doctors discussed the wide range of patient readiness (or lack of readiness) for 
the diagnosis. 
 
“Some people will walk through the door and say just, just tell me, I know 
what’s happening. And there are other people who sort of come in, not 
expecting it at all and you obviously have to change your approach.” H78 
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Establishing the person’s orientation and insight into the diagnostic feedback 
meeting at an early stage was necessary. 
 
“You can’t deal with your so-called medical agenda until you can tell the 
patient’s agenda. And establishing that they’re there in order to receive 
the diagnosis is paramount really. Because if they don’t know that’s what 
they’re there for then you know, you haven’t even got to first base.” H07 
 
The doctors reported aiming to build a narrative based on the perspective of the 
person with dementia, and leading them to a place where they will accept the 
diagnosis.  
 
“I think I’m partly trying to find out what it is that they think. Not so much 
what they know, but what they think, so that I can subtly bring them 
around to my point of view as to what might be wrong with them.” H21 
 
“Often, you’re coming to this meeting with very different thoughts, very 
different, I guess, ideas, to exactly what they’re expecting. So it’s helpful 
to find something that you can agree on, some sort of symptom which you 
can then begin to build a kind of story around really.” H22 
 
Discussion of patient awareness of the diagnostic process incorporated the 
issue of patient consent to deliver the diagnosis. Some doctors felt that if 
patients had been through the referral and assessment, they have already 
consented to the diagnosis. Others reported incidents where the possibility of 
receiving a diagnosis had not been discussed with patients.  
  
“You know they get a letter saying ‘come to see the doctor again for 
feedback about diagnosis’. So I think, well that’s what they came for.” H21 
 
“I’ll give you a story of a woman who, the daughter went to the doctor and 
said ‘I think my mum’s got dementia’. Doctor referred her without seeing 
her. The daughter intercepted the clinic letter and didn’t show her, and 
said ‘Mum we’re just going for a coffee, do you want to come?’ and 
brought her along to memory clinic.” H50 
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As discussed in Chapter 5 many doctors asked patients if they wanted to know 
the diagnosis in the diagnosis feedback meeting. Doctors reported service-
driven reasons for asking this question, as well as some concern as to what to 
do if people say they do not want to know. 
 
“I think on the back of MSNAP, Memory Service National Accreditation 
Programme, or whatever it’s called, that writes varying standards, it has 
ones about asking about diagnosis and what you want to know. And that’s 
made us be more explicit about asking those questions.” H17 
 
“Since I’ve started doing the clinic and there’s that totally awful letter that 
(name) knows I hate, which I believed, clearly wrongly, that we were sort of 
bound to use, and it says ‘after ascertaining that they wish to know the 
diagnosis..’,  so I’ve started doing that now..” H49 
 
“I think I find it very hard to know how to say ‘there’s something..’ ‘how 
much do you want to know?’ And even if you don’t want to know that, 
maybe you do actually want to know what we can do to help, in which case 
we’re talking about Donepezil (cholinesterase inhibitor) and memory 
groups. Yeah, I find that, that whole concept quite difficult.” H22 
 
The process of diagnosis delivery: considered use of labels, building 
personalised narratives 
The doctors placed great importance on delivering the diagnosis appropriately 
to the patient as an individual, so adjusting the information provided as to the 
patient’s needs. However, this could be made difficult by the fact they often had 
never met the patient before.  
 
“It’s very difficult though, I actually really hate going in cold and 
theoretically giving a diagnosis. If I’m going to give someone a diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s I would normally spend the first half hour of the 
assessment, and perhaps in psychiatry we’ve got more time, but I would 
normally spend that first half hour getting the information, but also working 
out who’s in front of me. You now how do they want to know? .. How do 
they want me to say it?” H49 
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The initial stages of the meeting – discussion of patient symptoms and feeding 
back the test results – were described as important in determining how doctors 
approached the diagnosis itself. 
 
“There’s a narrative: they come for the dementia, so there’s a problem 
here and let’s talk about it and talk around that. Maybe the score, the 
history or whatever it is. Get more of their narrative, more of what they’re 
about, what’s going on and then run with that. They usually like to see the 
scan. Get the scan up and they’re – “oh my brain!” Most people really like 
that.” H51 
  
“I might say to them you’ve come here, you saw another doctor, or me at 
home, and you had some investigations and you’ve come here to think 
about, to get the results and to find out what it means. Say like ‘you’ve 
had a scan do you remember?’ Some people don’t and say no I didn’t 
have it. And yeah, then ‘would you like me to tell you what it said?’ and so, 
I would offer them the opportunity to have that information if they want to.” 
H21 
 
Doctors reported variation in how patients responded to cognitive test feedback, 
with some patients realising the extent of their difficulties when they struggle 
with certain questions, and others misunderstanding their scores on feedback. 
 
“They get into the tests and they think, ‘there are simple things like drawing 
a clock face and I couldn’t do it’. They often say ‘it’s simple, there’s a clock 
on the wall, but I couldn’t do it’. And that leads into, ‘well that isn’t quite 
right’” H50 
 
 “If you compared (the cognitive test results) with any other sort of scoring 
system, you know, getting 50% is a pass isn’t it? Whereas we’d be pretty 
alarmed.” H49 
 
When it comes to delivering the diagnosis, doctors showed awareness both of 
the importance and the potential impact of naming dementia as the patient’s 
diagnosis.  
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“The purpose of the feedback, for me anyway, is to deliver the diagnosis, 
and actually, you know, say it – the D word – and give it to the patient and 
their carer.” H07 
 
“Often it’s the first time anyone has mentioned the word dementia to them. 
Because the GP says ‘oh well we’ll just go off and test your memory’.” H43 
 
They discussed giving particular attention to the placement of the diagnostic 
labels ‘Dementia’ and ‘Alzheimer’s disease’.  
 
“It’s a little dance isn’t it? Using the appropriate language at the time, 
that’s how it is.” H51 
 
“I always say that people have been invited because we want to look at 
their memory to try and work out whether they’ve got a dementia or 
something else. And then I come back to that later. So I suppose the 
word’s been put out there.” H49 
 
“I start off euphemistically saying ‘so we should start thinking about what 
we can do to protect your memory at this stage’ and then I might talk 
about the kinds of drugs that people use for things like Alzheimer’s 
disease. ‘And those are the sorts of drugs we might use for you because I 
think you might have Alzheimer’s’. So I go that slightly.. circuitous route.” 
H40 
 
One doctor reported not using ‘dementia’ terms when he felt that it would not be 
beneficial for the patient, for example if they were in later stages of dementia. 
 
“Rather than saying you’ve got Alzheimer’s disease and this is the 
medication, and this is the dementia care team, sometimes I’ll say you’ve 
got a memory problem, there’s medication for it, let’s discuss the 
medication.” H43  
 
It was pointed out that even the names of the clinics did not mention dementia. 
 
“I guess it’s sort of sugaring the pill isn’t it? That they’re called memory 
services. It’s euphemism.” H17 
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Doctors debated the importance of naming ‘dementia’ when telling patients their 
diagnosis, and there was differing opinion on the importance of providing the 
diagnostic label.  
 
“And does it really matter, whether we use the word dementia?.. Most of 
the time I just say you’ve got a memory problem and we call it dementia or 
whatever but it’s just a memory problem and this is the treatment for it. 
And patients are often happy with that.” H01 
 
“At least then you feel you’ve got it out there and they can talk about it. 
Because they’ve heard it from you and it’s there, it’s not anything that’s 
worth treading around.” H41 
 
Doctors reported that there could be confusion regarding the difference 
between Alzheimer’s disease and dementia, which caused difficulty in 
delivering diagnoses.  
 
“Another common things is, ‘Oh I’ve got dementia, not Alzheimer’s, I’m 
happy with that.’” H01 
 
“If you mention dementia and Alzheimer’s then you get into this sort of long 
convoluted, trying to explain the difference between the two, which is 
actually quite tricky anyway.” H03 
 
Many doctors aimed to differentiate the early stage of dementia that most of the 
patients they saw were in, from the later stages of dementia that the patients 
and their families associated with the condition. They reported following the 
diagnosis delivery with discussion of the helpful aspects of receiving a 
diagnosis. 
 
“I would normally say “it’s a dementia”, and then stop there and have a 
discussion.. Because often people have completely the wrong idea of what 
dementia is, and you know that’s the opportunity to think, oh yes, Aunty 
Nan had that she’s in a care home she can’t speak at all or something and 
then you can challenge some of the ideas about that.” H17 
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“And I say that it helps other people to understand what it is you’re finding 
difficult and to make plans to help you to deal with it, so it’s seen as a 
positive thing because it helps people to identify ways of helping you. So I 
think there’s lots of ways you can package the same stuff a lot more 
positively.” H41 
 
The range of insight, engagement, and emotional reactions to the diagnosis 
The spectrum of insight and interest in the diagnosis 
As discussed above people can present to the memory clinic with varying levels 
of insight. Doctors reported that lack of insight continues to affect how patients 
respond to the dementia diagnosis once it is delivered. 
 
“I never quite know what to do when you’ve said it all, and then as they’re 
going they say ‘well it’s OK because there’s nothing wrong with me’” H49 
 
Doctors shared strategies of adjusting their approach with patients who do not 
appear to register the diagnosis, often discussing treatment and planning 
primarily with the patient’s companions.  
 
“That’s something that would be a good sort of guideline to really 
emphasise to the carer that the person with dementia will probably not 
remember this. You’re acting as their memory. They don’t, they will not, 
remember this.” H21 
 
Doctors discussed whether making people understand they were receiving a 
diagnosis of dementia and that they needed support was necessary. It was 
agreed it varied on a case-by-case basis. 
 
“Because they are lacking in insight they’re refusing help or they’re putting 
themselves at risk at home then that’s something I really worry about. 
Whereas if they’re lacking insight and they’re refusing the Donepezil 
(cholinesterase inhibitor) that I’m offering then I feel that that’s a less of a 
make or break kind of decision.” H22 
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Varying emotional responses to the diagnosis and its practical implications 
Doctors connected lack of insight with a lack of emotional response to the 
diagnosis.  
 
“Don’t you find the ones with very little insight who are sitting there blithely 
unconcerned about anything, don’t seem to be concerned with the 
diagnosis either? You say that to them and it’s all sort of water off a duck’s 
back, isn’t it?” H41 
 
Doctors described strategies towards dealing with resistance (or “hostility” 
(H78)), such as seeing the person again in their own home. Strong emotional 
responses were reported as rare, but doctors reported that they occur more 
often at later stages in the meeting when practical repercussions of the 
diagnosis are discussed. This is particularly the case when doctors tell patients 
they may have to stop driving.  
 
“Someone’s got some insight that you are making a diagnosis and you tell 
them that they need to inform the DVLA (Driving and Vehicle Licensing 
Authority). That’s gone very badly wrong sometimes.. They don’t seem to 
be aware of it as a possible consequence.”  H40 
 
“I think some people feel if you’re talking with them about giving up driving 
that you’re taking away everything, their life, their autonomy. So I think 
that’s a really difficult thing to do. So I think that can be more difficult than 
the diagnosis because that they can’t remember, but if they can’t drive they 
can’t drive.” H21 
 
Balancing honesty, hope, and uncertainty 
Instilling hope: the message of living well and the uncertain efficacy of 
medication  
The conflicting goals of being honest but hopeful, while also communicating the 
uncertainty of the prognosis of dementia, were discussed by the doctors.  
 
“I think my concern around that has always been around striking the right 
balance, not scaring people too much, but not not saying it and not creating 
misunderstanding” H78 
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“I want them to understand, but not to understand too much. Because I 
think, you’ve got to have on board that this is an extraordinarily difficult way 
to go down, and to know that you’ve got an illness, and it’s important to 
know that it doesn’t mean that tomorrow you’ll be the person who can’t talk, 
can’t move, can’t walk.” H21 
 
A message of “living well” (H40) with dementia was deemed important by 
doctors to help patients cope with their diagnosis. 
 
“There’s something about not letting the diagnosis swamp them, you know, 
that they’re still the same person tomorrow, with a bit more baggage sort of 
thing and that you can, as you say take control of it, make decisions, 
continue going on your cruise, you know. But just perhaps with a slightly 
different support system around you.” H49 
 
Many of the doctors felt ambivalent as to the efficacy of the cholinesterase 
inhibitor medication for dementia, and there was some discussion as how to 
communicate that to patients. However, many doctors reported using the offer 
of treatment as a method of instilling hope after diagnosis.  
 
“And I think, from the moment one starts talking about the potential, the 
treatment, I think it already has a placebo effect on the actual adjustment or 
the sort of stress reaction of the patient. Okay, ‘ah there’s something, there 
is a tablet to start with.’” H02 
 
Communicating practical implications and prognostic uncertainties 
Doctors find the uncertainty of the prognosis of dementia difficult to 
communicate to patients.  
 
“You know some of the people will go very, very slowly and there’ll be very 
little change over years and other people will catastrophically drop. So I 
think there’s less specific medical stuff to do, which is harder for us doctors. 
And it’s harder for people to manage.” H21 
 
Doctors reported addressing prognosis differently with different patients, 
depending on how much they want to know and at what stage their dementia is. 
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“I think it’s variable depending on who you’re talking to really – what level 
they’re at. If somebody really, really wants to know, I will do my best and I 
will say, things have changed for you quite a lot in the last 2 years... It’s 
quite possible that it may progress, you know, along a similar course for the 
next 2 years.” H41 
 
“A lot of the patients that we see in (place) are at quite an advanced 
stage... so you say that you’ve got a memory problem, there’s medication 
for it, (and) it may get worse, rather than saying it will get worse.” H01 
 
Doctors reported often skirting around the practical implications of dementia 
and its prognosis, aiming to avoid emotional trauma.  
 
“So things that might happen in the future and might have to be thought 
about. In terms of living arrangements, it’s-, you don’t want to scare people 
and it’s already a lot to take in I think. You’re already quite busy telling them 
just the basics and I think it’s judging what people are worried about and 
often people will ask you about kind of specific things that they’re 
concerned about kind of looking to the future of that diagnosis and the 
implications of it.” H78 
 
Providing continuity of personalised care within service constraints 
Personalisation and flexibility within the institutional agenda 
Doctors were aware of following a specific medical agenda with patients; there 
were certain topics – medication, lasting power of attorney, driving – that 
needed to be covered in the feedback meeting. However, end of life planning 
(or ‘advance care planning’), despite being recommended by the NICE 
guidelines to be discussed as early as possible, was deemed an unsuitable 
topic within the diagnosis feedback meeting. 
 
“It is just so not appropriate to talk about advanced care planning at the 
point at which you tell somebody you’ve got dementia. I mean it’s like, you 
know, and I’ll just kick your head in as well while you do it. It just feels so, 
just, poisonous.” H07 
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Service and personal strategies for continuity 
Regarding the patient’s understanding of the diagnosis, and enabling them to 
make decisions about their future, the doctors felt strongly that the diagnosis 
was a journey – and that the feedback was just the start.  
 
“I always think I, that dementia diagnosis is a process. And that more 
questions arise as the implications sinks in.” H51 
 
Doctors felt a pressure of service constraints on what they can offer at the 
feedback meeting, particularly in relation to the time they had with the patient.  
 
“There are so many things one would want to talk with patients about.. I 
know I don’t have time enough to do it, the way that my clinic is structured, 
to just sit and listen. Let alone my agenda of what I might want to talk about 
being lasting powers of attorney, wills, you know.” H17 
 
For this reason, post-diagnostic follow up was seen as extremely important in 
ensuring that the needs of people with dementia and their families were met.  
 
“We actually see people a couple of months later and that’s the point at 
which we try and see people to discuss other things. Because the first, that 
first feedback is, you know, people sometimes just don’t ask anything, they 
can’t imagine what to ask.” H07 
 
Many doctors felt concern that they would not usually see the patient 
themselves after the diagnostic feedback meeting. There was variation between 
memory clinics as to whether nurses within the clinic ran post-diagnosis 
meetings or whether there was third sector involvement, such as support 
workers from the Alzheimer’s Society. Doctors felt that if there was some 
continuity in the staff between feedback and post-diagnosis then it was better 
for patients.  
 
“I’m always really pleased when I spot one of my GP surgeries (in the 
patient’s notes), because then I know that my team will be doing the post 
diagnosis session... And also I feel more confident. So I can say to them 
‘look if anything goes wrong just ring us’ because I know that actually it will 
be me” H49 
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“I mean for me the session is successful when I have the chance to 
eventually introduce the person from the Alzheimer’s Society. Let me 
introduce you to my colleague, we have these people who will be sort of 
following you through the process.” H02 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Analysis of focus groups with psychiatrists and geriatricians delivering dementia 
diagnoses resulted in 8 themes, 6 of which were discussed in this chapter. 
These outlined the key challenges for doctors in delivering dementia diagnoses: 
responses to public awareness and political agenda; the challenges, strategies 
and utility in making a diagnosis; training and frameworks for breaking bad 
news; the range of insight, engagement and emotional reactions of patients; 
balancing hope, honesty and uncertainty; and providing continuity of 
personalised care.  
 
The 6 themes that have been presented in this chapter will now be reflected 
upon according to two underlying threads within the focus group discussions. 
The first of these is doctors’ beliefs about the purpose and utility of a dementia 
diagnosis. The second is the external pressures and constraints of services 
beyond doctors’ control. 
 
Beliefs about the purpose and utility of dementia diagnosis 
As found in the literature, doctors reported a change in perspectives on 
dementia diagnostic disclosure in the last 10-20 years along similar lines to 
cancer (Dubois et al., 2015, Werner et al., 2013). While studies at the beginning 
of the decade were showing clinician reluctance in and avoidance of telling 
patients they have dementia (Bamford et al., 2004, Monaghan and Begley, 
2004), the doctors in this study reported consistently telling people their 
diagnosis. However, their beliefs about what a dementia diagnosis represented 
and the purpose of the diagnosis for the patient was apparent in how they 
talked about approaching the diagnosis delivery.  
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While doctors spoke positively about removing the stigma of dementia and 
made comparisons to cancer in its rising prevalence in public discussion, there 
was clear doctor anxiety in causing upset to the patient and their companion 
when delivering the diagnosis. This reflects studies of stakeholder opinions of 
dementia diagnosis disclosure, where a central concern is the negative 
emotional effect on the patient (van den Dungen et al., 2014, Carpenter and 
Dave, 2004, Milby et al., 2015). The increase in awareness of dementia and the 
effect of the media on treatment expectations caused added concern for 
doctors about how to ‘let down’ those who attended the memory clinic hoping 
for a drastic improvement. There was much discussion about the strategies to 
approach the dementia diagnosis, including building a narrative, using the test 
results, and the “little dance” in the placement of the term once the patient was 
ready. These strategies reflect the behaviours described in the previous 
chapters, and in other settings (Turowetz, 2015). However, what this 
demonstrates is that while there may have been a change in beliefs about the 
importance of using the ‘dementia’ label and telling people their diagnosis, 
doctors are very attuned to the delicacy and challenges involved in imparting 
this news. The current doctors were telling people their diagnosis, as evidenced 
in the video recordings, which shows a development from the avoidance of the 
dementia label reported in previous studies (Robinson et al., 2015, Peel, 2015). 
However, there remains a prominent awareness of the stigma and impact of 
dementia, and resulting discomfort for doctors in delivering the diagnosis.  
 
The doctors’ perspectives correspond with studies of patient and companion 
responses to dementia diagnosis. Stokes et al (2015) describe patients and 
companions seeing the benefit of having a diagnosis in their personal 
understanding and management of the condition, which is at odds with their 
wider, more stigmatised perceptions of dementia within society. Patients and 
companions will have different reactions to dementia diagnoses – from positive 
coping responses, to denial, to grief (Aminzadeh et al., 2007). The doctors’ 
heightened awareness of the latter two responses and wish to encourage the 
first was evident in the description of their approaches to naming the diagnosis, 
and thus their beliefs in the purpose of communicating the diagnosis to patients.  
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Doctors named two main purposes of diagnosis disclosure: accessing support 
services and for the patient’s family to understand the symptoms of dementia. 
They described an aim to emphasise “living well” with dementia. If doctors see 
these outcomes as the ultimate purpose of diagnosis, there may be an 
institutional agenda to speak positively and encourage patient engagement in 
treatment and support discussions. Doctors reported that this affects how they 
manage patient responses to diagnosis, which is similar to descriptions of other 
settings where the institutional aims will affect how responses are managed: for 
example while emotional responses may be sympathised with in helpline calls, 
they may be challenged in psychotherapy (Peräkylä and Sorjonen, 2012). 
 
However, as also discussed in Chapter 6, one of the key issues surrounding the 
optimistic perspective on the dementia diagnosis is the avoidance of prognosis 
discussions. Doctors reported sometimes actively avoiding the specific details 
of how dementia will develop unless patients ask outright. They reported that 
one of the reasons for this was that there is little way of knowing how individual 
patients will progress, but a key factor was avoiding “scaring” patients. The 
emphasis on a positive message in diagnosis has also been reported in other 
settings (Maynard, 2006, Furber et al., 2013), but there is evidence that 
although positive messages can reduce distress in patients, they also cause 
people to remember diagnostic information less well (Porensky and Carpenter, 
2016). Deliberately withholding this information is also paternalistic in that it 
removes the choice of the patient and their companion (Karnieli-Miller, 2007). 
Research shows that the primary complaint that relatives of people with 
dementia have about diagnosis is that they were not given enough information 
about how dementia progresses in order to plan adequately for the future 
(Stokes et al., 2015). There was awareness among doctors that this avoidance 
of prognosis in favour of a positive outlook does create misunderstandings, but 
that decisions surrounding the later stages of dementia were not relevant topics 
for when the person has just received the diagnosis. This again reflects the 
conflict between wanting the person to understand they have the diagnosis of 
dementia while avoiding articulating the degenerative nature of the condition.  
 
While doctors spoke about importance of accessing support and for patients’ 
families to understand the diagnosis, there was less discussion on the purpose 
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of the diagnosis for patients. It may be that this is related to doctor perspectives 
on patient expectations surrounding a dementia diagnosis. A large part of the 
discussion on approaches to diagnosis delivery revolved around issues of 
patient awareness of their symptoms. They reported widely varying 
expectations, from people waiting to be told they have dementia to people not 
knowing why they are seeing the doctor. They also reported reduced emotional 
reactions to diagnoses when people did not display awareness into their 
symptoms, and that not acknowledging symptoms resulted in patients putting 
themselves at risk in day-to-day functioning. Doctors felt at a loss when patients 
displayed a contrary view on their symptoms after the diagnosis delivery, and 
when this occurred they reported usually changing the focus of their 
communication to the companion. Previous studies have also indicated that 
when people with cognitive impairment appear to display a lack of 
understanding or agreement, doctors often talk more to their families (Schmidt 
et al., 2009). If doctors view the purpose of the diagnosis is to put in place 
management strategies, and if patients are not engaging in this once the 
diagnosis is delivered, it appears the main priority will be to ensure that the 
patient’s companion is on board.   
 
However, reports from companions state that they too can assume a lack of 
awareness based on their relatives reaction to the diagnosis, but that from a 
couple of days to a month later the patient shows an emotional reaction or 
display of understanding (Aminzadeh et al., 2007). It is recognised that the level 
of awareness a person has into their dementia symptoms will not be reliably 
elicited in a short clinical appointment (Clare, 2004). From the way that doctors 
spoke about patients “with” or “without” “insight”, they appear not to take this 
into account. However, doctors discussed emotional reactions occurring at later, 
more practical discussion points such as driving, as well as management of 
resistance to diagnosis in meeting the person at home or with psychology input, 
which suggests an understanding that the diagnosis is a process that will take 
place over more than just the diagnostic feedback appointment. This brings us 
to the next underlying narrative that occurred throughout the focus group 
discussions, and that is the systemic constraints of the memory services.  
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External pressures and constraints of services beyond doctors’ control 
The pressure of external systems affecting diagnostic communication was 
prevalent in the focus group discussion. Doctors reported one of the main 
benefits of patients going through the memory clinic and receiving a dementia 
diagnosis was that patients and their families would have access to appropriate 
support. However, that was felt to be compromised by several aspects of the 
memory services that the doctors perceived to be out of their control.  
 
One of the key concerns for doctors was that they were often meeting the 
patient for the first time in diagnosis feedback. In the current study, 75% of the 
patients recorded had not met the doctor before. This increased the diagnostic 
uncertainty and the resulting anxiety in delivering the diagnosis, which has also 
been described in other studies (Milby et al., 2015). It also caused 
communication challenges for doctors, who highlighted the importance of 
delivering diagnoses that were “timely” according to the individual’s needs and 
expectations (Dubois et al., 2015). A “timely” diagnosis has been at the centre 
of the drive to increase dementia diagnoses (Dhedhi et al., 2014, Robinson et 
al., 2015). However, doctors appeared not to be able to rely on reports from the 
GP or the clinician doing the cognitive assessment as to the patient’s readiness 
for the diagnosis, and reported trying to gauge how the patient “wants to know” 
at the beginning of diagnosis feedback meetings. They also reported feeling 
that patients had often not even heard the word “dementia” in prior to the clinic 
visit, which caused them additional anxiety in being the first to use this term in 
diagnosis delivery. This is at odds with how dementia guidelines consider a 
timely diagnosis should be approached, where patients should receive pre-
diagnosis counselling advising the potential outcome of the memory clinic 
process and decisions regarding when or how to disclose should be made 
accordingly (Hodge et al., 2014, Guss, 2014).  
 
The difference between the ideal structure of memory clinics and how doctors 
experience the reality is also evident in what happens after the diagnosis 
feedback. Doctors reported being concerned that patients would not always be 
getting adequate post-diagnosis support. Similar to previous studies, the 
doctors felt comforted if patients were seeing someone within their 
multidisciplinary team after diagnosis (Milby et al., 2015). However, this 
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appeared to be something that was beyond their personal control, which was a 
cause of concern. These descriptions of the contrast between clear diagnostic 
discussions followed by unsatisfactory levels of post-diagnostic support has 
also been reported by patients and their companions (Van Hout et al., 2001), 
and is becoming increasingly recognised in the literature as a key area of 
improvement (Guss, 2014) . 
 
Being “shipped in” to deliver the diagnosis with no input before or after the 
delivery was thus an issue of great importance to the doctors. This occurring 
alongside the increase in memory clinic referrals gave the doctors a sense of 
hopelessness. The inflexibility of the structures of dementia services have been 
criticised in the literature (Gladman et al., 2007), and is a cause of frustration for 
people with dementia and their companions (Peel and Harding, 2014). 
Literature exploring doctor reactions’ to and strategies for breaking bad news to 
patients shows that it is a stressful part of their work, but that one of the key 
coping mechanisms is to be able to provide high quality practical support for 
patients (Shaw et al., 2013). The fact that doctors are unsure if dementia 
patients will be receiving support is therefore likely to add to the already difficult 
task of delivering a dementia diagnosis, and this was reflected in the focus 
groups.  
 
Doctors reported very little dementia-specific training available for clinicians in 
memory clinics. While studies of breaking bad news training show mixed 
responses as to efficacy in improving communication, they appear to 
demonstrate improved perceived self-efficacy for clinicians (Alelwani and 
Ahmed, 2014). Even without formalised training, the opportunity for peer 
support for doctors is likely to help with some of the anxiety surrounding 
dementia diagnosis (Dosanjh et al., 2001). There was discussion among the 
doctors once the groups were over on their enjoyment in talking about their 
work. Some doctors even planned to carry on meeting as a method of 
continued support, which evidences that the chance for reflection and peer 
supervision is something that doctors in memory clinics may be missing.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
To summarise, the focus groups identified specific challenges experienced by 
doctors in delivering dementia diagnoses. The recent change in policy and 
service structure of memory clinics – with the emphasis on increasing diagnosis 
rates – has increased pressure on doctors to make diagnoses. Additionally, 
increased awareness of dementia in the public sphere has led to earlier 
presentations. These two factors can lead to some doctor anxiety as to the 
accuracy of their diagnoses and quality of care. While doctors felt that it was 
important to tell people they have dementia, some reported being careful with 
using the terms “dementia” and “Alzheimer’s disease”, using them strategically. 
Doctors reported varying levels of readiness and expectation of a possible 
diagnosis, and the strategies they used to gauge and deal with this challenge. 
Doctors talked about the importance of instilling hope in patients and their 
families after the diagnosis, through prescribing medication and providing 
positive projections of the benefits of treatment. Some doctors felt concern 
about the services available for people with dementia after diagnosis, and felt 
discomfort and a loss of control when they did not know who would be providing 
the post-diagnosis support. 
 
While doctors were clearly aware of the importance of telling people their 
diagnosis, the stigma and negative impact of the diagnosis appeared to affect 
how they approached the delivery. Downplaying negative aspects of dementia 
and assuming lack of insight raise ethical issues about informed patient choices 
surrounding diagnosis and treatment. The lack of control doctors felt regarding 
their place in the system reflects service issues that may be important to 
address to improve patient experience. 
 
 234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight: 
Discussion 
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The aims of this thesis were to (1) identify how diagnoses of dementia are 
communicated in diagnosis feedback meetings in memory clinics; (2) identify 
how people with dementia respond to diagnosis; and (3) explore the 
perspectives of doctors in communicating dementia diagnoses in memory 
clinics. A systematic literature review of observational studies was conducted to 
identify existing research and themes arising from studies of communication 
between people with dementia and healthcare professionals in outpatient 
settings. Eighty-one video recorded diagnostic feedback interactions in memory 
clinics in London and Devon were micro-analysed using conversation analysis. 
How doctors approach and deliver the diagnosis, as well as how patients 
respond and how these responses were managed, was described. Focus 
groups were held with the same doctors whose diagnosis feedback meetings 
were analysed to provide context from the doctor perspective.  
 
The issues that arose throughout the exploration of dementia diagnosis delivery 
were complex and overlapping. Communication of a diagnosis of dementia was 
affected by the terminal and stigmatised nature of the condition, patient 
cognitive impairment, and changes in dementia awareness and policy. The 
findings raise important questions about dementia diagnostic communication. 
How can a doctor ensure that a person understands they have dementia when 
they are likely to have some level of cognitive impairment? How can diagnostic 
information be delivered both honestly and sensitively? Given the different 
levels of patient awareness of their symptoms, what constitutes a person’s 
understanding of their diagnosis?  
 
The previous chapters explored these questions as they became evident in the 
analysis of the diagnosis interactions. In this chapter these issues will be 
explored in the broader context of dementia as a condition: its status in the 
public sphere and the personal representations of people with dementia and 
their families. Following this, the findings will be discussed in the context of 
conversation analytic (CA) research. Lastly, the implications of the findings for 
dementia diagnosis delivery in practice and memory services will be outlined.  
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Perceptions of dementia and communicating the diagnosis 
Public awareness and the stigma of dementia 
As discussed previously, there has been a dramatic increase in dementia 
awareness, with a variety of initiatives aiming to improve the image of dementia 
and create environments where people with dementia will be supported to live 
independently (Alzheimer's Society, 2013, Donegan et al., 2017). In the UK, 
policies specifically aimed at increasing the number of people receiving 
dementia diagnoses have been successful in accelerating an increase in 
dementia diagnosis rates (Donegan et al., 2017). However, the current study 
highlighted the pressures that these campaigns and policy changes give rise to 
in daily clinical practice. This includes increased risk of making incorrect 
diagnoses and the focus on diagnosis rates over continuity of care causing 
concern about providing adequate support for patients. Additionally, the 
reported benefit of increasing dementia diagnosis rates have been questioned 
in light of the cost of changing services to accommodate these changes and the 
lack of corresponding improvements in post-diagnostic support (Brayne, 2017, 
Evans, 2014, Vince et al., 2017).  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, it was evident in the data that doctors 
were adhering to policy changes surrounding diagnosis and explicitly delivering 
dementia diagnoses to patients. Strategies such as using more direct deliveries 
with people with lower cognitive test scores, taking steps to re-reference the 
evidence and delineate dementia from normal ageing within the delivery, and 
exploring patient perspectives and understanding after the delivery showed 
doctors aiming to enhance patient understanding of their condition. However, 
the stigma of the diagnosis and its resulting negative impact dominated how 
doctors tell people they have dementia, from downplaying the severity of the 
diagnosis, to avoiding prognosis discussions and providing optimistic 
projections of the patients future.  
 
The fact that an increase in dementia awareness has not led to a decrease in 
stigma is not surprising. Peel (2014) conducted a thematic analysis of 
newspaper headlines related to dementia and found a prevalence of 
catastrophising language (e.g. “assault”, “cruel”, “dreaded”), as well as a 
rhetoric of blame concerning ways to prevent dementia through changes in diet 
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and lifestyle. In a critique of dementia awareness campaigns, Swaffer (2014) 
argues that the language surrounding dementia is still negative (e.g. “sufferers”, 
“victims”), and that campaigns rarely take into account the views of people with 
dementia, resulting in initiatives that are more divisive than inclusive.  
 
This stigma of dementia and negative impact of the language surrounding the 
condition provides context for the findings of Chapters 4-7. An example of this is 
related to findings regarding patient orientation to diagnosis feedback. The vast 
majority of the diagnostic feedback meetings contained doctor elicitations of 
patient orientation, and over 60% of the time patients demonstrated some lack 
of orientation. However, as the doctors discussed in the focus groups, there is 
some question as to whether patients are ever adequately oriented to the 
dementia diagnosis before the meeting. The letters inviting patients to their 
appointment (Appendix B) do not mention dementia, and the majority of clinics 
do not offer routine pre-diagnosis counselling to discuss the diagnosis and its 
implications. Doctors even felt that the name “memory clinic” is not helpful, and 
that “dementia assessment clinic” would aid patient expectations. The 
avoidance of explicit discussions of dementia prior to the diagnosis delivery and 
the use of euphemisms (memory clinic, memory problem) is a reflection of this 
stigma.   
 
The language used when discussing dementia has to change in order to reduce 
stigma (Swaffer, 2016), and this is especially important at diagnosis. Clinicians 
have a key role in challenging the stereotypes surrounding clinical conditions 
(Lauber et al., 2004). The current study demonstrates that doctors are 
discussing the diagnosis positively in terms of “living well” and accessing 
medication and support, which is commendable in empowering patients and 
their families in managing the condition. However, the use of generalised 
language and avoidance of specific consequences of dementia suggests an 
underlying anxiety surrounding communication of the diagnosis to patients, 
which also emerged in the focus groups. These are indications of underlying 
beliefs about dementia that have been discussed in studies of GP perceptions 
of the condition, which describe a “perceived lack of reciprocity” of people with 
dementia (Gove et al., 2016). This belief encapsulates the view that people with 
dementia have an impaired ability to reciprocate not only in one-on-one 
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interaction but also in society as a whole, and thus their societal value is 
diminished. This has been described as “therapeutic nihilism”, where doctors do 
not believe that a life with dementia can be a positive one, and this affects their 
communication around the diagnosis (Werner et al., 2013). This reflects what 
Swaffer describes as her experience of dementia diagnosis, which consisted of 
“prescribed disengagement” from society (Swaffer, 2015). This term resulted 
from doctor communication around her diagnosis of dementia, focussing on 
creating wills, making end of life plans, and stopping activities that gave her life 
meaning. She argues that a focus on the limiting aspects of dementia from 
healthcare professionals lowers self-esteem and increases a sense of loss.  
 
As evidenced in the focus group discussions, doctors are aware that they do 
not want to “scare” patients. However, they feel under pressure to cover certain 
topics within diagnosis feedback, including the negative consequences of a 
diagnosis such as stopping driving. There is an importance in discussing the 
these aspects of dementia in order to not set unrealistic expectations for 
patients and their families and encourage adjustment with potential negative 
future experiences (Sabat et al., 2011). However, in order for doctors to play 
their part in decreasing the stigma and negative perceptions surrounding 
dementia, it may be that a different approach to diagnosis needs to be 
considered – one with a balance between encouraging people to not let the 
diagnosis impinge on their sense of self and enjoyment of life and putting in 
place coping mechanisms for when the condition progresses. There is 
increasing literature on the effect of public perceptions and societal stigma on 
people’s personal experiences of dementia (Gorska et al., 2017), but little 
recognition of how this can be positively utilised in clinical practice. The findings 
from this thesis show that these broader negative views of dementia are 
affecting diagnostic communication, and it would be beneficial to address these, 
both on a structural and individual level. 
 
Individual experiences of dementia diagnosis 
The doctor-patient interaction, by its nature, is asymmetrical (Heritage and 
Drew, 1992). This is particularly the case in diagnosis deliveries as medical 
diagnoses are an area where doctors, with their medical training have epistemic 
authority (Heritage, 2012, Maynard and Frankel, 2005). This is salient in 
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conversation analytic (CA) studies in other settings, where patient input in to 
diagnosis discussions has been shown to be minimal compared to other parts 
of the consultation, such as history taking or treatment decision making 
(Maynard, 2003a, Stivers, 2002, Stivers, 2005). The findings in Chapters 6 
show doctors are encouraging patient input into diagnostic discussions, eliciting 
a response to the diagnosis once delivered. While the frequency of these 
behaviours have not been recorded in other studies, it appears that doctors 
delivering dementia diagnoses are doing this more than those delivering 
diagnoses in other settings (Gill and Maynard, 1995, Monzoni and Reuber, 
2015), which as discussed may be a method of gauging engagement in the 
following treatment discussions. However, as the data shows, the input of 
patients is still not extensive, and doctors will move on to treatment discussions 
often without addressing potential concerns or reactions to the diagnosis.  
 
While the process of adapting to diagnosis takes place over time, studies show 
that the dementia diagnostic feedback meeting is a key transition point for 
patients that can influence subsequent wellbeing (Aminzadeh et al., 2007, 
Vernooij-Dassen et al., 2006, Mate et al., 2012, Frank and Forbes, 2017). The 
focus on the methods doctors use to deliver dementia diagnoses has resulted in 
little exploration of the patient’s experience of the dementia diagnosis process 
in the previous 4 chapters, but an examination of this interaction is important to 
begin the discussion of what aspects of this interaction may affect patient 
experience. 
 
Early arguments that dementia diagnosis disclosure would cause extreme 
negative reactions have been disproven, with some studies conversely showing 
a lessening of anxiety after diagnosis (Carpenter et al., 2008, Aminzadeh et al., 
2007). However, the process of recognition and receiving medical help for the 
symptoms of dementia are associated with feelings of uncertainty – often as a 
result of trying to accept change while holding on to how life has been until this 
point (Gorska et al., 2017, Campbell et al., 2016, Robinson et al., 2005). The 
changes brought about by dementia can threaten people’s sense of self and 
challenge social relationships (Mazaheri et al., 2013, Harris, 2008). Experiences 
will vary according to contextual factors such as gender, culture, or social class 
(Mazaheri et al., 2013, Tolhurst and Weicht, 2017, Jones, 2017), and people’s 
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perspectives on their diagnosis will change over time (Vernooij-Dassen et al., 
2006).  
 
Doctors spoke of the importance of naming the diagnosis to patients, but that a 
key aim was to instil a positive outlook, which was also reflected in the data. A 
balance between honesty and hope is how people with dementia and their 
companions report wanting to hear the diagnosis (Mastwyk et al., 2014). 
However, in reality, what people take away from dementia diagnosis delivery is 
more complicated. People with dementia have been shown to have a variety of 
different explanations as to the cause of their illness, from biological 
descriptions about brain changes, to social factors such as retirement or living 
alone, to psychological factors such as low mood (Harman and Clare, 2006, 
Cahill et al., 2008). That doctors approached the diagnoses in a variety of ways 
– framing it in discussions about patient history or cognitive tests or brain scans 
– may contribute to these differing representations. Furthermore, evidence 
shows that while people may not retain the name of their diagnosis, they will 
remember other aspects of diagnostic disclosure (Robinson et al., 2011). For 
example, people with dementia may have stronger reactions to practical 
consequences of the diagnosis, such as having to stop driving or whether they 
will need to move house, than they will to the diagnostic label itself (Lishman et 
al., 2016, Byszewski et al., 2007, Campbell et al., 2016). The attention that 
doctors pay to approaching the diagnostic label, the “little dance” and strategies 
used to maximise understanding, may therefore need to be re-considered in 
relation to what patients take away from diagnosis delivery. Hence, while the 
use of the diagnostic label is important, the communication of the wider context 
surrounding receiving a dementia diagnosis – such as the explanations of the 
testing and the progression – needs to be approached with similar care.  
Evidence shows that doctors hold a belief that patients need to understand and 
accept their diagnosis to achieve a sense of wellbeing (Vince et al., 2017). 
However, it may need to be recognised that this understanding and acceptance 
of having dementia does not necessarily equate to understanding and 
acceptance of the diagnostic label, but a broader knowledge of the impact of 
the condition on daily life. 
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Doctors spoke often of the challenges in communicating with patients when 
they lacked “insight” into their dementia symptoms. Terminology such as 
“insight” can be negative in that it characterises demonstrations of unawareness 
of symptoms as a neurologically based symptom of the dementia, ignoring the 
cognitive and psychosocial factors contributing towards denial as a 
psychological defence mechanism (Clare, 2002). This results in labelling the 
person with dementia with further cognitive impairments above that of their 
memory or concentration problems (Bond et al., 2002). A person receiving a 
dementia diagnosis may be experiencing changes in their behaviour that they 
may feel are shameful or embarrassing, for example forgetting people’s names, 
or making mistakes while driving. The fact that in conversation with doctors 
people may avoid talking about these behaviours, or normalise them as a part 
of ageing, is not surprising given our natural desire to protect our own self-
image in social contexts (Sabat and Harre, 1992, Goffman, 1967). Denial of 
dementia may occur after the diagnosis as much as before, both as a coping 
strategy (Harman and Clare, 2006) and as a cognitive response to the receipt of 
“threatening” information (Christopher and Cheston, 2015). The danger of 
speaking of patient ‘insight’ is that it categorises these face-saving strategies as 
a part of the person’s dementia, and thus a permanent part of their 
psychological state. If patient denial of their symptoms, or reluctance to speak 
of ‘shameful’ aspects of their experiences, is considered instead as part of their 
coping mechanism for their illness, the challenges in communication could be 
overcome with encouraging a safe environment for people to talk about their 
difficulties (Cheston, 2005). 
 
Research shows that personal representations of illness have implications for 
coping and management (Clare et al., 2016), and thus doctors’ explanations of 
the diagnosis on delivery are likely to have similar implications. If doctors are 
withholding certain aspects of the diagnostic information this will cause 
uncertainties in how people view and thus develop strategies to live with the 
condition (Harman and Clare, 2006). An emphasis on the positive aspects of a 
diagnosis can result in people being unable to acknowledge feelings of distress 
or loss, or not accepting a need for change (Bartlett et al., 2017). The analysis 
in Chapters 5 and 6 show specific aspects of the diagnosis delivery that may 
contribute to this – such as downplaying the severity of the diagnosis and 
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avoiding prognosis discussions. While the prognosis of dementia will need to be 
approached sensitively, it is likely that a clearer discussion of the potential 
impacts of dementia will help with feelings of uncertainty. Similar issues have 
been discussed in oncology settings (Maynard et al., 2016, Leydon, 2008). The 
avoidance of prognosis discussions raises ethical issues on the patient’s right to 
know and plan for the future, and these need to be addressed not only in 
dementia, but in the wider medical context (Hancock et al., 2003).    
 
A change in clinical perceptions of people’s experiences of dementia is thus 
integral in improving communication about diagnosis. There is a long tradition of 
psychosocial understandings of dementia, where dementia is defined not in 
medical terms, but in terms rooted in patient experience (Keady and Nolan, 
1995, Sabat, 2001, Clare et al., 2012). Pratt and Wilkinson (2003) describe two 
axes of patient understanding of dementia diagnoses – one representing a 
spectrum of “the desire and ability to know the diagnosis” from high to low and 
one representing the social context of the diagnosis from negative to positive 
(including stigma, support, and medical practices). These axes form 4 
quadrants of patient understanding and experience of diagnosis: detachment 
(low ability and desire to know, negative social context), distress (high ability 
and desire to know, negative social context), maximising coping strategies (high 
ability and desire to know, positive social context), and decline and denial (low 
ability and desire to know, positive social context). The authors give examples 
of how this can aid clinical practice that is suited to individuals – for example if 
someone is experiencing distress from a desire and ability to know their 
diagnosis but a negative social context in having little access to support, clear 
diagnostic information may help their distress. On the other hand, if a person is 
in a state of denial and not interested in knowing the diagnosis, but has a 
positive social context of family and professional support, then in-depth 
diagnosis discussions may be less beneficial. It may be that the use of models 
such as this, that place the patient’s experience central to diagnosis disclosure, 
may enable clinicians to approach diagnosis delivery in a way that is truly timely 
according to the individual with dementia.  
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Contribution to Conversation Analysis Research 
 
In CA studies of medical interaction, diagnosis delivery has not been as 
extensively studied as other aspects of medical communication such as 
treatment recommendations and problem presentations (Sidnell and Stivers, 
2013). Where it has been studied, the majority of the settings were in primary 
care, where the conditions are usually less complex, and issues affecting the 
communication, such as patient accounting for visiting the doctor and the 
conduct of physical examinations, are different from secondary care settings. 
There has been extensive study by Maynard and colleagues (Gill and Maynard, 
1995, Maynard, 2006, Maynard, 2004, Maynard, 2003a, Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2016) in developmental disabilities settings, as well as studies in 
oncology (Leydon, 2008, Maynard, 2006), neurology (Monzoni and Reuber, 
2015, Monzoni et al., 2011b) and psychotherapy (Peräkylä, 2011), which 
suggest many parallels with the current findings. These will now be discussed, 
followed by a discussion of intersubjectivity in dementia diagnosis interactions. 
 
Comparison of dementia diagnosis delivery with diagnosis delivery other 
settings 
These studies show that there are many similarities between how doctors 
deliver and how patients respond to diagnosis across different settings, 
providing evidence of the ‘norms’ of diagnostic interaction that characterise 
delivery of a medical diagnosis.  
 
As discussed above, there may be many overlapping reasons why patients 
receiving dementia diagnoses resist doctor formulations of their symptoms that 
are the same as other conditions, i.e., stigma, denial, and a desire to save face. 
Doctor epistemic authority is threatened by patients who are misaligned to the 
purpose of the diagnostic meeting and/or the doctor’s formulation of their 
symptoms. However, when there was misalignment, patients still showed 
adherence to the doctor’s authority: commonly presenting examples of where 
they are functioning well and thus indirectly contradicting the doctor’s 
formulation rather than explicitly disagreeing (“I remember an awful lot of things” 
extract 11 Chapter 4). This is similar to how resistance occurs in other 
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diagnostic settings, where patients provide further information after diagnosis 
that is contrary to the diagnosis being delivered (Maynard, 2004, Stivers, 2005, 
Peräkylä, 2002).  
 
The delicacy that has been described in other breaking bad news interactions is 
evident in dementia diagnosis feedback (Maynard, 2003). The terminal and 
stigmatised nature of a dementia diagnosis meant that it was approached with 
delicacy with evidence of qualification and mitigation, as well as optimistic 
projections and avoidance of prognosis discussion. There was however also 
evidence of doctors approaching the diagnosis directly in order to maximise 
understanding in the face of cognitive impairment. Inferential diagnosis 
deliveries (“this is dementia”) were most common, as described in other settings 
(Maynard, 2003b, Monzoni and Reuber, 2015). However, that doctors used 
direct deliveries (“you have dementia”) more often with people with lower 
cognitive test scores indicated that in some cases doctors prioritised clarity over 
sensitivity in telling people their diagnosis.  
 
What has also been described in other settings, but may be particularly relevant 
to memory clinics, is doctors displaying accountability for their knowledge about 
the patient. As described in Chapter 4, challenges can arise if the doctor 
demonstrates claims to knowledge without accounting for that knowledge (“so 
your memory problems started 9 months ago?” Extract 9) when that information 
came from the patient’s family rather than the patient themselves (“I never said 
that!” Extract 9). Additionally, doctors displayed evidence from the testing to 
account for diagnoses, which has been described in other settings as 
particularly common when the testing process is “opaque” to patients (Peräkylä, 
1998). This is particularly the case in dementia, where there are multiple tests 
and sources of information before clinicians make a diagnostic decision. That 
doctors often repeated evidence from the testing or rationale for diagnosis in 
the pre-diagnosis location provided further accountability for the diagnosis. That 
this was so frequent in the current data could be a method for doctors to retain 
accountability when patients may have not been able to hold the information in 
working memory. However, the repetition of previously fed back test results in 
the diagnosis sequence has not been systematically described in other settings. 
Hence, no clear conclusion can be drawn as to whether this is a strategy to 
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combat potential memory problems or whether this is a feature of diagnosis 
feedback more generally. 
 
Initial responses to the diagnosis were similar to that reported in other settings 
(Heath, 1992, Peräkylä, 2005, Maynard, 2003a). The majority of patients 
responded minimally, i.e., with minimal acknowledgement tokens (mhm), non-
verbal gestures such as nodding, or with no verbal or non-verbal reaction. 
However, doctors pursued patient extended responses to the diagnosis delivery 
more than has been reported in other settings, particularly in primary care 
where patient responses are very rarely oriented to as important. This enabled 
a study of the relation between initial responses and responses after pursuit: 
this demonstrated that minimal responses marked by stress or intonation were 
more likely to lead to extended, often resistant, responses later in the meeting. 
Additionally, those who later showed resistance had initially responded 
displaying disinclination to continue the discussion, demonstrating the 
importance of stoicism in the interaction. While these patterns have been 
analysed in the CA literature (Maynard, 2003a, Heritage, 2009), it has not 
before been examined quantitatively. It appeared that eliciting the patient’s 
perspective was sufficient for the progression of the meeting, and that achieving 
understanding was not a key objective in these meetings. This is similar to other 
settings where diagnoses may be contentious, such as neurology and 
developmental disabilities (Maynard, 2004, Monzoni et al., 2011b). 
 
Intersubjectivity in dementia diagnostic interactions 
 
Intersubjectivity concerns how participants in interactions aim to negotiate and 
maintain a mutual understanding of their “intentions, their state of knowledge, 
their relation, and their stance towards the talked-about objects” (Peräkyla, 
2007, p1). CA examines intersubjectivity in how speakers display understanding 
of each other’s talk within the structures of interaction. As a simple 
demonstration, a current utterance displays an understanding of a prior 
utterance: if an utterance is hearable as an answer, this demonstrates the 
speaker’s understanding of the previous turn as a question. Hence, a 
misunderstanding of the previous turn can cause the original speaker to re-state 
his turn or pursue the appropriate response in order to ensure a mutual 
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understanding (Sacks et al., 1974). Studies of interaction where one person has 
dementia in the later stages demonstrate a particular challenge for 
intersubjectivity due to potential impacts of dementia on memory, attention, and 
language processing, as well as a lack of flexibility in the person without 
dementia to alter their communication (Jones, 2013, Müller and Guendouzi, 
2005). 
 
The findings of this thesis relate to intersubjectivity in dementia diagnosis 
feedback interactions. The data presented in Chapter 4 indicated that there was 
often misalignment in doctor and patient perceptions of the purpose of the 
meeting. This became evident because doctors, implicitly or explicitly, took 
steps to gauge patient perspectives as to the purpose of the meeting and their 
experience of their symptoms – thus displaying an aim to achieve 
intersubjective understanding. When misalignment did occur, doctors 
implemented practices to negotiate and come to an agreement regarding the 
dementia diagnosis. As discussed above, many of these practices were the 
same or similar to practices used in other interactional settings: building 
diagnoses from the patient’s perspectives, delivering the diagnosis through 
inference, and pursuing a response (Turowetz, 2015, Maynard, 2003a, Monzoni 
and Reuber, 2014).  
 
However, over half of patient responses to diagnosis even after pursuit were 
either explicitly resistant, or were minimal or topic-shifting indicating passive 
resistance (Stivers, 2005). Hence, patient expression of agreement with the 
diagnosis was more often not achieved than achieved within the diagnosis 
feedback meeting. As discussed in Chapter 6, this remaining misalignment did 
not affect the successful progression of the interaction from diagnosis to 
treatment discussions. What this suggests from a CA perspective is that 
intersubjectivity within the diagnosis delivery and receipt does not reflect explicit 
agreement or acknowledgement on the part of the patient. This adds to 
previous arguments that patients do not see the primary purpose of medical 
examinations to be diagnosis, but instead are primarily oriented to accessing 
desired treatment (Robinson, 2003b, Stivers, 2002). Research on the 
implications of not reaching intersubjective understanding on the nature of 
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dementia regarding potential resistance to treatment and support would develop 
this further.  
 
Implication for Practice and Services 
 
In the mid 1990s Keady was arguing for dementia services to be structured 
according the needs and experiences of the person with dementia (Keady, 
1995). However, reflecting on the findings from Chapters 4-6 in the light of 
research demonstrating the complex experience of dementia diagnosis on 
individuals, it appears that, despite 20 years passing, there are still barriers to 
person-centred care that appear to be at least partially caused by service 
structure. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the current clinical guidance for memory clinics 
provides very little detail on how to communicate dementia diagnoses. The 
most specific guidance is from the British Psychological Society (Murphy and 
Gair, 2016), which emphasises checking patient preferences and 
understanding, using diagnostic terms, and allowing time for patients to process 
diagnostic information. While it is important to highlight these points, the 
guidance does not offer further instruction in terms of how these communication 
practices can be achieved, given the busy clinical context and complexities of 
interacting both with people with dementia and their families.  
 
This thesis did not aim to identify best practice in that it did not systematically 
examine the effects of different interactional practices on patient outcomes. 
However, there are challenges identified in the communication of dementia 
diagnoses that may have implications for practice and services: 
 
1. Doctors and patients meeting for the first time in diagnosis feedback: one of 
the key challenges reported by doctors was trying to identify the needs and 
expectations of patients (and their companions) when they had not met 
previously. This was also evident in the data, with doctors eliciting 
orientation to the purpose of the meeting and perception of symptoms in 
order to approach the diagnosis according to the person’s expectations. 
Meeting for the first time also caused doctor concern about diagnostic 
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accuracy, with some doctors feeling uncomfortable with using reports from 
other clinicians to make diagnoses of early stage dementia. While systems 
such as in Site A where the testing and feedback on the same day might be 
convenient for doctors and patients, the resulting lack of established 
relationship between the doctor and patient could be causing barriers to 
diagnostic decision making and communication. Studies also suggest that 
patients and families prefer hearing dementia diagnoses from a professional 
who they have a relationship with, regardless if they have dementia-specific 
expertise (Robinson et al., 2011, Keady et al., 2005). 
 
2. A lack of pre-diagnostic counselling: Doctors reported that they were not 
always sure if patients knew they were being investigated for possible 
dementia when they started the memory clinic process. Guidelines highlight 
the importance of pre-diagnostic counselling in dementia diagnosis (Hodge 
et al., 2014, Guss, 2014), but in this study of 9 memory clinics only one had 
systematic pre-diagnosis meetings in place. That over 60% of people 
attending the clinic showed some confusion as to the purpose of the 
meeting is likely to be compounded by the lack of explanation prior to the 
diagnosis meeting in addition to memory difficulties and disorientation. 
Patients report being unaware that they have been referred for assessment 
and finding the testing process a ‘labyrinth’ without clear explanations from 
professionals (Samsi et al., 2014, Cahill et al., 2008). If doctors know that 
patients have received clear explanations of what to expect, then they may 
not have to undertake this ‘little dance’ when it comes to the communication. 
Additionally, expectation may mitigate difficult reactions to the diagnosis or 
its life-altering consequences, such as cessation of driving.  
 
3. Confusion in test feedback: The data presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated 
that, while doctors used test results to successfully forecast the diagnosis to 
come, there could often be some confusion in their communication. It was 
evident that explanations of the test were causing misunderstandings in the 
diagnostic feedback (e.g. extract 5 in Chapter 6 where the tests were 
described as “not too bad” but the patient received a diagnosis), and this 
has also been reported in studies of patient experience of receiving 
feedback from assessments (Keady and Gilliard, 2002). If clear explanations 
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are given of the purpose of each test as it is being conducted, and doctors 
report the results with clear assessments as to their meaning for diagnosis, 
then this might remove some of the uncertainty and misunderstanding that 
this leads to.  
 
4. Minimising or avoiding negative aspects of diagnosis: Doctors emphasised 
that instilling hope was an important consideration in the diagnosis delivery 
(“I want them to understand but not too much” H21). This was evident in the 
video recordings, with doctors shifting the diagnosis discussion to treatment 
and support discussions by giving the diagnosis a positive slant. This has 
also been discussed in the literature (and the systematic review in Chapter 
2): debating whether honesty is the best policy in communicating with 
people with dementia, or whether the facts of the matter may cause too 
much unnecessary distress (Lindholm, 2015, Dooley et al., 2015). However, 
given that there are also concerns about a lack of post-diagnostic support, it 
may be that avoidance of the negative aspects of dementia will result in the 
patient never having a chance to talk about the prognosis, or process the 
potential anxieties about the diagnosis, with a healthcare professional. This 
may result in misunderstandings and cause particular challenges as 
dementia progresses (Stokes et al., 2014, Read et al., 2016). 
 
5. Misaligned doctor and patient agendas: Doctors raised the important point 
that it is difficult to discuss the diagnosis and prognosis in too much detail 
given the pressing medical agenda in the diagnostic feedback meeting. 
They describe having to cover certain topics in diagnosis feedback, such as 
medication, power of attorney, and driving. It was evident from the data that 
patients also have their own concerns that are on their agenda to discuss 
with the doctor, for example bringing up their medication (P150_H41), or 
shifting the topic to physical health conditions immediately after diagnosis. 
Patients report being disappointed with receiving a dementia diagnosis as 
the outcome differs from potential expectations of receiving support or 
treatment (Karnieli-Miller, 2012): this is also an issue that could be 
addressed in pre-diagnostic counselling. Additionally, while it was clear that 
doctors had clear agendas in terms of what they wanted to discuss with 
patients, it may be that flexibility in what has to be covered in diagnosis 
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feedback and what could be covered in later meetings could alleviate some 
of the time pressure surrounding communication of the diagnosis.   
 
6. The availability and quality of post-diagnostic support: While all of the 
memory clinics in the study had systems of post-diagnostic support – such 
as meetings with dementia practitioners or support workers, or referrals to 
cognitive stimulation therapy – there was little consistency. Doctors 
expressed concern as to the quality of support given, and were relieved 
when they knew patients would be staying within their clinical teams and 
they could follow them up personally if needed. Again, guidelines highlight 
the importance of post-diagnosis support (Hodge et al., 2014, Guss, 2014). 
Patients and their families report only starting to consider practical 
implications and needs in the months after receiving a diagnosis (Campbell 
et al., 2016), highlighting the importance of post-diagnosis support for 
people in adjusting to the diagnosis and condition. If systematic, 
personalised post-diagnostic support is given, with continuity from diagnosis 
feedback in terms of clinicians and information provided, then there may be 
less institutional pressure to cover certain topics in the diagnosis feedback 
meeting. This could facilitate more space to explore perspectives and 
understanding of diagnosis and prognosis, thereby allowing patients and 
companions an opportunity to process this life-changing turning point in the 
dementia journey.  
 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
Strengths and Limitations 
The strength of this thesis is the combination of a large dataset and detailed 
microanalysis of dementia diagnosis interactions. The use of data collected 
across 4 NHS trusts, with 20 doctors and 81 patients, allowed enough variation 
in doctor communication style and patient characteristics to identify systematic 
patterns in how dementia diagnoses are delivered. Conversation analysis, a 
well-established, rigorous method to analyse communication, enabled a 
detailed, inductive description of the practices used by doctors and patients as 
they approach and manage the challenges surrounding dementia diagnosis. 
The systematic review of the existing literature examining communication 
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between clinicians and people with dementia in outpatient settings and the 
findings from the focus groups with the doctors provided a wider context for the 
CA descriptions of the interactions.  
 
The main limitation of this thesis is the lack of detailed study of the role of the 
patient’s companion in the meeting. The difficulty in managing the patient’s 
needs alongside their companion’s was a topic highlighted in both the 
systematic review and the focus group study. Although companions played a 
larger role in the later stages of the meeting than the diagnosis delivery, a study 
of how and when companions become recruited for participation in the 
diagnosis delivery would have been a useful complement. However, the 
rigorous and time-consuming nature of the in depth qualitative data analysis, 
alongside the large number of diagnostic meetings analysed, meant that only 
certain aspects of the diagnostic interaction were within the scope of this thesis.  
 
The second main limitation of this thesis is the lack of focus on the patient 
perspective. Given the research questions focus on how doctors deliver a 
diagnosis of dementia, doctors’ perspectives were explored. Ideally patients’ 
and companions’ perspectives would have complemented the video data and 
focus groups with doctors, but this was beyond the scope of this PhD study. 
 
A central assumption of CA is that the meaning of talk is contained within that 
which is displayed to participants in the context of systematic interactional 
structures. Within this thesis meaning was therefore taken from within the 
analysis of the talk, and was approached without reference to other potential 
outcomes such as measures of patient and companion satisfaction or 
experience. Additionally, CA seeks to describe patterns of particular actions 
having particular consequences within interaction. Hence, there was no 
labelling of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ practice in the communication of dementia 
diagnoses, which could be considered a limitation of the thesis. Further 
research using perspectives of people with dementia, their companions, and 
professionals, alongside further work examining diagnosis delivery practices will 
be needed to start making conclusions about best practice.  
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Doctors knew that they were being video recorded. In recruitment discussions 
researchers described the study as having a focus on doctor-patient 
communication. Doctors will perhaps have been more aware of their 
communication than if they were not recorded. Patients and companions were 
also aware they were being filmed and their communication was being 
analysed, which may have affected their behaviour in the consultation. 
 
In terms of the validity and generalisability of the study, the literature review 
followed a systematic approach, with multiple reviewers ensuring a rigorous 
search and analysis of the available literature. Additionally, the focus group 
analysis was rigorously conducted within the research group, and inter-rater 
reliability in coding the data was high. Conversation analysis methodology was 
followed, with the next turn-proof procedure, repeated analysis in data sessions, 
and explorations of deviant cases ensuring a transparent and rigorous analytic 
process.  
 
Future Research 
The findings of this study are relevant to the recent government policies 
encouraging early and timely diagnoses, and the utility of disclosing a diagnosis 
of dementia. The primary reason for the push to increase diagnostic rates at the 
early stages of dementia is to encourage future planning at the earliest stage 
possible: for doctors to ensure that patients have power of attorney, wills, and 
advance care plans in place while they still have capacity. However, this study 
has highlighted the difficulty in telling people they have dementia and thus will 
need to make plans for when they will no longer be able to make decisions, but 
also ensuring that people live well despite their diagnosis. This is compounded 
by the variety of awareness and acceptance of symptoms of people in early 
stage dementia, which means companions often will have been more pro-active 
in seeking help. The analysis of diagnostic interactions demonstrates that for 
most doctors working currently in memory clinics, despite the change of policy 
to increase diagnoses, a key concern is to ensure that patients leave meetings 
with a positive future outlook.  
 
Future research needs to address this dilemma. An important question is 
whether patients not explicitly accepting the diagnosis, or doctor avoidance of 
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prognosis, have an effect on whether patients agree to and engage in treatment 
and support. Previous research has shown that diagnosis discussions are 
predominantly focused on progressing to treatment discussions (Robinson, 
2003a), and thus the fact that doctors do not pursue agreement with the 
diagnosis might indicate this it is not necessary to discuss treatment effectively. 
However, a detailed analysis of how patients display awareness of symptoms 
and understanding of diagnosis pertain to the later stages of the meeting, and 
to post-diagnostic meetings, and would be an important development of this 
work. 
 
Additionally, given that the role of the companion and the difficulty of triadic 
meetings have been highlighted in the literature, the role of the patient’s family 
members and friends in the diagnostic interaction would be an interesting topic 
for future study. As noted above, the findings from the review indicate that the 
input of the companion is likely to have an impact on how people with dementia 
are involved in diagnosis discussions and treatment decisions. As this triadic 
communication has been identified as a challenge for clinicians, it would be 
important to identify how doctors are currently managing this in memory clinics, 
in order to inform future research and guidelines.  
 
Another interesting and important area for future research would be the 
examination of how different diagnoses are delivered in the memory clinic. As 
touched upon in the introduction, people can leave memory clinics with 
diagnoses of functional memory problems, mild cognitive impairment (MCI), as 
well as no diagnosis. There is some evidence that the push for increased 
diagnosis rates has led to an increase in the “worried well” attending memory 
clinics, and that this is a challenge for clinicians (Blackburn et al., 2014). MCI 
has also been identified as an ill-defined and complicated diagnosis to make – 
with a lack of clarity as to whether it is a step between normal ageing and 
dementia, or a condition in its own right. Additionally, CA studies of people who 
receive no diagnosis from diagnostic meetings have reported a “symptom 
residue” – i.e. patient concerns that have not been addressed (Maynard and 
Frankel, 2005, :251). An examination of how doctors address these challenges 
in communicating non-dementia diagnoses to people attending the memory 
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clinic, and a comparison with the delivery of dementia diagnoses, would be an 
important topic for future research. 
 
Future research could also examine diagnostic deliveries with a focus on 
differences according to dementia subtype and participant characteristics. While 
there was not a clear difference in the cases where patients had lower cognitive 
test scores (except in the direct or inferential deliveries) or ages in this sample, 
these patients were not in the majority. For example, there was only one patient 
under the age of 65 in the sample, and further observation of the delivery of 
young onset dementia diagnoses may show some important differences. 
Furthermore, there was a lack of ethnic diversity between the patient and 
companions recruited to this study. Diagnosis delivery may be different, and 
more challenging, with people from non-Western cultures who may have 
different awareness of dementia. The issues that arose in the analysis of the 
diagnosis discussions may have had different consequences in interactions with 
people with different backgrounds, and this would be interesting to explore in 
future research. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
A dramatic shift in policy emphasising an individual’s right to know their 
diagnosis and plan for their future has led to diagnosis rates increasing rapidly. 
Receiving a diagnosis of dementia enables people to have access to support, 
as well as giving them and their families a medical explanation for symptoms. 
This in-depth analysis of doctor communication of dementia diagnoses 
demonstrated the dilemma of diagnosis delivery. While doctors were observed 
to use practices to enhance patient understanding, these were counterbalanced 
by an emphasis on positive outcomes and a downplaying of prognosis that may 
preclude understanding. This reflected an aim to ensure patients are fully 
informed of their diagnosis while also maintaining an optimistic outlook. 
However, this was compounded by the challenge of gauging patient 
expectations and perspectives in the context of meeting them for the first time.  
 
An important factor in the delivery and receipt of a dementia diagnosis is that it 
is a process. A dementia diagnosis is something that will take time to 
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understand, both for the person with dementia and their companions. The 
diagnosis delivery is a stage in the journey that starts with a recognition of 
symptoms and continues to the acceptance of help and support. Dementia 
services should reflect this journey, with appropriate support and information 
available at different stages of the condition. While there has been much focus 
on ensuring that everyone who has dementia is told their diagnosis, it is equally 
as important to ensure that support is in place in the weeks, months and years 
after a person receives a diagnosis of dementia. 
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Appendix A: Quality Assessment Tool: Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme (CASP) 
Qualitative Research Checklist 
**Answer all questions either YES, NO, or CANNOT TELL 
 
Screening Questions: 
(If either are a “no” then do not continue)  
1. Was there a clear statement of the aims of the research? Consider: 
• What the goal of the research was. 
• Why is it important? 
• Its relevance. 
 
2. Is a qualitative methodology appropriate? Consider: 
• If the research seeks to interpret or illuminate the actions and/or subjective 
experiences of research participants. 
 
Detailed Questions: 
3. Was the research design appropriate to address the aims of the 
research? Consider: 
• If the researcher has justified the research design (e.g. have the discussed 
how they decided which method to use)? 
 
4. Was the recruitment strategy appropriate to the aims of the research? 
Consider: 
• If the researcher has explained how the participants were selected.  
• If the data has given clear descriptions of number of eligible patients, 
patients approached and those consented.  
• If they explained why the participants they selected were the most 
appropriate to provide access to the type of knowledge sought be the study.  
• If there are any discussions around recruitment (e.g. why some people 
chose not to take part).  
 
5. Were the data collected in a way that addressed the research issue? 
Consider: 
• If the setting for the data collection was justified.  
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• If it is clear how data were collected (e.g. focus group, semi-structured 
interview etc.)  
• If the researcher has justified the methods chosen.  
• If the research has made the methods explicit (e.g. for interview method, is 
there an indication of how interviews were conducted, or did they use a 
topic guide)?  
• If methods were modified during the study. If so, has the researcher 
explained how and why? 
• If the form of data is clear (e.g. tape recordings, video material, notes etc.)  
• If the researcher has discussed saturation of data.  
 
6. Has the relationship between researcher and participants been 
adequately considered? Consider: 
• If the researcher critically examined their own role, potential bias and 
influence during: 
o Formulation of the research questions.  
o Data collection, including sample recruitment and choice of location.  
• How the researcher responded to events during the study and whether they 
considered the implications of any changes in the research design. 
 
7. Have ethical issues been taken into consideration? Consider: 
• If there are sufficient details of how the research was explained to 
participants for the reader to assess whether ethical standards were 
maintained.  
• If the researcher has discussed issues raised by the study (e.g. issues 
around informed consent or confidentiality or how they have handled the 
effects on the study participants during and after the study)  
• If approval has been sought from the ethics committee.  
 
8. Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? Consider: 
• If there is an in-depth description of the analysis process.  
• If thematic analysis is used. If so, is it clear how the categories/themes were 
derived from the data?  
• Whether the researcher explains how the data presented were selected 
from the original sample to demonstrate the analysis process.  
• If sufficient data are presented to support the findings.  
• To what extent contradictory data are taken into account.  
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• Whether the researcher critically examined their own role, potential bias and 
influence during analysis and selection of data for presentation.  
 
9. Is there a clear statement of findings? Consider: 
• If findings are explicit.  
• If there is adequate discussion of the evidence both for and against the 
researcher’s arguments.  
• If the researcher has discussed the credibility of their findings (e.g. 
triangulation, respondent validation, more than one analyst).  
• If the findings are discussed in relation to the original research question.  
 
10.  How valuable is the research? Consider: 
• If the researcher discusses the contribution the study makes to existing 
knowledge or understanding, e.g. do they consider the findings in relation to 
current practice of policy, or relevant research-based literature?  
• If they identify new areas where research is necessary.  
• If they identify any limitations to the study. Do identify further areas but 
limitations not described in overt detail.  
• If the researchers have discussed whether or how the findings can be 
transferred to other populations or considered other ways the research may 
be used.  
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Appendix B: Examples of Memory Clinic Appointment Letters 
 
Site A: 
 
(Site A) Early Assessment Clinic 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs (name), 
 
Referral to the (Site A) Clinic 
 
Further to your recent appointment with your GP we have received a referral for 
you to visit us at our Memory Clinic. 
 
The purpose of the Memory Clinic is to assist people in (Site A) who may have 
problems with memory.  Later, when we have a clear understanding of your 
circumstances we may be able to advise you on ways of helping with the 
memory difficulties.  
 
It is important for another person who knows you well to come along with 
you to your assessment.  A member of our team will spend time talking 
with them to get their perspective and views of your potential memory 
problem. 
 
Your appointment will start with a CT scan in the hospital’s radiology 
department at (Site A), followed by a memory assessment in the clinic. 
 
CT (Computerised Tomography) is an x-ray scan that creates a series of 
images showing cross sections through the head or body.  During the scan you 
will be asked to lie on the scanner and remain very still (movement will blur the 
images).  The scan does not hurt nor have unpleasant side effects.  The whole 
procedure commonly takes approximately 10 minutes.  
 
Your CT scan appointment details are as follows. Following the scan, a member 
of the team will direct you to the Memory Clinic which is based at Medical 
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Outpatients South (Site A). During the assessment you will see members of the 
medical, nursing and psychology teams. 
 
Date of Appointments: Date 
 
1. Scan Appointment  
Time of Appointment: 09:00AM 
(If possible please arrive 15 minutes before your appointment time.)  
 
Location: (Address) 
 
2. Memory Clinic Appointment  
 
Time of Appointment: 09:30am 
Location: (Address) 
 
The entire assessment will last approximately between 2½ or 3 ½ hours.   
 
You and the person supporting you with this appointment will meet with different 
team members to ensure we get a full understanding of the issues you are 
experiencing from both perspectives. The details of this will be explained to you 
both when you arrive at the clinic. 
 
On the day: 
 
Please bring with you a list of any medication that you are currently 
taking. 
 
Please bring this letter to your appointment. 
 
If you wear glasses for reading, or a hearing aid, please bring them with 
you.   
         
Anything you discuss and disclose during your appointment is confidential, 
although we are required to send a written report to your GP.   
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Parking arrangements 
 
There is a pay and display car park at the Hospital.  Alternatively, we are able to 
give you a parking permit for the (name) site from where you can walk through 
the grounds to the (name) site. If you would like a parking permit please 
telephone our office at least one week before your appointment and we can 
arrange for one to be issued.  
 
Should you need to cancel or change this appointment, please telephone the 
clinic as soon as possible on 01392 406103 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
(name) 
Memory Clinic Administrator 
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Site B: 
 
Services for Ageing and Mental Health 
 
Dear (name), 
 
An appointment has been made for you to see Dr (name).   
ON: DATE at TIME 
 
AT: CLINIC ADDRESS 
 
Please let me know on the above telephone number if you cannot attend 
this appointment as soon as possible so we are able to offer the slot to 
another patient.  If you wish to contact me on the morning of the appointment 
only, the telephone number for the day hospital is (number).  At any other time I 
can be contacted on the number at the top of the page. 
 
The nearest buses are (address), the (address), or the (address). Please give 
me a ring if you need further directions. 
  
We teach (university) medical students. When you attend the clinic you may be 
asked if you mind having medical students sit in on your appointment.  If you 
are attending for the first time you may also be asked if you will talk to medical 
students first and if you agree they will ask you about your current problems 
and about your past, and they will tell a senior doctor what you have told them 
who will then also see you. If you don’t want medical students to sit in on your 
appointment or for them to see you, please tell either the receptionist or the 
doctor either when you arrive at the appointment, when approached or you can 
also ring in advance. 
 
Please bring a list of all current medication. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
(name) Team Secretary 
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Appendix C: Jeffersonian Transcription Notation 
(Maynard and Frankel, 2005, :251) 
 
Symbol Meaning 
[ text ] Indicates the start and end points of overlapping 
speech. 
= No discernible pause between two speakers' turns or, 
if put between two sounds within a single speaker's 
turn, shows that they run together 
(No of 
seconds) 
A number in parentheses indicates the time, in 
seconds, of a pause in speech. 
(.) A brief pause, usually less than 0.2 seconds. 
. or ↓ Indicates falling pitch. 
? or ↑ Indicates rising pitch. 
, Indicates a slight rise in intonation. 
¿ Indicates a rise in intonation, more than a , but less 
than ? 
- Indicates an abrupt halt or interruption in utterance. 
>text< Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered 
more rapidly than usual for the speaker. 
<text> Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered 
more slowly than usual for the speaker. 
° Indicates whisper or reduced volume speech. 
ALL CAPS Indicates shouted or increased volume speech. 
underline Indicates the speaker is emphasizing or stressing the 
speech. 
::: Indicates prolongation of an utterance. 
£text£ Smiling heard in tone of voice 
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hh Audible exhalation 
.hh  Audible inhalation 
wo(h)rd Word with laughter ‘bubbling’ in it 
( text ) Speech which is unclear or in doubt in the transcript. 
( italic text ) Annotation of non-verbal activity. 
 266 
 
  
 267 
Appendix D: Results from Statistical Analysis in Chapter 5 
 
1. Relationship between ACE cognitive test score and Minimising the Diagnosis Severity (use of terms “mild” or “early”) 
 
Group Statistics 
 Downgrade 
Severity N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
ACE score No 40 67.68 13.392 2.118 
Yes 25 68.68 14.314 2.863 
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Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
ACE-III 
score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.072 .790 -.287 63 .775 -1.005 3.506 -8.011 6.001 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -.282 48.509 .779 -1.005 3.561 -8.163 6.153 
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2. Relationship between ACE cognitive test scores and Diagnosis Format 
 
Group Statistics 
 Direct or Inferential 
Diagnostic Format N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
ACE-III 
score 
Through Inference 40 70.78 13.306 2.104 
Direct 25 63.72 13.318 2.664 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
ACE-III 
score 
Equal variances 
assumed .305 .583 2.079 63 .042 7.055 3.394 .273 13.837 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.078 51.057 .043 7.055 3.394 .241 13.869 
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Appendix E: Results from Statistical Analysis in Chapter Six 
 
1. Relationship between Dementia Type and Initial Response 
 
Crosstab 
Count   
 
No/Minimal or Extended 
Initial Response 
Total No/Minimal  Extended  
Dementia 
Type 
Alzheimer's 
disease 30 15 45 
Mixed 11 3 14 
Vascular 11 1 12 
Lewy Body 1 2 3 
Dementia 
Unspecified 2 1 3 
Parkinson's 2 0 2 
Alcohol 
Related 1 0 1 
Semantic 
dementia 1 0 1 
Total 59 22 81 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
7.165a 7 .412 .428   
Likelihood 
Ratio 8.389 7 .300 .427   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 6.884   .398   
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
1.397b 1 .237 .262 .136 .036 
N of Valid 
Cases 81      
a. 12 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. The standardized statistic is -1.182. 
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2. Relationship between Delivery Format and Initial Response 
 
Crosstab 
Count   
 
No/Minimal or Extended 
Initial Response 
Total No/Minimal Extended  
Direct or Not 
Direct 
Diagnostic 
Format 
Not 
Direct 39 9 48 
Direct 20 13 33 
Total 59 22 81 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
4.213a 1 .040 .047 .037  
Continuity 
Correctionb 3.234 1 .072    
Likelihood 
Ratio 4.167 1 .041 .074 .037  
Fisher's Exact 
Test    .047 .037  
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
4.161c 1 .041 .047 .037 .026 
N of Valid 
Cases 81      
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.96. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 2.040. 
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3. Relationship between ACE cognitive test score and Initial Response 
 
Group Statistics 
 No/minimal or 
Extended Initial 
Response N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
ACE score None/Minimal 45 71.42 12.580 1.875 
Extended r 20 60.50 13.205 2.953 
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Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
ACE 
score 
Equal variances 
assumed .004 .948 3.182 63 .002 10.922 3.432 4.063 17.781 
Equal variances 
not assumed   3.123 34.963 .004 10.922 3.498 3.821 18.024 
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4. Relationship between Asking Question (Understanding Check (UC) or Perspective Question (PQ)) or only Elaborating 
Information and Patient Later Response 
 
Crosstab 
Count   
 
No/minimal or Extended 
Later Response 
Total No/Minimal Extended 
Just Elab Info 
or UC/PQ 
No Pursuit 3 0 3 
Just 
Elaboration 14 20 34 
PQ or UC 12 32 44 
Total 29 52 81 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-
Square 7.199
a 2 .027 .022   
Likelihood 
Ratio 8.035 2 .018 .018   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 6.497   .026   
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
5.280b 1 .022 .026 .018 .012 
N of Valid 
Cases 81      
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07. 
b. The standardized statistic is 2.298. 
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5. Relationship between Initial and Later Response Type 
 
Crosstab 
Count   
 
Response to Diagnosis after pursuit 
Total None/Minimal 
Question or 
Statement Negative  Resistant  Off Topic  
Initial Response None 4 2 0 3 1 10 
Non-verbal 11 4 4 1 0 20 
Minimal 
continuer 4 2 2 2 1 11 
Marked “mm” 2 2 0 5 0 9 
“Yeah” 3 3 0 2 1 9 
News receipt or 
Change of state 2 5 4 0 0 11 
Question 1 2 0 0 0 3 
Negative 2 4 2 0 0 8 
Total 29 24 12 13 3 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 279 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) Monte Carlo Sig. (1-sided) 
Significance 
99% Confidence Interval 
Significance 
99% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Pearson Chi-
Square 38.345
a 28 .092 .081b .074 .088    
Likelihood Ratio 42.540 28 .039 .066b .060 .072    
Fisher's Exact 
Test 33.191   .071
b .064 .078    
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .016
c 1 .899 .918b .911 .925 .462b .449 .475 
N of Valid Cases 81         
a. 38 cells (95.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .11. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341. 
c. The standardized statistic is -.126. 
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Appendix F: Focus Group Topic Guide 
 
Broad themes: 
1. Communication of a diagnosis 
2. Decision making 
3. Making complicated/difficult decisions together and MCA 
4. Scenarios 
 
Pre-diagnosis 
1. How do you weigh the evidence in reaching a diagnosis (memory tests, 
scan, patient/carer interviews)? 
 
Communication of a diagnosis: (30mins) 
 
1. What needs to be discussed in the diagnostic feedback session? 
 
2. How do you make decisions about disclosure of diagnostic information?  
a. How do you decide how much information you provide?  
b. Are there difficulties in balancing information for different levels of 
understanding?  
c. Are there situations in which you do not disclose the diagnosis to 
the patient? Or are there times where you avoid using the words 
‘dementia’ or ‘Alzheimer’s disease’? 
 
3. Are there ever circumstances when it is appropriate to see the carer 
alone? 
a. Are there situations you can recall where there has been conflict 
in how much patients and carers have wanted to know? 
 
4. Have you received training in how to deliver a diagnosis?  
a. (if discussion about breaking bad news training, then how does do 
you apply this in a memory clinic setting?) If you have worked in 
different services, have you noticed any changes in the way 
diagnoses are delivered? (Or have you noticed a change in this 
over time?)  
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5. Who is the primary recipient of the diagnosis? 
 
6. What do you think about asking permission to discuss the diagnosis with 
the patient and companion? What is your policy on the “do you want to 
know?” question? 
 
7. Often doctors are meeting patients for the first time when they give the 
diagnosis, what are some of the issues that this brings up? And how do 
you manage this? 
 
8. Are there particular diagnoses which are difficult to communicate or 
seem to create confusion? (prompt further with subtypes of dementia, 
and non-dementia diagnoses) 
 
9. Are there any challenges with any particular groups (for example 
different ethnic groups)? 
 
10. How do patients and carers react (emotional reactions)? 
 
11. What is it like to deliver a diagnosis of dementia? 
 
 
Shared decision making: (30 mins) 
 
1. What kinds of decisions are made at diagnostic feedback appointments?  
 
2. Do you feel that patients want to be involved in decisions? 
a. How can you tell if patients want to be involved in decisions?  
b. How do you explore patients’ decision-making preferences?  
3. What are some of the difficulties inherent to facilitating shared decision 
making in the memory clinic? (Can you identify any scenarios where it is 
difficult to include patients in decisions)? 
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4. How does the presence of carers or companions impact on shared 
decision making or patient involvement in decisions? 
 
5. Does it make any difference depending on relationship of the carer to the 
patient (eg: adult child, or elderly spouse)? 
 
6. Specific decisions (if not already covered): 
a. How do you make/approach decisions about Medication/Cognitive 
stimulation therapy or other groups/Driving/Social support/Power 
of attorney? 
b. How? Are any of these issues complicated by ethnic factors? 
c. Are there any other decisions that are made in the feedback 
session? 
 
7. When is the right time to discuss about advanced care planning?  
 
8. How confident do you feel continuing to involve people in decisions when 
they lack capacity? When does this become difficult? (exploring the 
concept of assent). 
 
9. What resources are you aware of that might assist you in involving 
patients and carers in decision making? 
 
Closing questions  
 
10. What kinds of things you would appreciate help or training on in relation 
to feedback appointments or your work in the memory clinic? 
 
11. Have we missed anything? 
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